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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
§ 1.1. Proof in action, according to Kant 
 
The present study is concerned with certain issues turning on how a 
mathematician proves (or demonstrates) a theorem when he proves it. In other 
words, our interest goes to aspects of the procedure or method of mathematical 
proofs, or proofs in mathematics, if you prefer.1 As the subtitle of this thesis 
indicates, we will concentrate on the views of that one great Königsberger 
philosopher: Immanuel Kant.2 But before we definitely state our aim, let us first 
warm up and briefly look at an example. 
 Consider the following well-known theorem from elementary plane 
geometry: 
 
THEOREM 1. The sum of the internal angles of every triangle is equal to two right 
angles.3 
 
In the following striking passage from the Critique of pure reason [94], Kant 
describes in considerable detail how he thinks a (or any) mathematician ideally 
proves this theorem (we present some elucidation shortly): 
 
He [i.e., a mathematician] begins at once to construct a triangle. Since he 
knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent 
angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one side 
of this triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles that together are equal to 
two right ones. Now he divides the external one of these angles by drawing 
a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and sees that there arises 
an external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal one, etc. In such a 
way, through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he 
                                                 
1
 It is not clear whether there is such a distinct kind of thing as mathematical proof, as opposed to 
other kinds of proof. In chapter 3, however, we shall see that Kant believed that mathematical proof 
is indeed a distinct kind of proof. See also § 5.3. 
2
 More precisely, we concentrate attention on Kant in his so-called critical period, that is, the Kant 
of the Critique of pure reason and later works. 
3
 The sum of two right angles is equal to 180°. 
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arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the 
question (A716-7/B744-5).4 
 
In this study, we frequently return to this quotation. Though the proof contained 
in it is not very interesting mathematically speaking, we nevertheless think it 
forms a rich source of insights into Kant’s views. For convenience, we 
henceforth refer to it as The Passage.5 
 Kant says that the first thing a mathematician does in order to prove theorem 
1 is to construct a triangle. In order to fix our thoughts, let us assume that this 
construction produces a triangle as drawn below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsequently, Kant goes on, the geometer extends one side of this triangle. He 
does this in view of his knowledge that the angles that can be drawn at one point 
on a straight line together are equal to two right angles.6 Let us assume that he 
extends side BC to a point D (say), as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 In referring to Kant’s Critique of pure reason, we adopt the customary habit of using the page 
numbering of both the A and B edition. Only references to the Critique of pure reason won’t 
contain a pointer to the relevant item in the list of references at the end of this study. Thus, an 
expression of the form Am/Bn refers to page m of the A edition and page n of the B edition of the 
Critique of pure reason. (In case a page does not occur in the A edition or not in the B edition 
(which occasionally happens), we shall locate that page by way of an expression of the form An or 
Bn respectively.) Quotations from the Critique of pure reason, as well as those from any other 
work of Kant, are all taken from the relevant volume in “The Cambridge edition of the works of 
Immanuel Kant.” (The volume containing the Critique of pure reason has both the page numbering 
of the A and the B edition.) 
5
 In chapter 4 (especially § 4.2), we provide a detailed analysis of The Passage, using insights 
obtained in chapter 3 and the framework presented in § 4.1. 
6
 What Kant evidently has in mind is that these angles are to be drawn at a point on a straight line, 
but all on the same side of that line. 
 B 
 A 
C 
 A 
C D 
 B 
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By extending the side of the triangle as shown in the diagram above, the 
mathematician obtains two adjacent angles, namely, ∠ACB and ∠ACD. He 
concludes that the sum of both these angles is equal to two right angles. 
 Next, he divides the external angle (i.e., ∠ACD) by drawing a line CE (say) 
parallel to the opposite side of the triangle. Assume that he draws this line thus: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, there arises an external adjacent angle, say, ∠ACE.7 The 
mathematician concludes that this angle is equal to an internal opposite angle, 
i.e., ∠BAC. Et cetera. 
 Here Kant’s description of the proof of theorem 1 stops. In order to complete 
the proof, we may nevertheless presume that the mathematician would continue 
as follows. He concludes that there arises a second external adjacent angle, 
∠DCE. The latter is equal to the other internal opposite angle, ∠ABC. Since the 
sum of the two external angles ∠ACE and ∠DCE and the adjacent internal angle 
∠ACB is equal to two right angles, he therefore finally concludes that the sum of 
the internal angles ∠BAC, ∠ABC and ∠ACB is equal two right angles. This is 
what had to be proven. 
 
 
§ 1.2. Aim and scope 
 
The goal of this study is to throw new light on Kant’s views regarding certain 
aspects of the methodology of mathematical proofs, and to reevaluate Kant’s 
views on mathematical proof accordingly (see § 1.3). 
Owing to the complexity of the issues concerned, coupled with limitations of 
space and time, we mainly restrict ourselves to proofs from elementary Euclidean 
geometry.8 Thus, the reader should bear in mind that whenever we speak of 
mathematics and related issues, we always mean mathematics as restricted 
accordingly, unless otherwise stated. In particular, we do not enter into Kant’s 
views on the methodology of proving theorems in algebraically oriented parts of 
                                                 
7
 In fact, two external angles arise. 
8
 Say, the geometry as it is more or less practiced in Euclid’s time-honored Elements [41]. 
 E 
 A 
C D 
 B 
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mathematics (cf., e.g., A717/B745). Our conclusions are accordingly not meant 
to apply there. 
We present two examples of proofs from modern general topology in an 
appendix (these proofs have a strong geometric flavor). Thus, we indicate that 
Kant’s methodological views may very well apply beyond the mathematics of his 
time.9  
 
 
§ 1.3. A question 
 
In regard of The Passage, Kant gives us the impression that he thinks of a 
mathematical proof primarily as a certain cognitive procedure carried out by a 
competent mathematician. Perhaps we may typify the proof Kant describes in 
The Passage as a kind of mental animation. A diagram is being created and is 
subsequently modified for several times (by adding lines). Furthermore, it seems 
that the creation and the successive manipulations of the diagram form the 
primary means for the inferences made. A goal of the proof Kant describes is to 
prove the truth of theorem 1, and hence to get to know that theorem (cf. 
A734/B762). We are interested in a certain aspect or feature of this procedure, 
which we bring to attention by posing a specific question.10 
Reconsider a mathematician proving a theorem as described in The Passage. 
Distinguish between what this mathematician reasons with from what he reasons 
about. Concentrate on the former and not on the latter. In general, a 
mathematician proves his theorems with may be called knowledge (broadly 
understood). Now, those concerned with the study of proof typically split this 
knowledge into distinct “knowledge quanta” or, as we henceforth tend to say, 
items of knowledge.11 A natural question is the following: 
 
what type (or types) of item of knowledge does a mathematician 
employ when he proves a theorem? 
 
We approach Kant’s views on the method of mathematical proof with this 
specific question in mind, and the bulk of this thesis (especially chapters 3-5) can 
                                                 
9
 Compare Friedman [49], pp.xi-xiii, who holds that Kant’s entire philosophy of science, and his 
philosophy of mathematics in particular, was intimately related to the state of the art of science in 
Kant’s time, and must nowadays be considered out of date (see also § 1.4). However, Friedman 
also sees positive value in Kant’s thought. Precisely because Kant was so well acquainted with the 
science of his days, his views would stand as a model for contemporary philosophy (ibid., p.xii). 
10
 Note that our focus on the cognitive dimensions of Kant’s views on mathematical proof finds 
clear motivation in the fact that Kant was above all a transcendentalist philosopher. Accordingly, 
Kant sought to account for knowledge by considering the cognitive procedures an idealized agent 
carries out in consciousness in order to get that knowledge (cf. Posy [127]). 
11
 The product of a proof—i.e., the theorem proved by it—is also an item of knowledge. See § 2.2 
for further discussion. 
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be considered what we think Kant’s extended answer to it would be. We outline 
the considerations leading up to this answer shortly. 
Nowadays, a quite common answer to the above question is that a 
mathematician proves a theorem by employing propositional items of 
knowledge: a mathematician proves a theorem by inferring propositions from 
other propositions by applying logical rules of inference to them. Accordingly, a 
proof can be exhaustively represented or formulated in terms of language 
(sentences). We will refer to this type of reasoning as propositional reasoning, 
thus suggesting a specific view on the structural organization of a proof. 
An answer along these lines is intimately related to views on mathematical 
proof arising from modern logic. What we particularly have in mind is logic as it 
is conceived in the tradition stemming from Frege and the logical empiricists. 
One of the more fundamental presuppositions underlying this tradition is that a 
mathematical proof can be exhaustively formulated in a language. We add that, 
within this tradition, logic is often taken to be in close association with scientific 
methodology. See chapter 2 for further discussion. 
In the past, however, other answers have been given to the question stated 
above. For example, a mathematician may prove a theorem by employing 
concepts, or ideas. Something along these lines can be found in the thought of, 
for example, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Hume, among others. Interestingly, 
up to varying degrees, these authors furthermore manifest a critical attitude with 
respect to the relation between logic (i.e., syllogistic logic) and mathematical 
methodology. In particular, they see little or no value in logic as an instrument 
for proving theorems12 (cf., e.g., Descartes [36], pp.36-7; Leibniz [102], pp.476-
8; Locke [107], pp.669-77). We discuss Locke’s views in § 3.1. Let us now 
briefly turn to Kant. 
To be somewhat more precise, Kant acknowledged two fundamental types of 
items of knowledge: concepts and intuitions.13 The one that plays its distinctive 
(§ 3.3) role in mathematics—and mathematical proof in particular—is, in Kant’s 
view, the intuition.14 With regard to his predecessors, the notion of intuition 
seems to be a novel element of Kant’s thought. It forms one of the central 
elements of Kant’s philosophy as a whole, and is of vital importance for his 
views on the mathematical method of proof. 
Kant characterizes an intuition as an item of knowledge that is (1) immediate 
and (2) singular. It is not readily apparent how these two characteristics are to be 
understood. Given the importance of Kant’s notion of intuition for his philosophy 
                                                 
12
 Indeed, their attitude was critical with respect to the relation between logic and scientific 
methodology in general. 
13
 The proposition (judgment) he considered as a derived item of knowledge: a proposition is built 
from concepts, intuitions, or both. 
14
 Kant’s original German term is Anschauung. In fact, Kant distinguished between several types of 
intuitions, among which are intuitions a posteriori and intuitions a priori. The ones playing their 
distinctive role in mathematics are intuitions a priori (see § 3.2 for further discussion). 
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of mathematics, the issue has caused much debate. We review the most central 
contributions to this discussion, point out the weak spots, and suggest better 
alternatives in their place. See § 3.2. 
Kant, it turns out, holds that an intuition is to a great extent constituted by 
relations in space (and time15). Accordingly, an intuition is an item of knowledge 
organized in space and time. This suggests that an intuition is an item of 
knowledge of a quite specific format. We propose to construe an intuition as a 
diagrammatic item of knowledge (§ 3.4). That said, we can now provide a brief 
sketch leading up to what we think is Kant’s answer to the above question—or so 
we shall argue. Details will be provided mainly in chapters 3-5. 
According to Kant, a mathematician, qua mathematician, essentially proves 
his theorems by way of a distinctly mathematical procedure, or method. This 
method, we will argue, cannot be accounted for by (general) logic alone. For 
Kant, the mathematical method of proof is fundamentally constructive, meaning 
that a mathematician proves a theorem by way of constructing concepts. 
Construction is a feature of a distinctly mathematical method, which, in Kant’s 
view, may be properly called a special logic of mathematics. See § 5.3. 
To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding 
to that concept (§ 3.3). In view of things said earlier, it follows that, according to 
Kant, a mathematician constructs his concepts (e.g., the concept of a triangle, or a 
line) diagrammatically, in terms of intuitions. A careful analysis of The Passage 
(to be carried out in § 4.2) will lead us to conclude that, in Kant’s view, the 
reasoning a mathematician undertakes turns on the spatial relations constitutive 
for an intuition. Consequently, a mathematician employs intuitions when he 
proves a theorem. This provides the answer to the question posed above. 
As a result, note that Kant’s notion of intuition now comes to stand in an 
interesting new16 light. Our approach suggests that it can be typified somewhat as 
follows: an intuition constitutes a specific, i.e., diagrammatic, mode of cognitive 
organization. In the light of this, mathematical reasoning is in Kant’s view a form 
of diagrammatic reasoning17—indeed, essentially so. This, we think, implies that 
Kant does not accept that a proof can be exhaustively represented in terms of a 
language. 
                                                 
15
 We will not consider these temporal relations and mainly consider the spatial relations 
constitutive for an intuition. In Kant’s view, temporal relations play an important part in inferences 
involving continuity. See Friedman [49], chapter 1, and especially pp.71-80, for a discussion. 
16
 We disagree with Hintikka and Beth, who suggest that an intuition comes very close to what 
logicians would nowadays call an individual constant (or singular term). See § 3.2 for further 
discussion. 
17
 Something along these lines was also proposed by Thompson [156], p.100, but for somewhat 
different reasons. According to Thompson, Kant’s point that mathematical proofs are 
demonstrative (i.e., that mathematical proofs show, or make one see the truth of a theorem; cf. 
A735/B763) can be explained by posing that mathematical proof are in Kant’s view diagrammatic 
in nature. However, since Thompson did not pursue his proposal in any detail, it is hard to see what 
it comes down to. 
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§ 1.4. Motivation 
 
Why is it interesting to confront Kant with the question posed in the previous 
section and to undertake an attempt to find out what Kant’s answer to it will be? 
 The question from § 1.3 evidently has historical interest. By trying to find 
out what Kant’s answer to it will be, we isolate an aspect of his views on 
mathematical proof, and increase our understanding of it. Furthermore, and 
perhaps more importantly, we will be thus able to correct a misinterpretation of 
Kant’s views due to Hintikka [72], [73] and Beth [16], [17], [18]. Both Hintikka 
and Beth believe that there is no deep conflict between Kant’s conception of 
proof on the one hand and a modern, logical conception of proof on the other. In 
fact, Hintikka and Beth seem to believe that Kant’s views on mathematical proof 
can be adequately interpreted (or reconstructed) in terms of systems of natural 
deduction (see ibid.).  
 A reading of Kant as advocated by Hintikka and Beth strongly suggests that 
Kant is someone according to which mathematical proof is a form of 
propositional reasoning. Related to this, we would be committed to believe that, 
in Kant’s view, a mathematical proof can be entirely represented in terms of a 
language, which we think is highly problematic. Furthermore, if we follow the 
Hintikka-Beth reading of Kant, an important point is not thematized and 
accordingly swept under the carpet, namely, the relation between the 
mathematical method of proof on the one hand and logic on the other. Hintikka 
and Beth appear to assume without much ado that the method of mathematical 
proof is essentially the method of natural deduction. For Kant, however, the 
relation between logic and the method of mathematical proof is a far from trivial 
issue, and he made a couple of pertinent distinctions on this score. See § 5.3; cf. 
also § 2.3. 
 Intimately related to the previous points, there are clear systematic interests 
too. In contradistinction with a view as expounded by Beth and Hintikka, it is 
sometimes also held that developments in modern logic have made Kant’s views 
on proof obsolete.18 For example, a few paragraphs after quoting The Passage, 
Michael Friedman repudiates Kant’s views on mathematical proof in fairly strong 
language: 
 
Kant’s conception of geometrical proof is of course anathema to us. Spatial 
figures [i.e., diagrams], however produced, are not essential constituents of 
proofs, but, at best, aids […] to the intuitive comprehension of proofs 
(Friedman [49], p.58). 
                                                 
18
 Another reason for downplaying Kant’s views on mathematics (and geometry in particular) turns 
on Kant’s (supposed) views on the geometry of physical space in combination with certain 
developments in physics. In this respect, we can especially mention the rise of theory of general 
relativity at the beginning of the 20th century. Cf. Friedman [49], p.340-1. See also Reichenbach 
[133], especially p.6. 
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On the positive side, Friedman holds that a 
 
[…] proof […] is a purely “formal” or “conceptual” object: ideally a string 
of expressions in a given formal language (ibid.). 
 
In his rather negative assessment19 of Kant’s views on mathematical proof, 
Friedman [49], p.56, follows Russell [137], p.457, [138], p.145. See also Ayer 
[1], pp.110-1, for a statement of a view similar to that of Friedman. 
 As with Hintikka and Beth, Friedman’s conception of proof is evidently one 
taking its orientation from modern logic. However, as suggested, Friedman’s 
evaluation of Kant goes in an almost complete opposite direction. While Beth 
and Hintikka offer room for a vindication of Kant’s views on this score (cf. 
Hintikka [76], pp.174-98), such is not the case with Friedman. According to 
Friedman’s own views, a mathematical proof can be represented exhaustively in 
terms of language. In fact, according to Friedman, a mathematical proof ideally is 
a sequence of sentences. The impression that is thence forced upon us is that, in 
Friedman’s view, mathematical reasoning would be a kind of propositional 
reasoning, namely, reasoning with the propositions expressed by those sentences. 
Friedman’s own views on mathematical proof, furthermore, seem intimately 
related to a methodological conception of (modern) logic (cf. Friedman [49], 
p.58). 
 Besides the fact that Kant would not accept that mathematical proof is a 
form of propositional reasoning (see above), there is no reason to believe that we 
should. Again, we think that we touch here upon a presupposition of a logic-
oriented conception of proof, a presupposition that may be legitimately put into 
question.20 
 We think that on the whole Friedman’s negative assessment of Kant’s 
conception of proof is somewhat exaggerated. More positively, we believe that 
there is, grosso modo, nothing intrinsically wrong with the proof Kant describes 
in The Passage. Quite the contrary, we are strongly inclined to think that Kant 
                                                 
19
 But see also footnote 9. 
20
 Though we do not intend to make Kant a spokesman for modern discussions, his views in this 
respect evidently raise issues that are of contemporary relevance. For example, questions 
concerning the format of knowledge have always been acknowledged to be of fundamental 
importance in disciplines such as cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence (AI). For example, 
one only needs to consider the connectionism debate in cognitive science. Furthermore, a 
knowledge representation system, as it is typically understood within AI, has at least two 
components. First, a knowledge base consisting of a set of “data structures” in terms of which 
knowledge is represented. Second, an associated “inference engine” that allows the system to 
execute inferences over the data structures in the knowledge base. Those concerned with the theory 
and design of knowledge representations systems have considered various ways of storing the 
knowledge in a knowledge base, varying from propositional formats to, for example, semantic nets 
or frames. See also van Benthem, [14], p.10, who stresses that formatting issues are important for 
logic as well; cf. also van Benthem [13], p.292. 
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has in fact given us a very appealing description of a proof of theorem 1 (cf. Beth 
[18], p.45). This, we think, gives Kant’s conception of proof a considerable 
degree of credibility. 
 It thus turns out that the logical conception of proof plays a quite pivotal role 
in modern interpretations and evaluations of Kant’s views on mathematical 
proof. We believe that the Beth-Hintikka reading is incorrect and that Friedman’s 
negative assessment is not entirely justified at the same time. The question “what 
type of items of knowledge does a mathematician view reason with when he 
proves a theorem?” forms one means to pinpoint our dissatisfaction on both 
sides. 
 We look at Kant as someone who has deep and still valuable insights into the 
cognitive and methodological dimensions of mathematical proof, though they 
often need not accord well with modern logical conceptions of proof. Kant’s 
point that a mathematician essentially reasons with intuitions is intimately related 
to this. Accordingly, we think it is incorrect to reject Kant’s views on 
mathematical proof because they do not seem to accord well with a modern 
logical conception of proof, as, for example, Friedman does. In contrast, we 
believe that Kant’s views on proof have to be looked at from a wider perspective. 
For Kant, besides logic, mathematical proof involves elements of a cognitive 
nature as well.21 Thus, what we nowadays call logic and psychology are in Kant’s 
view more tied together than they often appear today.22 Furthermore, in Kant’s 
views, the procedure a mathematician executes when he proves a theorem is not 
just a matter of logic. It crucially involves considerations turning on a distinctly 
mathematical method as well, thus making the relation between logic and 
philosophy of science considerably more complex. 
 
 
§ 1.5. Outline 
 
In outline, our study takes the following form. 
 Chapter 2 discusses the view that a mathematical proof is ideally a logical 
proof, a view that is pivotal in modern interpretations and evaluations of Kant    
(§ 1.4). The subsequent chapters are devoted to our main task: the systematic 
exploration of Kant’s views on the methodology of mathematical proofs. 
                                                 
21
 It is of some interest to note that there is nowadays a growing attention for reasoning with 
diagrams (or diagrammatic reasoning) from cognitive scientists and scholars from the AI 
community. See, for example, the volume edited by Glasgow, Narayanan and Chandrasekaran [58]; 
see also Kulpa [98], including the references found there. Recently, logicians, too, have shown 
interest. See, for example, Shin [145], and Hammer [62]; cf. also the previous footnote; cf. also      
§ 2.1. 
22
 See also § 2.4. Let us add that Kant was not a psychologist. The proof described in The Passage 
forms as much a rational reconstruction as a logical proof is supposed to do (cf. § 2.4): it is a proof 
carried out by some idealized agent. 
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 Chapter 3 discusses the two essential components of Kant’s views on the 
mathematical method of proof:23 his notion of construction and the related notion 
of intuition. 
 In chapter 4, we shall begin by presenting a methodological framework for 
mathematical proofs (§ 4.1). The rest of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed 
analysis of the methodology that we think lies at the background of The Passage. 
In our analysis, we will use insights obtained in chapter 3 and § 4.1. 
 In chapter 5, we readdress a central issue for the philosophy of mathematics, 
namely, Kant’s views on the nature of the synthetic a priori. 
 We close off by stating our conclusions. 
                                                 
23
 For Kant, construction and intuition not only play their role in mathematical proof but within 
mathematical science generally. See § 3.3. 
  
 
Chapter 2 
 
Logical ways: 
proof by natural deduction 
 
 
 
In the present chapter, our attention goes to what we call the logical conception 
of proof.  Generally put, according to the logical conception of proof, a 
mathematical proof is (ideally) a logical proof. In various different though related 
forms, the logical conception of proof was prominent in Frege and Russell, 
among others, who can be reckoned among the founding fathers of modern 
logic.24 Via logical empiricism, it has subsequently found a firmly established 
place in today’s philosophical thinking about mathematical proof (§ 2.1). The 
main purpose of this chapter is to characterize the logical conception of proof and 
to bring out some fundamental assumptions underlying it. 
 Why it is interesting to delve into issues underlying the logical conception of 
proof within the context of a study on Kant? As we have seen (§ 1.4), the logical 
conception of proof has heavily influenced the way Kant has been interpreted and 
evaluated. This forms ample reason to consider it somewhat more closely. 
Accordingly, we can clean up the way for a more adequate reading of Kant as 
well as to repave it in order to obtain a more balanced evaluation of his views on 
mathematical proof; hence, the present chapter. 
 We begin with a general characterization of logical proofs (§ 2.1). Second, 
we bring out an important assumption underlying the logical conception of proof    
(§ 2.2). Third, we distinguish two respective types of logical inference used in 
logical proofs, and discuss an interpretation of The Passage due to Beth which 
has formed the basis for Hintikka’s reading of Kant (§ 2.3). Finally, we critically 
discuss important distinction from the philosophy of science that has motivated 
the logical conception of proof, namely the distinction between “context of 
discovery” and “context of justification” (§ 2.4). 
                                                 
24
 In case of Frege, this conception of proof functioned in the so-called logicist program (with 
respect to arithmetic; see Frege [45], [46]). The logicist program puts certain strict requirements on 
the axioms, definitions, and rules of inference figuring in a logical proof. First, the axioms should 
be logical truths. Second, a definition should define its definiendum in terms of logical definientia. 
Third, the rules of inference should be logical rules of inference. From the point of view of the 
logical conception of proof, we may say that logicism is especially concerned with the logical 
status of axioms and definitions. As regards the logical conception of proof, we shall only be 
concerned with logical rules of inference (and not with the status of axioms and definitions), hence, 
the present chapter sets specific logicist concerns aside. 
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§ 2.1. Logical proofs 
 
Logical proofs characterized. It may be said that one of the aims of logic is to 
define and study consequence relations between sets of sentences and, in many 
cases, individual sentences (cf. Gabbay [52]). Let  be such a relation, and, 
where Γ is a set of sentences and  an individual sentence, let Γ   (read as: 
“ is a consequence of Γ”). In general, a definition of  can be given from the 
point of view of proof theory or from the point of view of model theory. From 
the point of view of proof theory, we say that  is a consequence of Γ if there is a 
logical proof of  from Γ. From the standpoint of model theory, we say that  is 
a consequence of Γ if  is satisfied by every model that satisfies every sentence 
in Γ. We focus on the proof theoretic standpoint, since this is the one most 
relevant for our purposes. In the light of this, we will henceforth say that a 
sentence is provable from a set of sentences instead of being a consequence of it. 
 Given our proof theoretic standpoint, a logical proof is always presented or 
formulated relative to a logical system for short (or a “logic”). 25 A logical system 
is given by “specifying”: 
  
  a language; 
  a collection of rules of inference. 
 
In general, relative to a logical system, a logical proof is presented or formulated 
as a certain finite configuration (e.g., a sequence, or a tree) of sentences. Below 
we will offer a more specific characterization of logical proofs. Let us first settle 
a few preliminary conceptual points. 
 A language is a set of sentences. A sentence, in turn, is a meaningful unit of 
expression. We assume that a sentence is always a declarative sentence. 
Examples of sentences are: 
 
 • two points determine exactly one line; 
 • every finite straight line can be bisected; 
 • the sum of the internal angles of every triangle is equal to two right 
angles. 
 
We mention specific sentences in the usual sloppy way, by putting them in 
italics.26 Occasionally, we mention sentences by putting them between ‘single 
quotes.’ Similar conventions hold for every other expression (e.g., an individual 
constant (singular term), a predicate, etc.). When we refer to a sentence without 
having any specific sentence in mind, we typically use Greek letters such as , 
                                                 
25
 Barwise and Feferman [9] consider logical systems more from the standpoint of model theory. 
26
 Italics will be used for other purposes as well, e.g., in order to emphasize. 
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, etc. Occasionally, we also use letters from the Latin alphabet, e.g., p, q, etc. 
for the same purpose. 
 The above examples are sentences of a natural language, i.e., English. 
However, logicians do typically not consider natural languages but certain 
artificially designed languages instead. With respect to natural language, these 
languages are typically used to exhibit certain logically relevant features of the 
sentences that form the object of logical scrutiny, for example, logical form. For 
instance, in a standard first-order language, the sentence two points determine 
exactly one line can be paraphrased as: 
 
∀x∀y∃z∀u((point(x) ∧ point(y) ∧ line(u, y, x)) ↔ u = z).27 
 
See § 2.2 for a discussion of two of such artificial languages. 
 A rule of inference can be seen as a license to carry out an inferential step, 
i.e., a license to infer one sentence using several others. Consider, for example, 
the well-known (logical) rule of inference known as modus ponens (typically 
figuring in Hilbert-style systems or natural deduction systems—see below). 
According to this rule, one is allowed to infer, for instance, the sentence the sum 
of ABC’s internal angles is equal to two right angles from the two sentences if 
ABC is a triangle, then the sum of its internal angles is equal to two right angles 
and ABC is a triangle (see also § 2.3). 
 Given a rule of inference, we generally say that an inference is carried out in 
accordance with the rule. Alternatively, we sometimes say that a sentence is 
inferred by applying a rule. Note that in both cases, our attention is accordingly 
drawn to an inferential procedure or process. We will return to the procedural 
dimensions of logical inference in § 2.3. 
 Many different types of logical systems have been considered by logicians, 
each of them determinative for a certain “logical proof style.” Let us mention 
some of these systems, without pretending to have given a complete list: 
 
  Hilbert-style systems; 
  natural deduction systems; 
  sequent-style systems; 
  resolution systems; 
  tableaux systems. 
 
For example, a logical proof in a Hilbert-style system is referred to as a Hilbert-
style proof; a logical proof in a natural deduction system is referred to as a 
natural deduction proof, etc. An interesting question is whether any of these 
proof styles can be taken to correspond to the way a mathematician would 
                                                 
27
 line(t, v, w) means “t is a line determined by v and w”; the predicate point speaks for itself. We 
take a sentence  ↔  to abbreviate the sentence ( → ) ∧ ( → ). 
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(ideally) prove a theorem. The answer to this question is often taken to be 
affirmative. For example, Gentzen, who was among the pioneers of the study of 
natural deduction, believed a system of natural deduction “reflect[s] as accurately 
as possible the actual logical reasoning involved in mathematical proofs” 
(Gentzen [56], p.291; cf. Barwise and Hammer [10], p.77). 
 Gentzen’s point is far from obvious, however. In particular, no clear criteria 
for “accurateness” are provided. Furthermore, it may even be said that there is 
plenty of prima facie evidence counting against it. For example, proofs as they 
are written up in mathematics books and journals do not appear to be natural 
deduction proofs. One may point out that these proofs can always be turned into 
natural deduction proofs by filling in the extra steps that are sometimes left out. 
Now it is indeed true that mathematicians often deliberately leave certain steps as 
an almost proverbial “exercise for the reader.” However, it is far from clear 
whether filling in those steps would result in a natural deduction proof in the end. 
On the contrary, it may very well be that a proof merely becomes more long-
winded but no less close to a natural deduction proof, or, for that matter, any 
other type of logical proof (e.g., a Hilbert-style proof). 
 Further, to say that a natural deduction proof accurately (or at least as 
accurately as possible) reflects the procedure carried out in a mathematical 
proof—which is what Gentzen seems to have in mind—turns out to have a 
significant consequence. For according to such a view, natural deduction proofs 
are not merely taken as means to define a purely extensional relation of 
provability. In contrast, they also provide “intensional” information turning on 
the procedures a mathematician carries out when he proves a theorem. Put 
differently, natural deduction proofs are also supposed to reflect a certain 
method, i.e., a method of mathematical proof. As a consequence, systems of 
natural deduction turn out to have clear methodological dimensions too, making 
them suitable as a topic in a chapter of the philosophy of science. 
 The logical conception takes natural deduction proofs—or, more generally, 
systems of natural deduction—in this methodological sense. According to the 
logical conception of proof, a mathematical proof can be formulated or 
represented as a certain configuration of sentences, which accordingly reflects a 
method of proof. We may refer to this method as the method of natural 
deduction. 
 Let us add that not every type of logical system together with its 
accompanying proof style is taken in this sense (cf. Barwise and Hammer [10], 
p.77). For example, in contradistinction with natural deduction systems, Hilbert 
style systems provide a theoretically elegant characterization of provability but it 
appears that such systems fail to reflect the structure of mathematical proofs. A 
similar point holds for sequent-style proofs, which are often invoked for the 
mathematical study of the provability relation itself. Resolution or tableaux style 
proofs, finally, are considered because they have properties making them 
particularly suitable for implementation on a computer. Again, however, such 
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systems fail to reflect adequately the structure of the proofs as given by 
mathematicians. 
 Henceforth, we shall restrict ourselves to systems of natural deduction: a 
logical proof is always natural deduction style, and hence presented relative to a 
system of natural deduction. The reason for this choice should be obvious by 
now. We shall also assume that logical proofs in such systems are presented as 
sequences of sentences.28 We refer to the final sentence of a logical proof (in a 
system of natural deduction) as a theorem. Some of the sentences constituting a 
logical proof are called premises (or axioms—see below). For theoretical 
elegance, we do allow cases where a theorem is a premise. 
 What is distinctive for systems of natural deduction, as opposed to other 
types of systems, is the possible use of assumptions (cf. Prawitz [128], p.23, incl. 
n.1): some of the sentences cited in a logical proof, except for the premises and 
the theorem, are allowed to be assumptions. For the moment, assumptions can be 
seen as auxiliary sentences introduced in the course of a proof (if only 
temporarily) in order to infer other sentences. When a sentence has been inferred 
using assumptions, these assumptions need to be properly accounted for by 
“discharging them.” See § 2.3 for more details. 
 We assume that the language of a system of natural deduction is a first-order 
language.29 It should be added, however, we are not so much interested in first-
order languages per se. The reason for our choice is mainly that it gives us clear 
footholds on the specific types of inferences that are allowed relative to such 
systems. 
 A rule of inference of a system of natural deduction is sometimes called a 
rule of natural deduction. In the present section, it is not important to know what 
the rules of natural deduction precisely are. They are more extensively discussed 
in § 2.3. 
 From the point of view of logic, there is a strict separation between the 
“inferential regime” of a mathematical proof on the one hand and the 
mathematics on the other. The inferential regime is accounted for by a logical 
system: it determines what sentences can be legitimately inferred using others 
and how. However, an inferential regime alone does still not give us 
mathematical proofs. From the standpoint of a logical system, mathematics 
comes in at the axioms. Let us present the following definition. 
 Let  be a logical system (i.e., a system of natural deduction). A theory in  
(or simply a theory) is a subset of the language of . We think of the members a 
theory as representing the axioms of a branch of mathematics. For example, a 
theory in some logical system may represent a set of axioms for Euclidean 
                                                 
28
 Some logicians tend to define a logical proof not as a sequence of sentences but as a tree whose 
nodes are labeled with sentences instead (cf. Prawitz [128], van Dalen [32]). However, this 
difference is not a substantial one but merely concerns two different forms of notation. 
29
 We restrict ourselves to the following logical constants: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → 
(material conditional), ¬ (negation), ∀ (universal quantifier), and ∃ (existential quantifier). 
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geometry.30 The axioms of a logical system do not admit of a proof (in that 
system), except a trivial one-line proof. In the present study, we assume that 
every premise cited in a logical proof is an axiom. See below for a further 
discussion on the nature of axioms. We present the following definition: 
 
DEFINITION 1. Let  be a system of natural deduction and let  be the language 
of . Let Γ be a theory in . A Γ-logical proof in  is a finite sequence of 
sentences of  such that every sentence in the sequence is an axiom in Γ, an 
assumption, or is inferred by means of the application of a rule of natural 
deduction, using earlier sentences in the sequence. 
 
A definition along the lines of definition 1 has found a firmly established place in 
logic textbooks. See, for example, Mates [109], p.113, 166, 180; Barwise and 
Etchemendy [8], pp.48-9; Tidman and Kahane [157], p.42; Bonevac [19], p.107. 
Many more references could be added to this list. 
 As it stands, definition 1 is not fully precise. In particular, it is not clear how 
one should take account of the assumptions, which involve some intricacies. The 
point can only be settled after the rules of natural deduction are specified (§ 2.3). 
 Instead of Γ-logical proof in , we henceforth often simply use logical 
proof, unless confusion is possible. However, whenever we speak of logical 
proofs, the reader should bear in mind that we always presuppose some logical 
system and some theory in that system. 
 Let Π be a logical proof. Without loss of generality, we henceforth assume 
that all the axioms are cited in an initial fragment of Π. Accordingly, where 
1,…, k are the axioms cited in Π, and k + 1,…, n are the remaining sentences, 
Π can be written as 
 
1,…, k, k + 1,…, n. 
 
We say that Π is a logical proof of (the theorem) n from the axioms 1,…, n. 
Alternatively, when Γ is the underlying theory (so that 1,…, n  Γ) we say that 
Π is a logical proof of n from Γ.31 
 Insofar as the sentences constituting a logical proof are concerned, we can 
distinguish between sentences that are inferred and sentences that are not 
inferred. The sentences that are not inferred are precisely the axioms and the 
assumptions. See definition 1. It will turn out that the inferred sentences come in 
two different types: sentences that depend on an assumption and sentences that 
do not depend on an assumption (see § 2.3). The final sentence of a logical proof 
                                                 
30
 We ignore definitions, since, in the present context, these are eliminable. 
31
 If Π is a logical proof of  from Γ then evidently there are 1,…, n  Γ such that Π is a logical 
proof from 1,…, n. 
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is not allowed to depend on an assumption. In effect, then, the sentences possibly 
cited in a logical proof are of four different types: axioms, assumptions, 
sentences dependent on an assumption, and sentences not dependent on an 
assumption. 
 Logical proofs have the following property. Let Π be the following logical 
proof: 
 
1, 2,…, k,…, n. 
 
Suppose k is a sentence not dependent on any assumption (k  n). Then the 
following is also a logical proof, namely, a logical proof of k: 
 
1, 2,…, k. 
 
This property allows us to refer to any sentence of Π that does not depend on any 
assumption also as a theorem. Notice, however, that Π itself is not a logical proof 
of such a sentence but an initial fragment of Π instead. 
 We can now restate an earlier point: as to the sentences cited in a logical 
proof, we can distinguish between four different types, namely (i) axioms, (ii) 
assumptions, (iii) sentences dependent on an assumption, and (iv) theorems. We 
need this in the next section. 
 
Logical proofs, truth, and (propositional) items of knowledge. A logical 
proof, as we have defined it (cf. definition 1 above), is merely a certain sequence 
of sentences. In particular, notions such as truth and knowledge do not figure in 
definition 1. As such, a logical proof is not properly speaking a proof: a logical 
proof on itself does not really prove a theorem. The most a logical proof does is 
to show that a conclusion is provable from several axioms. 
 Now what is a proof? In general, a proof is something that establishes the 
truth of a theorem (cf. also A734-5/B762-3). Once the truth of a theorem has 
been established, then that theorem is known to be true. Note that this is a 
functional description of proof: a proof is characterized in terms of a certain 
function it is supposed to fulfill, namely, to establish the truth of a theorem. 
 Once we have a functional characterization of proof such as the one 
presented above, we can turn to matters pertaining to the implementation of this 
functional description. We can turn to questions such as: what procedure or 
method does one execute in order to establish the truth of a theorem? In order to 
deal with such questions, many parameters that can be set. The values of these 
parameters will be strongly dependent on one another. For example, one such 
parameter turns on the type of item of knowledge employed in a proof, which is 
what interests us here. However, a decision on this point will certainly influence 
the type of inferential procedure used in order to process these items of 
knowledge. 
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 However, one may desire more of a proof than that it merely establishes the 
truth of a theorem (cf. Rav [132]). For example, one may require of a proof that it 
yields a certain insight, perhaps into the reason why a theorem is true. Further, 
one may demand that a proof be based on reusable techniques. Other 
requirements on a proof procedure may turn on the available resources usable in 
order to prove a theorem (e.g., time and memory space). It is far from clear how 
these requirements affect the parameters concerning the implementation of a 
proof. We lay this matter to rest. 
 As will be clear by now, in order for logical proofs to be proofs in the proper 
sense of the word, we have to dress them up in terms of two other notions: truth 
and knowledge. To this we turn shortly. We first settle a few preliminary points. 
 We can make a distinction between sentences on the one hand, and the 
propositions they express on the other. For example, we say that the sentence two 
points determine exactly one line expresses the proposition that two points 
determine exactly one line. The proposition expressed by a sentence is an aspect 
that can be shared by other sentences. For example, the aforementioned English 
sentence expresses the same proposition as the German zwei Punkte stellen 
genau eine Linie. The proposition expressed by both sentences is the proposition 
that two points determine exactly one line. 
 Let  be a sentence and let a be some “agent.” In the present study, we are 
mainly interested in cases where we say things like “a knows that .” 
Knowledge in this sense turns primarily on propositions, and not on the sentences 
used to express them. In particular, when we say “a knows that ,” we mean to 
say that a knows that proposition expressed by the sentence  is true (in some 
sense of ‘true’).32 We may say that the proposition that  forms the object of a’s 
knowledge. If, as a matter of fact, some agent a knows that , then the 
proposition that  is an item of knowledge. When we want to stress the 
propositional format of this item of knowledge, we sometimes refer to it as a 
propositional item of knowledge. (It should not be assumed, however, that all 
items of knowledge are propositional. See § 3.1 and § 3.2; cf. also § 2.2.).  
 Having straightened out these conceptual issues, we shall henceforth not 
always strictly keep track of the distinction between sentence and proposition. It 
is because of this reason that we shall use the terms proposition and sentence 
interchangeably. Our main motivation for blurring the distinction between 
sentence and proposition is that this prevents us from using all kinds of 
cumbersome formulations. For example, we shall say such things as: “the axioms 
are true (or known).” Since axioms, as we have introduced them, are sentences of 
(the language of) a logical system, we should strictly have said: “the propositions 
expressed by the axioms are true (or known to be true).” Furthermore, and 
especially from a more procedural point of view, notions such as proof and 
                                                 
32
 In the light of this, we also assume that it is primarily propositions that admit of truth. 
Derivatively, we say that a sentence is true if the proposition expressed by it is true. 
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inference appear to apply primarily to propositions. Thus, an agent proves that  
is true ( a sentence), and infers the proposition that . However, sometimes we 
will simply say that an agent proves , or that he infers . The reader should 
bear in mind that, strictly speaking, these notions turn on propositions. 
Nevertheless, our formulations, when taken literally, sometime suggest 
otherwise. 
 Let us now dress up logical proofs in order to turn them into proofs in the 
proper sense. We begin by concentrating on matters of truth; next, we turn to 
knowledge.33 
 
1. Truth. We need the following definition. Whenever ∆  {} is a set of 
sentences, we define an argument as a pair (∆, ). An argument is written as       
∆ / . We say that an argument ∆ /  is logically valid (or valid, for short) if, 
necessarily,  is true provided all the sentences in ∆ are true. 
 Note that the definition of validity is not very precise according to logical 
standards. For the concept of validity depends on the semantics of the language 
from which the sentences constituting an argument are given. However, for the 
present purposes, the above definition is good enough. 
 Let  be a logical system and let Γ be a theory in . We assume that the 
axioms in Γ are true (see below). We also assume that the system  is sound 
relative to Γ. By this, we mean the following: whenever a sentence  is provable 
from Γ, then the argument Γ /  is valid. 
 The validity of Γ /  in a way secures that a logical proof of  from Γ 
“carries over” the truth from the axioms to the theorem . Since the axioms are 
also assumed to be true, the soundness of the underlying system secures that  is 
true whenever  is provable. In this respect, soundness can be seen as a kind of 
closure property. In terms of a slogan, we may say that truth is closed under 
provability from true axioms.  
 The following remarks are not strictly necessary for the purposes of this 
study. Nevertheless, they do add to the completeness of our exposition. 
 As to the truth of axioms, we can distinguish between the following two 
views: 
 
(i) an axiom is true with reference to a fixed antecedently given subject-
matter; 
(ii) an axiom determines a class of models such that the axiom is true in any 
model in the class. More generally, a set of axioms determines a class of 
                                                 
33
 For some (e.g., intuitionists) truth and knowledge are much more intimately related than the 
following considerations suggest. 
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models such that, given any model from the class, all the axioms are 
true in that model.34 
 
In the former case, the axioms are supposed to “fit” the subject-matter; in the 
latter case, the various “subject-matters” (in the form of models) are supposed to 
“fit” or satisfy the axioms. 
 A conception of axioms in the former sense seems to be the traditional one. 
For example, it seems that the subject matter of geometry is traditionally taken to 
be physical space and in particular the figures contained in it. A conception of 
axioms in the latter sense seems to be of relatively recent origin. It can be 
attributed to Hilbert. 
 In case of axioms in the sense of Hilbert, we need not to decide whether, for 
example, certain geometrical axioms are true with reference to an antecedently 
given subject matter (e.g., physical space). In contrast, we can consider different 
sets of axioms and accordingly study the models that respectively satisfy them.35 
Each set of axioms determines a “geometry.” Thus, the possibility arises of 
studying a variety of different “geometries” instead of “the one true geometry.” 
 The point can be illustrated by means of the well-known case of the axiom 
of parallels: through any point of the Euclidean plane not on a line 	 there is 
exactly one line that does not intersect 	 (i.e., which is parallel to 	). Instead of 
wondering whether this axiom is true with reference to, say, physical space, one 
takes this axiom for granted, and considers the models satisfying this axiom 
(together with the remaining axioms for Euclidean geometry).36 Alternatively, 
one may also consider the models satisfying a substitute of the axiom of parallels, 
e.g., two lines always intersect, or through any point not on a line 	 there is more 
than one line not intersecting 	. Both these axioms are inconsistent with the 
axiom of parallels, but consistent with the remaining axioms of Euclidean plane 
geometry. Accordingly, these two axioms give rise to two respective types of 
non-Euclidean geometry, namely, elliptic geometry and hyperbolic geometry. 
We conclude that from a mathematical point of view, axioms in the sense of 
Hilbert are clearly preferable, since they serve a more fruitful way of doing 
mathematics.37 
 It is of some interest to add that Kant defines truth in terms of “the 
agreement of cognition with its object” (A58/B82). Thus, Kant appears to think 
                                                 
34
 Within first-order logic, the class of models of a sentence is known as an EC class; the class of 
models of a set of sentences is known as an EC∆ class. 
35
 In order for a set of axioms to have models, it should be consistent. 
36
 It is often and quite simply held that the axiom of parallels is not true with reference to physical 
space, since the geometrical structure of physical space is non-Euclidean. The point obviously 
requires some qualification, however. For the non-Euclidean structure of physical space only 
manifests itself at a very large scale (of light-years). 
37
 This does not mean that axioms in the sense of Hilbert are unproblematic philosophically 
speaking. For example, there are serious questions pertaining to the ontological status of models. 
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of truth in terms of the medieval idea of adequatio. Kant does not, unlike 
Brouwer and his followers, identify the truth of a proposition with its being 
proved. Perhaps we may say that for Kant truth is something more fundamental 
then proof. Proof, in this respect, is a means to an end: again, a proof establishes 
the truth of a theorem. 
 
2. Knowledge. Thus far, axioms are in effect nothing but sentences of the 
language of a logical system. This is not how the term axiom has been typically 
understood. In particular, axioms are often seen as having a specific epistemic 
status. 
 Let  be an axiom of a logical system. We shall assume that  is known, 
that is, it is known that  is true.  Traditionally, it is often supposed that the 
knowledge that  ( an axiom) is true needs no other propositions for its 
justification besides . For example,  may be supposed to be self-evident. A 
proposition is self-evident roughly if one assents to its truth as soon as one 
understands the concepts involved in it. The notion of self-evidence forms a 
classical foundationalist theme. 
 It would seem that axioms in the sense of Hilbert (see above) could not be 
self-evident in this sense. One reason is that self-evidence appears to be an 
absolute notion. However, if an axiom in the sense of Hilbert can be said to be 
known, it is not simply known but only with respect to a given model, or class of 
models. For example, consider the geometrical axiom two points determine 
exactly one line. Thought of as an axiom in the sense of Hilbert, we should for 
example say that this axiom is known to be true in Euclidean space. On the other 
hand, the very same axiom is not true in elliptic or hyperbolic space. By way of 
conclusion, let us state that the justification of axioms in the sense of Hilbert 
presumably has to be analyzed along other than classical foundationalist lines 
(see, for example, Bernays [15]). 
 We furthermore assume that an agent a knows that  is true whenever a has 
logically proved  from a collection of known axioms. As with soundness, the 
latter, too, can be seen as a kind of closure property, but this time with respect to 
knowledge instead of truth. In a slogan: knowledge is closed under proof (not: 
provability) from known axioms. 
 Note the difference between “having logically proved ” and the 
“provability of .” The latter merely refers to the existence of a logical proof of 
. The former, in contrast, also refers to an agent and a certain procedure carried 
out by that agent. In § 2.2, we put this procedure under scrutiny. 
 Recall that besides axioms and theorems, also other types of sentences are 
possibly cited in a proof, namely, assumptions and sentences dependent on 
assumptions. Assumptions are typically not items of knowledge.38 An agent 
                                                 
38
 Though there is no reason of principle not to use a propositional item of knowledge as an 
assumption. 
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typically does not know that an assumption is true. Instead, he merely assumes it 
true. Indeed, an assumption need not even be true. A similar point holds for 
sentences dependent on assumptions. These are likewise typically not known to 
be true. As with assumptions, a sentence dependent on an assumption need not 
even be true. Perhaps we may say that an agent holds such a sentence to be true 
on the condition that an assumption is true. Instead of items of knowledge, we 
may say that assumptions and sentences dependent on assumptions express mere 
propositions. Before we end up this section, let us readdress another issue. 
  
In the first paragraph of this section, we said that a proof satisfies a certain 
functional description, namely, a proof establishes the truth of a theorem. In 
order to turn logical proofs (cf. definition 1 above) into proofs in this sense, some 
dress-work had to be done (in terms of the notions of truth and knowledge). In 
sum, we assumed (cf. above): 
 
 (1) truth is closed under provability; 
 (2) axioms are true and known; 
 (3) knowledge is closed under proof. 
 
Strictly speaking, we now need to verify whether logical proofs dressed up 
accordingly are indeed genuine proofs. In other words, we need to verify whether 
(1)-(3) imply that theorems are known to be true. For the sake of argument, we 
assume that this is indeed the case, i.e., we assume that logical proofs are indeed 
genuine proofs. Accordingly, logical proofs can be seen as a specific way of 
logically implementing the aforementioned functional description. 
 
Logical proofs and philosophy. We think that a conception of proof taking its 
orientation from definition 1 is still the predominant one, especially within more 
philosophical circles. Many appear to believe that a mathematical proof (ideally) 
is a logical proof. See, for example, Friedman, quoted in § 1.3. Others that can be 
mentioned are Steiner [151], Chihara [30], and Bonevac [19], especially p.2. 
Many more names could be added to this list. Among proof theorists, a 
conception of proof along these lines also has at least some currency. See, for 
example, Buss [24]. 
 These considerations suggest that the logical conception of proof is a 
relatively widely accepted within philosophical circles (but see below). The 
following case forms an illustrative example to consider somewhat more closely. 
Although the specific points that the example aims to highlight are not 
particularly relevant for the purposes of the present study, the case clearly shows 
how specifically logical notions color philosophical reflection on mathematical 
proofs. 
 In a recent paper, Don Fallis [43] has pointed out that mathematicians hardly 
ever publish their proofs in full detail. Instead, Fallis goes on, mathematicians 
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often intentionally leave out several more detailed considerations in order to 
make their written proofs not unnecessarily lengthy and thus to communicate 
them more efficiently. True as this may seem, he goes on to articulate this idea 
by saying that a mathematician typically does not lay down “the entire sequence 
of propositions in excruciating detail” (ibid. p.55). Fallis apparently thinks of a 
proof essentially as a sequence of propositions. The difference between a 
published proof and an ideal proof would be that several “chunks” of 
propositions are left out of the former which would be maintained in the latter. At 
any rate, Fallis’ conception of proof no doubt has its roots in modern logic, and a 
definition such as definition 1 in particular. 
 Not everyone within the philosophical community believes that a 
mathematical proof is logical proof. A notable exception is formed by those who 
endorse an intuitionist philosophy of mathematics in the line of Brouwer. It will 
be clear from definition 1 and 2 above that language has a central place in the 
logical conception of proof. However, Brouwer held that mathematical proof is 
essentially a “languageless” mental construction. A mathematical proof has 
essentially nothing to do with language, and neither with logic—or so Brouwer 
thought. Brouwer considered logic to be a kind of language, which had 
fundamentally no place in the process of mathematical proof: 
 
Logic is not a reliable instrument to discover truths and cannot deduce 
truths which would not be accessible in another way as well. […] 
Mathematics rigorously treated from this point of view, and deducing 
theorems exclusively by means of introspective construction, is called 
intuitionistic mathematics (Brouwer [22], p.1243). 
 
The best language can do is to describe certain regularities in mathematical 
construction processes and to form a medium for reasoning about these 
construction processes (Brouwer [23], p.99). However, language does not form 
the medium in which this construction process itself is carried out. Thus, 
language has only a secondary role. Again, according to Brouwer, the 
mathematical construction process itself is essentially languageless. 
 
Logical proofs and diagrams: an overview. Some logicians have stretched up 
the notion of a logical proof in an attempt to accommodate for reasoning with 
diagrams. The strategy is to take the same template for the underlying logical 
system, namely, a language and a collection of rules of inference. This time, 
however, language is understood in a somewhat wider sense. Thus, the language 
of a logical system is not only allowed to include sentences but diagrams as well. 
Let us provide a brief overview of these developments and raise a few issues on 
behalf of them. We won’t go into the details since this would quickly make our 
discussion unnecessarily lengthy; we simply refer the reader to the literature 
instead. 
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 Consider any logical system. If the language of the system only consists of 
sentences, then the system may be called sentential. If the language only consists 
of diagrams, then the system may be called diagrammatic. If the system has 
diagrams as well as sentences among its members, then, borrowing from Barwise 
and Etchemendy [4], [5], [6], the system may be called, heterogeneous (see also 
Barwise [2]).  
 A logical proof in a diagrammatic system is a sequence of diagrams such 
that any diagram in the sequence is a premise or is inferred by means of the 
application of a rule of inference (see Hammer [62], p.45, for an example). A 
logical proof in a heterogeneous system is a sequence of sentences and/or 
diagrams such that any sentence/diagram in the sequence is a premise or is 
inferred by means of the application of a rule of inference. Let us mention a few 
important diagrammatic systems that have been developed and investigated by 
logicians. 
 Shin [145] presents two systems for Venn diagrams (which she calls Venn-I 
and Venn-II). Hammer [62] in part builds on Shin’s work and presents systems 
for Euler diagrams, and Pierce’s alpha graphs, among other things. Venn 
diagrams are originally due to Venn [160]. As noted by Shin [145], p.6, Venn 
intended his diagrams “to be in complete correspondence and harmony with 
Boolean algebra” (cf. Boole [20]). Euler diagrams are due to the Swiss 
mathematician Leonhard Euler, who described them in a series of letters he wrote 
in 1761 (Euler [42]).39 They were mainly designed to the end of developing a 
diagrammatic version of syllogistic logic (cf. Shin [145], p.12). 
 Pierce’s system of alpha graphs forms a diagrammatic version of sentential 
logic: every diagram in this system corresponds to a sentence in the language of 
sentential logic and vice versa. See Hammer [62], for a systematic study of this 
system.40  Pierce himself also designed a system of so-called beta graphs and a 
system of so-called gamma graphs. The former can be considered a 
diagrammatic version of predicate logic, the latter of a kind of modal logic.41 
 Hammer [62], chapter 5, presents and studies a heterogeneous system. The 
language of this system includes Venn diagrams and sentences from first order 
logic. The computerized system  (Barwise and Etchemendy [5]) may 
also be considered a heterogeneous system, as is explicitly done by Barwise and 
Hammer [10], p.88. Note that, strictly speaking,  is not a logical 
system as characterized in § 2.1, since it involves the implementation on a 
computing machine. 
 According to Barwise and Etchemendy: 
 
                                                 
39
 See especially letters no. 102-8. 
40
 But see Lemon  [103], p.215, where doubt is expressed as to whether Pierce’s system of alpha 
graphs may be genuinly called a diagrammatic system. 
41
 Sowa’s well-known work on conceptual graphs (Sowa [150]) is based on Pierce’s system of 
alpha graphs and to some extent on Pierce’s system of beta graphs. 
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The importance of these results is this. They show that there is no 
principled distinction between inference formalisms that use text and those 
that use diagrams. One can have rigorous, logically sound (and complete) 
logical systems based on diagrams (Barwise and Etchemendy [6], p.214). 
 
As indicated by this quotation, the study of proof and reasoning in terms of 
diagrammatic systems such as the ones mentioned above may be called 
conservative in certain respects (cf. Scotto di Luzio [142], p.118). The systems 
that have been developed form an attempt to accommodate for the apparent fact 
that reasoning may involve diagrams. In this respect, they certainly go beyond 
traditional sentential systems. Nevertheless, the techniques employed are entirely 
analogous to those in case of standard sentence-based systems. The members of 
the language are specified recursively, a model-theoretic semantics is provided, 
and hence a consequence relation. Logical proofs are again defined as certain 
sequences of members of the language. Subsequently one can try to prove these 
systems to be sound and complete. The study of diagrammatic and heterogeneous 
systems accordingly comes down doing “logic as usual.” 
 This, however, is not an objection against the study of diagrammatic and 
heterogeneous systems per se. Rather, it puts such systems in what we deem to 
be their proper perspective. Two points may be raised. 
 First, defining proofs involving diagrams in terms of logical systems in a 
way as explained above puts diagrams in the same basket as sentences and 
accordingly treats them exactly alike. Specifically, just as sentences can follow 
from to other sentences, this likewise holds for diagrams. Thus, a diagram can 
follow from other diagrams and/or sentences. Alternatively, a sentence can 
follow from certain diagrams and/or sentences. 
 From a semantic point of view, this presupposes that diagrams have truth-
values just as propositions do. It is accordingly that soundness (and 
completeness) of diagrammatic systems can be defined, and, if possible, proved. 
However, it is highly unnatural to hold that a diagram, as it occurs in a proof, 
should be understood as something that admits of a truth value. For example, it 
would seem somehow inappropriate to attribute a truth-value to, say, a diagram 
of a triangle, or a cube. Winterstein, Bundy, and Jamnik [162], p.194, express the 
point forcefully when they say that a “diagram cannot be true or false […]. We 
therefore do not define soundness in diagrammatic reasoning at all.” 
 However, a qualification is in order. Many of the diagrammatic systems 
considered by logicians are often diagrammatic versions of well-known 
sentential systems (as was mentioned above). More generally, logicians have 
often been inclined to consider only those diagrams that can be quite naturally 
associated with sentences. Perhaps this points to a deeper reason why the 
diagrams considered by logicians are so naturally subjected to the usual logical 
methods. However, it is far from obvious how typical logical methods would 
apply to reasoning with diagrams that do not admit of truth-values. For example, 
it seems hard to see how the usual logical methods would take account of the 
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proof described by Kant in The Passage. Indeed, the creation and modification of 
a diagram (a triangle in this case) and the inferences that are made accordingly 
appear not to accord very well with the usual logical frameworks. 
 A second point is that an account based on diagrammatic systems fails to 
take seriously the spatial aspects of a diagram (Lemon [103], Lemon and Pratt 
[104]). For example, one can use Euler diagrams in order to prove properties of 
various set theoretical relations and operations. However, in doing so, one 
crucially relies on various spatial relations of the curves that make up these 
diagrams. For example, in order to show that the inclusion relation among sets is 
transitive, it is precisely the spatial inclusion relation among the various curves 
exhibiting the set theoretical inclusion relation (see also § 2.3). The transitivity of 
the latter is shown precisely by means of the transitivity of the former. 
Accordingly, the spatial relations that in part constitute a diagram are really 
employed in the course of this type of reasoning. However, this point is swept 
entirely under the carpet by the logical approach to diagrammatic reasoning. For 
under this approach, a Venn diagram receives a set theoretical interpretation in 
the same way as sentences of well-known languages do. Accordingly, the spatial 
relations that in part constitute an Euler diagram are not accounted for. 
 In order to simplify our discussion, we shall henceforth restrict ourselves to 
sentential logical systems. 
 
 
§ 2.2. Propositional reasoning 
 
As regards the logical conception of proof, the reader will have noticed that 
language plays a quite crucial role. According to the logical conception of proof, 
a mathematical proof can be entirely formulated in terms of a language. Here it is 
to be understood that the sentence is the prime linguistic object—a language is a 
set of sentences. This points at a fundamental assumption underlying the logical 
conception of proof. The aim of this section is to articulate this assumption in 
various directions. 
 We proceed as follows. To begin with, we once more turn our attention to 
logical proofs and try to provide a deeper understanding of them. We point out 
that logical proofs can be (and in fact have been) understood in static as well as 
in dynamic ways. Next, we turn our attention to some of the tools used by 
logicians, and make clear how they have helped to shape the logical conception 
of proof. Finally, we turn to a development in logic that does not consider the 
proposition as the fundamental building block of a proof. 
 
Logical proof texts.  According to definition 1 above, a logical proof is a certain 
sequence of sentences. As it stands, a logical proof thus appears to be a static 
type of object, i.e., it is not subject to change through time. A logical proof has 
been more specifically thought of as (a model of) a certain type of text. The 
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notion of text presupposed here is of a rather abstract sort: a text is simply a 
linear configuration of sentences. 
 Different types of texts have been distinguished in the literature, such as, for 
example, narrations and explanations. We may specifically refer to a logical 
proof as a logical proof text. See, for example, van Benthem [12], and Glymour 
[59], pp.14-5 for views along these lines. See also Vermeulen [161], who holds 
that a characteristic of a logical proof text is, among other things, the presence of 
certain inferential relations among the sentences constituting it. 
 It is clear that an important character figuring in logical proof texts is the 
sentence. This point manifests the central place of language within logical 
theorizing. Thus, in a recent edition of an introductory textbook we read on page 
1: “Logic begins with the study of language” (Bonevac [19], p.1). The title of 
Barwise and Etchemendy’s Language, proof and logic [8] clearly suggests and 
intimate connection between logic, language, and—interestingly—proof.42  
Earlier, in 1936, we find the publication of Ayer’s well-known exposition on the 
doctrines of logical empiricism, titled Language, truth and logic [1]. Ayer gives 
us the impression of an intimate connection between logic and language (and 
truth). At the dawn of modern logic (in 1879), Frege’s influential Begriffsschift, a 
formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic, for pure thought [47] was 
published. Considering the title, the logic set out in Begriffsschrift Frege appears 
to see as a certain type of language (a formula-language43), namely, a language 
for pure thought. 
 It may be considered remarkable that logic begins with the study of language 
outright, as for example Bonevac suggests (see above). Wouldn’t we expect that 
logic begins with the study of reasoning and proof? To this end, it may use 
whatever tools are appropriate in a given context. For example, given the 
question whether a given argument is valid, it seems natural to resort, to begin 
with, to an appropriate language in order to characterize the logical form of the 
sentences constituting the argument. However, when we turn our attention to the 
process structure of a proof, then it is far from obvious whether language forms 
the appropriate tool, though the matter may depend on the specific questions one 
seeks to answer. However, we think that also from this procedural point of view, 
the notion of language is, as it where, often built in our conception of proof: 
proof processes are often simply thought to be organized in terms of sentential 
items. Sentences are considered the prime medium in which reasoning takes 
place. Let us consider this issue somewhat more closely. 
 
 
  
                                                 
42
 This title may seem remarkable to some extent. For the software package delivered together with 
this book—we particularly have in mind the program 	
—allow a user to reason not 
only with sentences but also with diagrams. 
43
 Frege’s original German term is Formelsprache. 
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Logical proof procedures. As said in the previous section, logical proof texts 
appear to be static in nature. Upon closer inspection, however, logical proofs can 
be, and often have been, thought of in dynamic terms as well. For example, a 
logical proof can be easily explained in process-oriented terms (as was noted by 
van Benthem [13]). In the light of this, reconsider also the definiens of definition 
1 above, and in particular the phrase “is inferred by means of the application of a 
rule of natural deduction.” This clearly suggests that a certain activity has taken 
place, namely, the application of a rule of inference. Consequently, it appears that 
definition 1 defines a logical proof in part as the product delivered by a certain 
process. This process can be understood as the production of a logical proof text. 
Related to this, logical proofs can be, and in fact have been, understood as 
cognitive procedures as well, namely, as cognitive procedure to the end of 
proving a theorem. 
 Let Π be a logical proof of . Let us think of Π as a logical proof text (cf. 
above). The sentence  is the final sentence of this text. Now, we may imagine 
some agent, a, “interpreting and following” Π. Accordingly, after a has 
interpreted and followed Π, the proposition that  is proved, i.e., its truth is 
established. Hence, a knows that . 
 This suggests us to think of a logical proof somewhat metaphorically as a 
kind of program expressing a certain procedure. In general, a procedure is a 
structured way of doing or acting. In the present context, a procedure is always 
carried out in order to reach a specific goal, namely, to establish the truth of a 
theorem. Let us refer to the procedure expressed by a logical proof as a logical 
proof procedure. 
 A logical proof procedure is a certain way of doing or acting in order to 
prove a theorem, that is, to prove that theorem logically. Bonevac has given us an 
impression of the way a logical proof procedure may proceed:44 
 
A mathematician may begin a proof by stating some assumptions. The 
mathematician then draws out consequences of the assumptions, perhaps 
making other assumptions along the way. Finally, the proof ends with a 
conclusion—the theorem it proves (Bonevac [19], p.2). 
 
Cf. also Barwise and Etchemendy [8], pp.46-7; Frege [48], p.204. 
 In general, we can distinguish between a procedure on the one hand and a 
run of a procedure on the other. The latter we refer to as a process. A process is 
fundamentally characterized by its being in time. A procedure, in contrast, does 
not seem to be temporal, since it primarily concerns the way a process is to be 
carried out. We may say that the procedure provides control over the process: it 
determines what actions are executed and when. In this respect, then, the 
                                                 
44
 Reading premises where Bonevac uses assumptions. 
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procedure structures the process. In line with earlier terminology, we may refer to 
a run of a logical proof procedure as a logical proof process (but see below). 
 The post-condition obtaining after a run of a logical proof procedure is that 
the truth of a theorem is established, i.e., that a theorem is proved. We say that 
the proved theorem forms the product of a logical proof process. Suggestively 
put, we may say that by means of running a logical proof procedure, one 
logically proves a theorem, that, is a logical proof process proves a theorem in a 
logical way. 
It may be wondered, however, how it is that a logical proof can express a 
logical proof procedure, and hence how a logical proof can structure a process 
delivering a theorem as its product. For after all, a logical proof is merely a 
certain sequence of sentences. A mere sequence of sentences does not in any way 
structure a process. There is no “flow of control,” so to speak. In this respect, the 
program metaphor is perhaps somewhat misleading. The interpreter at least needs 
to know which sentences in the proof are axioms, which ones are assumptions, 
and which ones are inferred sentences. Also, he needs to know which sentences 
are used to infer other sentences from.  
 This difficulty can be met by defining the notion of logical proof in a 
somewhat wider sense. To begin with, note that when we normally write down a 
logical proof, we typically add consecutive line numbers to the respective 
sentences constituting that proof. Furthermore, we also typically “flag” the 
sentences in a logical proof with expressions such as ‘axiom IV,’ ‘assumption,’ 
‘I→(3, 6),’ and ‘E∧(5).’ These expressions indicate which sentences in the 
sequence are axioms, which ones are assumptions, and which sentences are 
inferred. Also, it is indicated which sentences are used in order to infer those 
sentences from. For example, we can read ‘E∧(5)’ as “infer this sentence from 
the sentence on line 5 by applying the elimination rule for the conjunction.” As 
such, we may interpret these expressions as inference instructions. To some 
extent, we can attempt to provide control by building the line numbers and the 
inference instructions into a logical proof. The line numbers determine, so to 
speak, the order of execution; the inference instructions determine how to obtain 
a sentence is obtained and what other sentences are used in order to obtain it. 
 Collectively, this leads to a modification of definition 1 from § 2.1, as 
follows: 
 
DEFINITION 1*. A logical proof is a finite sequence of consecutively numbered 
sentences and inference instructions. The inference instructions and line 
numbers are part of the proof. Every sentence in the sequence is an axiom, 
an assumption, or is inferred by means of a rule of natural deduction, using 
earlier sentences in the sequence. 
 
(A similar proposal was made by Isard [83], p.295.) 
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 However, it seems that this still cannot be the whole story. For example, 
what, precisely, should an interpreter do when he is interpreting an axiom, an 
assumption or any other sentence constituting a logical proof text? Given 
standard truth conditional semantics, the interpretation of a sentence yields the 
truth-value of that sentence. If the truth-value of a sentence is true, then that 
sentence is true; if not, not. However, it appears that truth-values on themselves 
do not in any way structure a process. Consequently, it is not clear how a truth-
conditional account enables an interpreter to follow a logical proof procedure. 
Furthermore, this account is obviously problematic in case of assumptions and 
sentences dependent on assumptions. Assumptions, in particular, do not have a 
truth-value; they are merely assumed to have one.45 
 A way out of this difficulty is to interpret the sentences as instructions to act 
in certain ways.46 Recall that any sentence of a logical proof belongs to either one 
of the following categories (cf. § 2.1): 
 
 1. axiom; 
 2. assumption; 
 3. sentence dependent on and assumption; 
 4. theorem. 
 
The axioms and the theorems express propositional items of knowledge. The 
assumptions and sentences dependent on assumptions, in contrast, express mere 
propositions (cf. above). 
 Philosophers have suggested that sentences may be interpreted in terms of 
acts of judgment, e.g., as an act of assenting to the truth of a proposition (cf. 
Dummett [37], p.362, Sundholm [153]; Frege [47] is an earlier defender of such a 
view). We can further this proposal by distinguishing between immediate 
judgments (axioms) and mediate judgments (theorems). Alternatively, one may 
interpret axioms and theorems in terms of a corresponding linguistic act of 
assertion. Assumptions (i.e., sentences flagged with ‘assumption’), furthermore, 
may be interpreted as acts of taking a certain sentence to be true, if only 
temporary. Sentences dependent on an assumption may be taken as acts of 
conditional judgment or assertion, that is, as procedures of judging or asserting 
something to be true on the condition or assertion that some other proposition is 
true (Belnap [11]).47  
                                                 
45
 Accordingly, standard truth-conditional semantics is not appropriate for assumptions and 
sentences dependent on assumptions. See Belnap [11]. 
46
 Such a line of thought motivates much work in dynamic semantics; see van Benthem [13] for a 
discussion and overview of the field; see also Muskens, van Benthem, Visser [113]. 
47
 Sundholm [154] prefers a categorical analysis of judgment and assertion, and accordingly takes a 
different route. 
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 In sum, the main types of procedure carried out in the course of a logical 
proof procedure are acts of judgment, acts of assumption, acts of conditional 
judgment, and acts of inference. 
 After a logical proof procedure has been executed, what is left is the product 
delivered by it, i.e., the proved theorem. The logical proof process itself need not 
exist anymore. Perhaps this is what Hardy and Littlewood had in mind when they 
compared a proof with a “gas”. Their idea seems to be that a proof “evaporates” 
as soon as the theorem is proved (cf. Hardy [63], p.18). However, a logical proof 
process can be “traced” by recording the axioms, assumptions and the other 
propositions that have been used, for example, by writing them down. 
Accordingly, one again obtains a logical proof, but this time understood as a 
logical proof text. As seen accordingly, a logical proof text in some sense 
“fixates” a logical proof process. We may refer to this text as the result of a 
logical proof process. 
 In sum, we have seen that we can think of logical proofs from a more 
dynamic as well as a more static point of view. Despite the fact that these two 
points of view can certainly be distinguished, we do not think that they can be 
separated. Thus, for instance, while a logical proof text is certainly different from 
the logical proof procedure encoded by it, both often manifest a delicate and 
subtle interplay. This is witnessed by the fact that we so easily explain to others 
the result (a text) in terms of a procedure that delivers it (see above). In the other 
direction, during a run of a logical proof procedure, it is often required to check 
whether the product delivered thus far satisfies certain conditions. For example, 
in order for a rule of inference to be correctly applied one often needs to verify 
whether certain conditions obtain. To this end, one often looks back at the static 
presentation of the proof so far, which is often formulated in terms of a text. 
 Taken together, we think that a logical proof—indeed, a proof generally—
has a multiplicity of dimensions. By way of analogy, we may compare a logical 
proof with a vector in a high dimensional space. So conceived, logical proofs 
conceived of as texts and logical proofs conceived of as procedures correspond to 
two different “projections” (or aspects) of the same rather than two separate 
kinds of things. Though static and dynamic aspects of logical proofs can certainly 
be distinguished, it is hard, if not impossible, to split them apart. 
 Something along these lines seems to be suggested by a certain ambiguity 
that can be found in the term proof, and hence logical proof (cf. Sundholm 
[153]). On the one hand, the term may refer to a certain dynamic procedure—
e.g., a logical proof procedure. On the other hand, it may refer to the result of 
such a procedure. The single word proof in a sense unites both the dynamic and 
the static aspects we have pointed out above. 
 As the considerations given above should have made clear, we will not 
succeed in concentrating exclusively on the dynamic dimensions of logical 
proofs. Nevertheless, the reader will notice that in what follows we tend to think 
of logical proofs primarily as logical proof procedures. The reason is closely 
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connected to the fact that in the present study we are primarily interested in the 
cognitive aspects of proofs. Particularly in the present chapter, we want to obtain 
more insight in how a theorem is logically proved. Naturally enough, then, 
procedural considerations will come to the fore. 
 
Language. For several times we have stressed the central place of language in 
the logical conception of proof. Let us brief look somewhat more closely to the 
languages used by logicians. We shall mainly consider the syntax of so-called 
sentential languages and first-order languages. Though other languages have 
been considered by logicians, we can make our points only on the basis of these. 
For our purposes, the syntax of these languages is not very interesting on itself. 
Nevertheless, considering their syntactic specification allows us to put them in an 
interesting perspective. We begin with the syntax of sentential languages. 
 
1. Sentential languages. A sentence of a sentential language can be seen as being 
built from two main types of (syntactically) primitive expression: primitive 
sentences and logical constants. Thus, let P be a set of primitive sentences. 
Specific logical constants often considered are ‘∧’ (conjunction), ‘∨’ 
(disjunction), ‘→’ (material conditional), and ‘¬’ (negation).48 We also add 
parentheses (e.g., ‘(’ and ‘)’) to the primitive expressions. They mainly serve to 
avoid syntactic ambiguity.49 
 From a syntactical point of view, a sentential language  consists of certain 
strings of primitive expressions that we wish to consider as well formed. Thus, 
define an expression as any string of primitive expressions. Let A be a set of 
expressions that satisfies the following two conditions: 
 
 (i) any primitive sentence in P is in A; 
 (ii) if  and  are in A, then ( ∧ ), ( ∨ ),  ( → ), and ¬() are in 
A. 
 
Then the sentential language  is defined as the intersection of all sets A 
satisfying (i) and (ii). As usual, outermost parentheses are often omitted; 
whenever  is a primitive sentence, ¬() is often written as ¬.50  
 As an example, suppose the following primitive sentences are in P: 2 is 
prime, 7 + 5 
 12, 7 is a square number. Then the following are examples of 
other (compound) sentences of : 
 
                                                 
48
 Cf. also footnote 29. 
49
 Representing the syntax of sentences in an alternative way (e.g., by using Polish notation) allows 
one to dispense with parentheses. Also, some logical constants can be defined in terms of others, 
allowing one to dispense with the former. We shall not consider these issues here. 
50
 Thus, it is understood that negation dominates over all other logical constants. 
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 • 2 is prime ∧ 7 + 5 
 12, 
 • ¬7 is a square number, 
 • (7 is a square number ∨ 2 is prime) → 7 + 5 
 12. 
 
2. First-order languages. A first general difference between a first-order 
language and a sentential language is that sentences of a first-order language are 
built from two extra logical constants: ∀ (universal quantifier) and ∃ (existential 
quantifier). 
 A second difference is that, instead of primitive sentences, other types of 
non-logical primitive expressions are considered. These are: relational 
expressions, functional expressions, individual constants and variables. 
 To any relational expression and to every functional expression there 
corresponds an integer  1, called the arity of that relational or functional 
expression. (A relational expression of arity 1 is called a predicate.) The arity of 
a relational expression determines the number of relata that can be associated 
with that expression; the arity of a functional expression determines the number 
of arguments that can be associated with that expression.51 
 We shall not give an official definition of a first-order language here (see, 
for example, Barwise and Etchemendy [8], pp.231-2). Instead, we give the reader 
a feel for what sentences in a first-order language look like by way of a few 
examples. 
 Consider the predicate is prime. Also, consider the following relational 
expressions: 
 (the identity relation), and > (“greater than”), both of arity 2.52 
Furthermore, suppose we are given functional expression + (addition) and ⋅ 
(multiplication), both of arity 2. Finally, suppose that also the individual 
constants 1 (one) and 2 (two), 5 (five), 7 (seven), and 12 (twelve). Then the 
following are examples of sentences of a first-order language: 
 
 • ∀x(x is prime → ∃y( y is prime x  ∧  y > x)), 
 • ∀x∃y(x ⋅  y 
 1  ∧  y ⋅ x  
 1), 
 • 7 + 5 
 12, 
 • 2 is prime. 
 
Let us compare sentential languages with first order languages. 
 To begin with, notice that while sentences such as 2 is prime and 7 + 5 
 12 
are considered as primitive in a sentential language, they are considered 
composite in a first-order language. A similar remark can be made on behalf the 
                                                 
51
 In some presentations, functional expressions of arity 0 are also allowed. Accordingly, constants 
are assimilated under functional expressions, namely, as functional expressions of arity 0 (e.g, 
Monk [110]). 
52
 We do not consider ‘=’ a logical constant. 
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first and the second example. Both sentences are considered primitive from the 
point of view of a sentential language. In contrast, they are considered composite 
from the point of view of a first-order language. 
 A similar point can be made with respect to other types of languages that we 
have not considered in any detail. To illustrate this, consider the sentence (2 is 
prime).53 From the point of view of a sentential language, this sentence is 
considered primitive. Suppose, now, that we consider the  as a logical constant. 
Thus, we arrive at a modal sentential language. From the point of view of this 
language, the aforementioned sentence has two primitive constituents, namely, 
the logical constant  and the (primitive) sentence 2 is prime. 
 Similarly, if we consider the sentence (2 is prime) from the point of view 
of a standard first-order language as considered above, then this sentence has two 
primitive constituents, namely, the constant 2 and the predicate  … is prime 
(arity 1). Again, suppose we now consider  as a logical constant, as we do from 
the point of view of a modal first-order language. Then this sentence has three 
primitive constituents, namely, the logical constant , the constant 2, and the 
relational expression is prime. Let us state our conclusions. 
 In some sense, sentential languages are the main languages among those 
considered by logicians. With respect to sentential languages, other languages 
add more syntactic fine structure at the sentence level (though often in 
incomparable ways). Related to this, sentential logic (or propositional logic) can 
be seen as the “mother logic.” In a way, predicate logic, modal logic and many 
other logics are all sentential logics. We do not mean sentential logics in the 
technical sense, i.e., as a specific type of logical system. The point is that 
sentential logic is a logic of sentences (or a logic of propositions). Accordingly, 
reasoning within sentential logic is reasoning with sentences. Other logical 
systems such as predicate logic, modal logic, and so on, inherit precisely this 
property.54 
 Recall our earlier point that modern logic assumes that mathematical proofs 
are at the fundamental level built from propositional items. Our point now is that 
this assumption is intimately related to the nature of (some of) the tools used by 
logicians in order to study mathematical proofs. In this respect, the most 
important tools we have in mind are languages. There is an intimate relation 
between the structural organization of a logical proof and language (sentences). 
Put differently, the ubiquitous use of languages by logicians betrays a very 
                                                 
53
 To be read as: necessarily, 2 is prime. 
54
 By way of qualification, let us note that one may consider systems based on the sequent calculus 
as taking a short step away from this idea. For in case of the sequent calculus, a proof at the 
fundamental level consists not of just sentences but of sequents. A sequent is an expression of the 
form Γ  ∆, where Γ and ∆ are sets (or sequences, or multisets) of sentences in the usual sense. A 
similar remark applies to systems based on labeled deduction. In that case, the basic unit of a proof 
is not just a sentence but a labeled sentence. A labeled sentence is an expression of the form  : x, 
where  is a sentence in the usual sense and x is a term of a given labeling language. See also the 
next section on term logic. 
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specific view on the structural organization of a mathematical proof. This point 
holds independently of the fact whether one thinks of proof primarily as texts or 
as certain procedures (see above). Consequently, to put into question the 
assumption that mathematical proofs are at the fundamental level built from 
sentences will inevitably lead to a critical consideration of these tools and vice 
versa. 
 The very practice of studying proofs through their representation in a 
language betrays a fundamental assumption determining our conception of what 
a mathematical proof is, and in particular, what the fundamental building blocks 
of a mathematical proof are. Perhaps this is one of the things van Heijenoort had 
in mind when he said that the founding fathers of modern logic—van Heijenoort 
mentions people like Frege and Russell in particular—thought of “logic as a 
language” (cf. van Heijenoort [65]).55 One idea van Heijnenoort tries to point out 
is that according to this conception of logic, reasoning is quite literally reasoning 
within a logical system: proving a theorem, for example, means primarily using 
the axioms, rules, and other sentences of that system in order to prove that 
theorem (cf. ibid., p.326).56 
 Accordingly, language—or, more precisely, sentences—forms the prime 
medium of reasoning. It is precisely this point constituting a fundamental 
assumption underlying the logical conception of proof. In chapter 3 we shall see 
that Kant did not accept this assumption. Accordingly, an interpretation of Kant’s 
views on proof in terms of the logical conception of proof misreads Kant on a 
fundamental point. This, however, is of later concern. 
 
Term logic. It is of interest to notice that even from the standpoint of modern 
logic, scholars have considered alternative formats of the building blocks of 
proof.57 However, it should be admitted that these developments have remained 
somewhat off mainstream. 
 Thus, Fred Sommers, in collaboration with George Englebretsen, has 
developed a logic of terms, or term logic (abbreviated as 	). We shall not enter 
into the details of the system considered by Sommers and Englebretsen. Instead, 
we only highlight a few salient points. The interested reader is referred to 
Sommers and Englebretsen [149] for a much more extensive and detailed 
exposition. 
 Historically speaking, 	 has its roots in Aristotelian syllogistic logic. A 
negative point often brought up against syllogistic logic is its lack of 
expressiveness: within syllogistic logic, one cannot reason with relations—
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 See also Hintikka [78]. 
56
 Let us note that Frege would deny that his logic is a logic of propositions. In contrast, the logical 
system presented in Begriffsschrift [47] is strictly speaking a logic of judgments. Despite this 
qualification, our main point nevertheless remains standing: for Frege, too, the structural 
organization of a proof is intimately related to language (sentences). 
57
 See also § 3.1. 
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relational expressions, that is. The logic of terms is intended to accommodate for 
this lack. In a sense, 	 incorporates first-order logic. However, 	 takes a 
somewhat different orientation towards the internal organization of reasoning 
(see also § 3.1). 
 Let us provide some background. Syllogistic logic can be seen as a logic of 
four types of categorical sentence:58 
 
 (a) all A are B 
 (i) some A are B 
 (e) all A are not B 
 (o) some A are not B. 
  
In case of (a), (i), (e) and (o), A is called the subject term and B is called the 
predicate term. 
 Let us call not, as it occurs in both (e) and (o), a sign of quality. 
Alternatively, not may also occur as a sign of judgment, as in not some A are B. 
The latter may also be written as no A are B, which is closer to common English 
usage (this sentence is equivalent to (e) above). 
 It is easy to see that, for instance, the sentence every boy likes a girl cannot 
be very well expressed within syllogistic logic. The main reason is that the 
sentence involves the relational expression likes, which cannot be accommodated 
for. Within a first-order language, in contrast, this sentence can be paraphrased 
as: 
 
∀x(x is a boy → ∃y(y is a girl ∧ x likes y)). 
 
Using restricted quantifiers, this sentence might be construed as follows: 
 
∀(x : x is a boy)(∃(y : y is a girl) x likes y), 
 
or, employing indices instead of variables: 
 
∀ boy1(∃ girl2 likes12). 
 
Within 	, all (or ∀) is written as ‘−’ and some (or ∃) is written as ‘+.’ 
Furthermore, not (either as sign of quality or sign of judgment) is written as ‘−’ 
and are is written as ‘+.’ 
 Observe that these notations suggest an analogy with arithmetic, which is 
indeed what Sommers and Englebretsen have in mind. Note, however, that both 
‘−’ and ‘+’ are overloaded. While this facilitates reasoning as a kind of algebraic 
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 But see footnote 62. 
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calculation (see below), it also requires certain restrictions, breaking down a full 
analogy with arithmetic. For example, within 	 we have 
 
−(−A + B) = + A + (−B), 
 
but not 
 
−(−A) + B = + A + B.59 
 
The latter runs contrary to properties of the corresponding arithmetic operations 
of addition and subtraction. Let us return to our original discussion. 
 With the help of the notations introduced above, our last example can be 
rewritten as: 
 
–boy1 + (girl2 + likes12). 
 
This algebraic expression is in the “language” of 	. Specifically, the expression 
may be seen as a complex term, built from the primitive terms boy1, girl2 and 
likes12, and the algebraic operations − and +. 
 Now, consider also the sentence every girl owns a dog. Within 	, this 
sentence can be paraphrased as 
 
−girl2 + (owns23 + dog3). 
 
The sentences every boy likes a girl and every girl owns a dog imply every boy 
likes the owner of some dog. Interestingly, within 	, this can be shown by way 
of algebraic calculation: 
 
[−boy1 + (girl2 + likes12)] + [−girl2 + (owns23 + dog3)] 
 
                       =  −boy1 + (likes12 + (owns23 + dog3).60 
 
In view of this example, we can make the following point. 
 Given an appropriate specification of the rules for the operations + and − 
(Sommers and Englebretsen develop these in their book; see ibid.), reasoning 
within 	 generally comes down to a kind of algebraic calculation with terms.61 
                                                 
59
 This may be respectively read as: not all A are B is equivalent with some A are not B, while all 
not A are B is not equivalent with some A are B. 
60
 Because girl in the second premise is universal, it may be assigned any subscript. (Let us 
parenthetically add that the addition of subscripts generally is non-deterministic, and hence this 
may affect the outcome of the calculations.) 
61
 It turns out that 	 in some sense includes propositional logic. For example, the term A + B can 
be shown to behave like the conjunctive “A and B.” It will now be expected (apply DeMorgan’s 
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Thus, in comparison with logics of sentences, 	 involves an interesting shift as 
to the format of the items reasoned with in the logic. From the point of view of 
logics of the former type, reasoning is at the fundamental level seen as reasoning 
with sentences. Reasoning within 	, in contrast, may in general be thought of as 
a kind of reasoning with terms.62 
 It appears, however, that logics such as 	 have thus far not been a very 
influential means to think about mathematical proof. As yet, they have not been 
incorporated within the mainstream. Borrowing from Kuhn, we may say that 
nowadays “logics of sentences” in general still constitute the dominant paradigm. 
 
 
§ 2.3. Two types of logical inference 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that the logical conception of proof 
assumes that sentences form the prime medium of reasoning.63 We argue in 
chapter 3 that Kant did not accept this assumption, a point that will be developed 
in a positive way in chapters 4 and 5. Nevertheless, many people have found that 
the logical conception of proof can be of help in understanding Kant. Hintikka 
forms an important example in this respect (see above; cf. also below). We 
disagree, and for reasons indicated earlier: Kant does not accept that sentences 
are the prime medium of reasoning. 
 Nevertheless, we think there is an element of the logical conception of proof 
that has some similarities with a fundamental notion figuring in Kant’s 
conception of mathematical proof. This notion can be put under the heading of 
construction. The similarity has to be taken with care, however, and we provide 
the necessary qualifications in due course. Though we think that logical proofs 
form in the end an inadequate means to reconstruct Kantian mathematical proofs 
(let us call them), the present section provides a small qualification to this 
standpoint. Thus, the aim of the present section is to bring out a certain 
constructive element of logical proofs. We proceed as follows.  
 Relative to systems of natural deduction, two types of logical inference can 
be distinguished. We respectively call them: simple logical inference and 
annotated logical inference. Both types of logical inference will be successively 
introduced and discussed below. It is annotated logical inference that betrays the 
constructive feature that we wish to bring out. Next, we link our conclusions to 
themes to be raised in chapter 4. 
 
                                                                                                                         
law) that –[(–A) + (–B)] behaves like “A or B,” which indeed turns out to be the case. Furthermore, 
–A + B can be shown to behave like “if A then B.” Thus, in a way, 	 incorporates propositional 
reasoning as well. (Note that ‘+’ now also stands for propositional conjunction.) 
62
 Incidentally, note that from the point of view of 	, syllogistic logic does not appear as a logic of 
categorical propositions but as a logic of terms instead. 
63
 Term logic formed an exception in this respect. 
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Simple logical inference. We begin by briefly considering inference generally. 
Next, we narrow our focus to logical inference, and simple logical inference in 
particular. Terminology will be clarified as we go along. 
 In the present study, we mainly wish to think of inferences in procedural 
terms. Let us provisionally say that an inferential procedure (or an inference for 
short) is a procedure to the end of drawing a conclusion. A run of an inferential 
procedure is called an inferential process. The product of an inferential process is 
what we call a conclusion. We assume that a conclusion is always a 
proposition.64 Instead of “to infer ”, we will alternatively say: “to conclude .” 
 An important characteristic of logical inference is its highly non-local 
nature. This point has also been expressed by saying that logical inference is 
topic neutral (Detlefsen [33]). The latter has been taken to mean, among other 
things, that a logical inference can be made irrespective of the specific subject-
matter one is reasoning about. As an example, consider a logical inference in 
accordance with modus ponens (see also below). It allows us to infer  from  
→  and . The idea now is that one is allowed to carry out this inference no 
matter whether  and  refer to physical objects, mathematical objects, or any 
other type of object. In a sense, the inference is indifferent to its subject-matter. 
 As opposed to logical inference, one may imagine the possibility of a type of 
inference that is more intimately related to the specific subject-matter one is 
reasoning about. In this respect, such a type of inference would be more local in 
nature in comparison with logical inference. For example, Poincaré [123], p.37, 
believed that an inference in accordance with the principle of mathematical 
induction (or complete induction) is such a type of inference. According to the 
principle of mathematical induction, one is allowed to conclude that all natural 
numbers have a certain property P (say) if one knows that (1) 0 has property P 
and (2) for all natural numbers n, n + 1 has P provided that n has it. 
 In Poincaré’s view, an inference in accordance with the principle of 
mathematical induction is a distinctly mathematical type of inference. As such, it 
is intimately related to a specific mathematical subject-matter one is reasoning 
about. More specifically, in Poincaré’s view, we may say that an inference in 
accordance with the principle of mathematical induction is a type of inference 
that is intimately related to reasoning about natural numbers (cf. ibid., pp.37-9). 
Let us return to our original discussion. 
 A simple logical inference is a logical inference such that the conclusion is 
directly drawn from one or more other propositions. A simple logical inference 
can be best seen as an inferential transition from one or more propositions to 
another. The propositions from which the conclusion is drawn are supposed to be 
given. An annotated logical inference is an inference such that a conclusion is 
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 Recall from § 2.1 that logical systems have been designed allowing for inferences where a 
diagram is drawn as a conclusion. (We also said that, in this study, diagrammatic logical systems 
will not be considered.) 
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not dawn from one or more given propositions. In contrast, it is an essential 
characteristic of annotated logical inferences that a certain derivation be 
produced first. A derivation is a sequence of sentences that is in many respects 
like a proof, except for the fact that it does not proceed solely from axioms but 
also from assumptions. How this derivation is to be produced is circumscribed by 
a certain restriction, or “annotation,” and hence annotated logical inference. In a 
way, the conclusion is then drawn from this derivation, or from the production of 
this derivation (see below). 
 A simple logical inference is carried out in accordance with what may call a 
simple rule of inference (or a simple rule of natural deduction). An annotated 
logical inference is carried out in accordance with what we call an annotated rule 
of inference (or an annotated rule of natural deduction). 
 Unless confusion is possible, we shall henceforth omit the adjective ‘logical’ 
and speak in terms of simple and annotated inference respectively. A similar 
point holds for the corresponding rules of inference. Before we illustrate these 
two types of inference, let us first explain why it is so interesting to consider 
them. 
 Simple inferences correspond to what Prawitz calls proper inferences; 
annotated inferences correspond to what Prawitz calls improper inferences. 
Improper inferences (i.e., annotated inferences) are those in accordance with the 
introduction rule for the material conditional, the introduction rule for the 
universal quantifier, and the elimination of the existential quantifier. Proper 
inferences (i.e., simple inferences) are inferences respectively in accordance with 
the introduction or elimination rule for the conjunction, the introduction or 
elimination for the disjunction; the introduction and elimination rule for the 
negation, the elimination rule for the material conditional, the elimination rule for 
the universal quantifier, and the introduction rule for the existential quantifier.65 
(See below for illustration and discussion of the rules mentioned.) 
 Our reason for diverging from Prawitz’ terminology is as follows. The term 
improper inference seems to suggest that improper inferences, in contrast with 
proper inferences, are somehow not “proper” or genuine inferences. However, 
we wish to avoid any suggestion along these lines. In our view, there is no reason 
to consider annotated inferences as somehow “improper.” We think it is more 
fruitful to admit a variety of types of logical inference and to consider them all as 
genuine (or “proper”). Let us now turn to a discussion of simple inferences. 
 Where 1,…, n (n ≥ 1) and  are sentences, we can write a simple (logical) 
inference as a configuration of the following form: 
 
1,…, n 
. 
                                                 
65
 Prawitz uses a different but “equivalent” collection of rules (cf. ibid., p.20). However, our 
division of proper and improper inferences exactly follows his intentions. 
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The sentences 1,…, n are called the premises of the inference;  is called the 
conclusion of the inference. 
 A possible premise of a simple inference is allowed to be an axiom, an 
assumption, a sentence dependent on an assumption, or a theorem. Note, 
however, that the term premise is now overloaded. Indeed, in § 2.1, we referred 
to premises as certain sentences cited in a logical proof (§ 2.1, definition 1). 
Later, however, we referred to these sentences more specifically as axioms (cf.   
§ 2.1, definition 1). Accordingly, the ambiguity noticed is not very harmful. 
 In line with our more general characterization of inference above, we think 
of a configuration as the one above as encoding a certain procedure. Somewhat 
more specifically, we think of such a configuration as encoding a procedure of 
drawing  as a conclusion from 1,…, n together. We may refer to such a 
procedure as a simple inferential procedure. However, we shall often continue to 
speak in terms of simple inferences, except on occasions where we want to stress 
the procedural dimensions of such inferences. A run of a simple inferential 
procedure can be called a simple inferential process. The product delivered by 
such a process is precisely the conclusion drawn. We sometimes say that the 
conclusion is drawn from the premises. 
 In a way, simple inference forms the stereotypical type of inference. A 
simple inferential procedure can be seen as an inferential transition from one or 
more premises to a conclusion. It seems to us that something along these lines is 
what many people mainly have in mind when thinking of inference. However, it 
turns out that inference is much more varied than this, even within the context of 
logical systems. Our distinction between simple inference and annotated 
inference shows this. Furthermore, and seemingly outside the context of well-
known logical systems, still other types of inference can be found (see below; see 
also § 4.2). 
 A logical inference refers to a rule of inference. As said earlier (§ 2.1), a 
logical rule of inference generally can be seen as a license to infer a conclusion 
using other sentences. 
 A rule of inference of a system of natural deduction is called a rule of natural 
deduction (§ 2.1). Every rule of natural deduction is an introduction rule or an 
elimination rule for a specific logical constant.66 An introduction rule can be seen 
as introducing a logical constant in the conclusion (as the principal constant). An 
elimination rule can be seen as eliminating a principal logical constant from one 
of the premises. In this respect, reasoning within a system of natural deduction 
can be seen as a succession of eliminations and introductions of logical constants. 
Accordingly, logical constants play quite literally a pivotal role when it comes to 
reasoning within a system of natural deduction. 
                                                 
66
 This is already clear by now in case of the logical constants ∨, ∧, ∃, and ∀. The introduction 
rules for respectively → and ¬ will be presented in the next section. 
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 Corresponding to the distinction between simple and annotated inferences, 
there are simple and annotated rules of natural deduction respectively. In the 
present section, we only consider simple rules of natural deduction.  
 An example of well-known simple rule of natural deduction is modus ponens 
(we mentioned this rule earlier).67 According to this rule, one is licensed to infer 
a conclusion  from two premises  and  → . An inference in accordance 
with modus ponens can be written as follows: 
 
,  →  
. 
 
The inference written above is not the rule modus ponens. In contrast, it 
represents an inference in accordance with this rule. The difference can be 
marked out by representing rules of inference as inferential schemas, or schemas, 
for short.  Modus ponens itself can be written as the following schema: 
 
A, A → B 
B. 
 
Here, A and B are schematic letters standing in place of sentences. 
 Generally speaking, any simple rule of natural deduction can be represented 
in terms of the following inferential schema (or schema for short): 
 
A1,…, An 
B. 
 
Here, A1,…, An are schematic letters stand in place of the respective premises of 
a simple inference; B is a schematic letter that stands in place of the conclusion 
of that inference. In what follows, however, we are not so much interested in 
inferential schema’s as well as the inferences that are carried out in accordance 
with the rules of natural deduction represented by such schema’s. 
 Another example of a simple rule of natural deduction is known as the 
elimination rule for the universal quantifier. An inference in accordance with this 
rule may be written as follows: 
 
∀x(x) 
(a). 
 
In words: infer that the object a is  given that everything is .68 
                                                 
67
 Also known as the introduction rule for the material conditional. 
68
 Note that , as it occurs in the premise of this inference, is not a sentence but an open sentence, 
i.e., a sentence in which at least one free variable occurs. 
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 Let us mention the remaining simple rules of natural deduction. Consider the 
following inferences: 
 
    ∧           ,           
                         ∧      ∨    
 
 
       ∨ ,  → ,  →          (a)   ¬¬ 
               ∃x(x)      . 
 
The first inference on the first row is in accordance with the elimination rule for 
the conjunction.69 The second inference is in accordance with the introduction 
rule for the conjunction.70 The third inference on the second row is in accordance 
with the introduction rule for the disjunction. The first inference on the second 
row is in accordance with the elimination rule for the disjunction. The second is 
in accordance with the introduction rule for the existential quantifier. Finally, the 
third inference on the second row is in accordance the elimination rule for double 
negations.71 
 
Annotated logical inference. As said, in case of annotated inferences, a 
conclusion is not drawn via an inferential transition from one or more given 
premises. In contrast, it is an essential characteristic of annotated inferences that 
a derivation be produced first. In a way, the conclusion is then drawn from this 
derivation, or from the production of this derivation. In this section, we consider 
the annotated rules of natural deduction. These are: the introduction rule for the 
material conditional, the introduction rule for the universal quantifier, the 
introduction rule for the negation and the elimination rule for the existential 
quantifier. 
 Let us begin by considering the introduction rule for the material 
conditional. Where  and  are sentences, an inference of this type is often 
written as follows (cf., e.g., Prawitz [128], p.20): 
 
 
                                                 
69
 Strictly speaking, there are two elimination rules for the conjunction. According to the rule 
mentioned in the text, one is licensed to “infer to the right conjunct.” According to the other, one is 
licensed to “infer to the left conjunct,” that is, on is licensed to infer  from  ∧ . 
70
 Strictly speaking, there are two introduction rules for the disjunction. According to the rule 
mentioned in the text, one is licensed to “infer a disjunct to the right.” According to the other, one 
is licensed to “infer a disjunct to the left,” that is, on is licensed to infer  ∨  from . 
71
 This rule is not admissible within systems of natural deduction for intuitionistic logic. In contrast, 
it is admissible in systems of natural deduction for classical logic. It is also convenient to have the 
“repetition rule” available (both in an intuitionistic as well as in a classical setting). According to 
this rule, one is licensed to infer  from . We will not consider this rule here. 
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         
 
         
 
         
         → . 
 
 
The idea behind this inference is as follows. In order to infer  →  (say), one 
begins by assuming , that is, the antecedent of the conditional. Subsequently, 
one infers the consequent of the conditional, , from this assumption together 
with the remaining active assumptions (see below) and the axioms cited in the 
proof. 
 However, the above configuration does not characterize the introduction rule 
for the implication completely. There is a restriction circumscribing this rule: one 
is allowed to infer  →  if at this point there are no other active assumptions 
that where introduced after  was assumed. If that is the case, we say that the 
assumption  (including the sentences that have been inferred from it) is 
discharged. (That  has been discharged is indicated by the “hook”.) If an 
assumption has still not been discharged, we call that assumption active. 
 The above inference is not a simple logical inference: it is not an inferential 
transition from one or more premises to the conclusion  → . What else is it 
that this conclusion is drawn from? Prawitz has made an interesting proposal for 
an answer. He suggests us that the “premise” from which  →  is inferred is a 
derivation (see below) of  from the assumption  together with the 
assumptions active at the point  →  is inferred and the axioms cited in the 
proof (cf. Prawitz [128], p.23). 
 A derivation of a sentence  is not a logical proof of . The point is that 
there possibly still are active assumptions on which  depends. This is not 
allowed in case of a logical proof of  (see § 2.1). As such, the truth of  is not 
established. In contrast, it is merely established that  is true on the condition 
that the active assumptions are true, hence derivation. 
 With Prawitz’ proposal in mind, it becomes perhaps more suggestive to 
write the inference we are currently considering as follows (1,…, n are the 
axioms cited in the proof; 1,…, m are the active assumptions at the point  → 
 is inferred: 
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        1 
         
        n 
         
        1 
         
        m 
         
         
         
         
         → . 
 
 
Thus, the idea is that  →  is inferred from the entire derivation 
 
1,…, n,…, 1,…, m,…, ,…,  
 
From the point of view of a system of natural deduction, a derivation is 
something that must be produced from other propositions. In order to produce a 
derivation of  from  one will typically carry out several intermediate 
inferences, yielding several intermediate conclusions along the way. However, 
while it accordingly clear enough where these intermediate conclusions come 
from, the following will perhaps come as unexpected: where does the assumption 
 come from? Thus far, it simply appears to fall out of the sky. 
 As a first shot, one may propose that this assumption is taken from the 
language of the underlying system. However, this would seem to make the very 
possibility of producing a derivation of  from  dependent on available 
resources: what if  is not a sentence of this language? A way out may be to 
suggest that one creates the assumption . However, it seems that we have now 
arrived at the darker realms of modern logic. We lay this matter to rest. 
 The next example of a constructive inference is known as the introduction 
rule for the universal quantifier. According to this rule, one is licensed to infer 
∀x(x) given (a). In other words, one is allowed to infer that everything is  
given that a is . However, the configuration below does not completely 
characterize the introduction rule for the universal quantifier: 
 
(a) 
∀x(x). 
 
assumption 
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Indeed, given that an object a satisfies (x), it does not follow that every object 
satisfies (x).72 
 The point can be remedied by invoking a restriction circumscribing this rule: 
in order to infer ∀x(x) from (a), the constant a must not occur in an axiom, or 
in an active assumption, or the sentence ∀x(x).73 Accordingly, the above 
configuration is circumscribed by this restriction. 
 In a sense, this restriction on possible applications of the introduction rule 
for the universal quantifier secures that a is “arbitrary.” The idea is that, instead 
of a, one might as well have used any other constant. This can be secured if, in 
order to infer ∀x(x), no specific knowledge bearing on a is used at the point one 
infers ∀x(x), except for (a) itself. It is essentially this what the restriction tries 
to capture. 
 Accordingly, it appears that ∀x(x) is not simply inferred from (a), but 
rather from a specific derivation of (a) from axioms and (active) assumptions. 
Again, denoting these axioms as 1,…, n and the assumptions as 1,…, m, we 
can suggestively write the introduction rule for the universal quantifier as 
follows: 
 
 
        1 
         
        n 
         
        1 
         
        m 
         
        (a) 
        ∀x(x). 
 
 
Let us present the remaining annotated rules of inference. 
 The first is the introduction rule for the negation. The idea underlying an 
inference in accordance with this rule is as follows. In order to infer ¬, one 
begins by assuming . If one subsequently succeeds in deriving a contradiction 
 ∧ ¬ (say), then one is licensed to infer ¬.74 Again, there is a restriction 
circumscribing the rule: one is allowed to infer ¬ from a derivation of  ∧ ¬  
                                                 
72
 Provided we assume standard semantics; but see Fine [44]. 
73
 On assumptions, see below. 
74
 A contradiction is any sentence having the same form as  ∧ ¬. 
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from  provided that all the assumptions that where introduced after the 
assumption  was introduced are discharged. 
 This time, too, we may say that it is an essential part of the inference that 
one first produces a derivation of  ∧ ¬ from the assumption , the axioms 
cited in the proof, and the assumptions still active at the point  ∧ ¬ is 
inferred. Using the same notations as above, we may suggestively write an 
application of the introduction rule for the negation as follows: 
 
 
        1 
         
        n 
         
        1 
         
        m 
         
         
         
         ∧ ¬  
        ¬. 
 
 
 
Finally, we have the elimination rule for the existential quantifier. The idea 
underlying an inference in accordance with this rule is as follows. Given is that 
∃x(x). If one succeeds in deriving the sentence (a) →  for some arbitrary 
individual constant a, then one is allowed to conclude . The required 
arbitrariness of a means that the rule is circumscribed by a restriction: the 
constant a must not occur in an axiom, in an assumption that is still active at this 
point, in the sentence ∃x(x) and in . 
 Accordingly, we may again say that  is inferred from a specific derivation 
of (a) →  from ∃x(x), the axioms, and the still active assumptions. Again 
writing these axioms as 1,…, n and the assumptions as 1,…, n, we may 
suggestively write this inference as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assumption 
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        1 
         
        n 
         
        1 
          
        m 
         
        ∃x(x) 
         
        (a) →   
        . 
 
 
 
We have now discussed all the introduction and elimination rules of a system of 
natural deduction for the logical constants →, ∧, ∨, ¬, ∀, and ∃. Let us end up 
this section by focusing on constructive logical inferences from a procedural 
point of view. 
 As an example, reconsider an introduction of the material conditional  → 
. We have said that this conditional is inferred from a derivation of  from , 
the axioms cited, and the assumptions still active at the point  →  is inferred. 
However, from a procedural point of view, it would seem not inappropriate to 
say more specifically that the conditional is inferred from (a run of) a certain 
(derivational) procedure of  from . This gives the inference a strong dynamic 
flavor. Indeed, from a dynamical point of view, it would seem not inappropriate 
to say that the conditional is inferred from a run of a derivational procedure of  
from . Even more so, we may perhaps say that to infer the conditional  →  
in some sense is to infer  from the assumption . For example, Tomassi [158], 
p.58, seems to come close to this idea when he explains the introduction of the 
material conditional as follows: “[…] in general a [material] conditional will 
have been justified if, having assumed the antecedent, the consequent can also be 
shown to hold.”75 A similar point holds for the other annotated inferences. 
 
Motivation. Our motivation for distinguishing between simple and annotated 
inference is twofold. 
                                                 
75
 Gamut [53], p.20, seems to play with a similar idea when he suggests interpreting the material 
conditional as derivability (which, according to a more orthodox conception, should be considered 
to be a meta-systematic notion). 
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 First, it will turn out that a certain feature of annotated inferences is reflected 
in the inferences that, in Kant’s view, the mathematician carries out in The 
Passage—or so we shall argue (§ 4.2). The point turns precisely on the fact that, 
in case of annotated logical inferences, in order for a conclusion to be drawn, it is 
essential that a derivation be produced first. Though a derivation is built from 
propositions, it is itself not a proposition. Now, it will turn out that, in Kant’s 
view, in order for a mathematician to draw a conclusion, it is essential for him 
also to produce (or better: to construct in the sense of Kant; § 3.3) a non-
propositional item. It is precisely here that annotated inferences have some 
similarities with mathematical inferences according to Kant. 
 The point is this: in Kant’s view, mathematical reasoning turns out to be 
mainly a form of non-propositional reasoning (i.e., diagrammatic reasoning). In 
this respect, a Kantian mathematical proof differs from a logical proof. However, 
when carefully considered, certain forms of non-propositional reasoning also turn 
out to be present in logical proofs. (We may refer to this form of non-
propositional logical reasoning as “derivational reasoning.”) 
 However, we should hasten to add that the suggested analogy between 
annotated inferences and mathematical inference according to Kant should not be 
taken too far. In many other respects, the mathematical inferences according to 
Kant are radically different from annotated logical inferences—indeed, from 
logical inferences generally. First, in Kant’s case, the item produced is not a 
derivation but an intuition. An intuition is an item of knowledge that is 
diagrammatic in nature—or so we shall see (§ 3.2, § 3.4).76 In the light of this, 
“derivational reasoning” is something quite difference from “diagrammatic 
reasoning.” In particular, diagrammatic reasoning employs spatial features or 
characteristics of diagrams. However, a derivation is not in the possession of 
spatial characteristics (cf. § 2.1). Hence, these cannot be employed in the case of 
derivational reasoning. Second, we will also see that Kant sees them as distinctly 
mathematical inferences. This gives them an air of “locality” that logical 
inferences (and hence, annotated logical inferences) lack (cf. § 4.2). 
 Second, Beth [16], [17], [18] (especially chapter 4), and Hintikka [72], [73] 
believe that there is no deep conflict between Kant’s views on mathematical 
proof and the logical conception of proof. In their view, a Kantian mathematical 
proof can be adequately characterized in terms of a logical proof relative to a 
system of natural deduction. For example, Beth [18], pp. 47-8, holds that the 
proof described in The Passage accords well a logical proof along the following 
lines:77 
 
 
                                                 
76
 See also Lindsay’s example inference to be discussed at the end of this section. 
77
 Beth [17], pp.19-24, provides a (lengthy) logical proof of the same theorem in full detail. Cf. also 
Beth [16], pp.372-4. 
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  1.  Axioms 
  2.  triangle(ABC)      assumption 
   .   . 
   .   . 
   .   . 
  k.  right_angles(ABC) 
  k + 1. triangle(ABC) → right_angles(ABC) I→(2, k) 
  k + 2. ∀x(triangle(x) → right_angles(x))  I∀(k + 1). 
 
 
Here, Axioms is a sentence abbreviating the conjunction of a suitable collection 
of axioms for Euclidean geometry. Following Beth,78 Hintikka [72], [73] also 
suggests that the proof as described in The Passage can be adequately 
characterized in terms of a logical proof in a system of natural deduction such as 
the one above. 
 The idea is that a mathematician starts with a suitable collection of axioms. 
Subsequently, he assumes that ABC (say) is a triangle (line 2). He then infers, 
using other assumptions along the way, that the sum of ABC’s internal angles is 
equal to two right angles (line k). Now it can be concluded that if ABC is a 
triangle, then the sum of ABC’s internal angles is equal to two right angles (line k 
+ 1). Finally, the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is applied, and it is 
accordingly inferred that everything which is a triangle is such that the sum of its 
internal angles it equal to right angles (line k + 2). 
 Note that Kant opens The Passage with “He [i.e., a mathematician] begins at 
once to construct a triangle.” Beth represents the product of the constructive 
procedure accordingly carried out as an individual constant (i.e., ABC). This 
individual constant, in turn, figures in the context of a sentence, i.e., an 
assumption. It will turn out that Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kant’s notion of 
intuition finds much inspiration on this point of Beth’s (§ 3.2). 
 Both Beth and Hintikka acknowledged certain constructive elements in 
Kantian mathematical proofs. Beth has linked these to the introduction rule for 
the universal quantifier (cf. especially Beth [16], p.365). This is a rule of natural 
deduction that, in our terminology, is an annotated logical inference (see below). 
Hintikka has connected the constructive element in Kantian mathematical proofs 
to those rules of natural deduction that introduce new individuals in the course of 
the proof (cf. Hintikka [76], p.136). This implies that, in Hintikka’s view, the 
constructive elements in Kantian mathematical proofs should be connected to the 
                                                 
78
 Hintikka [73], p.182, n.7, pays dept to Beth’s reading of Kant. 
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elimination rule for the existential quantifier (again, see below).79 Both the 
introduction rule for the universal quantifier considered by Beth and the 
elimination rule for the existential quantifier considered by Hintikka will turn out 
to be rules for carrying out annotated inferences. 
 In contrast with Beth and Hintikka, our considerations suggest that if there is 
any correspondence between Kantian mathematical inferences and logical 
inferences at all, this correspondence turns precisely on the annotated logical 
inferences. The correspondence can be best understood in terms of an analogy: 
both are forms of non-propositional reasoning. However, it will turn out they are 
nevertheless quite different types of non-propositional reasoning: we disagree 
with Beth and Hintikka that a Kantian mathematical proof can on the whole be 
adequately characterized in terms of a logical proof presented in terms of a 
system of natural deduction. 
 
 
§ 2.4. Discovery and justification 
 
With hindsight, we think that the logical conception of proof is to a considerable 
extent motivated by an important distinction from the philosophy of science, 
namely, the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification 
(henceforth often simply referred to as the distinction). In the present section, we 
critically discuss this distinction.80 The issue is of interest since, since, from a 
contemporary perspective, Kant may be said to have rather different views on it. 
In fact, it may be said that Kant to a considerable extent does not accept the 
distinction between discovery and justification. For him, both go often more or 
less hand in hand. This is an important point to realize, since it will influence our 
appreciation of many things Kant has to say to us. 
 We begin this section by introducing the distinction in relation to logic. 
Next, we argue that the distinction is often understood in different though related 
ways, thereby basing ourselves on some useful work done by the philosopher of 
science Paul Hoyingen-Heune [82]. We subsequently argue that context of 
discovery and context of justification are often much closer than proponents of 
the distinction sometimes tend to suggest. Finally, we point out that it is not 
always clear what, precisely, it is that is supposed to be “discovered” within what 
is considered the context of discovery. In this respect, we make some distinctions 
and offer a few examples. 
 
                                                 
79
 It turns out that Hintikka specifically concentrates attention on the elimination rule for the 
existential quantifier. The elimination rule for the existential quantifier does not seem to play an 
explicit role in Hintikka’s considerations. 
80
 Since a couple of decades, the distinction has become to stand under attack by philosophers of 
science. See, for example, Nickles [117]. 
52    LOGICAL WAYS 
  
Logic and the context distinction. The distinction between context of discovery 
and context of justification can be considered as one of the more influential 
contributions of 20th century logical empiricism. In this respect, the distinction is 
often attributed to Reichenbach [134], chapter 1, § 1. Earlier sources might be 
mentioned, however. See for example Frege [47], p.5, Frege [45], pp.3-4. 
Furthermore, Popper [126], p.31, wonders whether the distinction can already be 
found in Kant under the guise of the distinction between quid iuris and quid facti 
(cf. A84/B116).81 See also Hoyningen-Heune [82], pp.502-3, for further 
historical references. 
 Even up to these days, many logicians appear to accept the distinction 
between discovery and justification almost as an article of faith. Thus, without 
spending many words on the issue, we read the following in a recent edition of a 
fairly well-known textbook: 
 
In general, logic does not deal with the context of discovery. The mental 
processes used in thinking of hypotheses or conclusions are of interest to 
the psychologist, not the logician. The logician is interested in reasons that 
are, or might be, presented in support of conclusions. In other words, the 
logician is interested in the context of justification (Tidman and Kahane 
[157], p.15).  
 
(See also Copi [31], pp.4-5; Salmon [141], pp.10-1.) 
 It appears that Tidman and Kahane endorse a very broad conception of logic, 
incorporating propositional logic, predicate logic, epistemic logic, probability 
theory and set theory, among other things. Besides that, their book also contains 
chapters on, for example, the theory of definitions (chapter 10), the theory of 
explanation and the theory of confirmation (chapter 16), the analytic and the 
synthetic (chapter 19), and axiomatics (chapter 20).82 
 In the light of this, the authors manifest a strong tendency to conflate logic 
and scientific methodology (cf. Tidman and Kahane [157], p.249). This may very 
well be considered a characteristic trait of the tradition stemming from the logical 
empiricists. In particular, within this tradition, the methodology of mathematical 
proof is seen as the method of logical proof. As to the logical empiricist tradition, 
views along these lines where defended by, for example, Carnap [26], Hempel 
[66], and Hahn [61]. But surely Frege [46], too, can be taken as an earlier 
precursor of this view. The quote given above shows that this view still has 
currency today. See also § 2.2. 
 
Hoyningen-Heune’s analysis of the distinction. The philosopher of science 
Paul Hoyningen-Heune [82] has pointed out that the distinction between context 
of discovery and context of justification is often understood as a complex of 
                                                 
81
 We shall not attempt to answer Popper’s worry here. 
82
 We simply refer to Tidman and Kahane [157] where the reader can find all the issues addressed. 
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different though related distinctions. Sorting these out has lead Hoyningen-Heune 
to a list of five (see below).83 
 Hoyningen-Heune suggests that the distinction does not simply fall apart 
into five different distinctions. In contrast, what he means to say is that various 
proponents of the distinction have often implicitly understood it as a combination 
of various related distinctions. And not just by mistake, Hoyningen-Heune says, 
but much more as a consequence of certain philosophical presuppositions (cf. 
ibid., p.504). 
 We shall present Hoyningen-Heune’s list below and elucidate the respective 
items that occur in it. Not all of them are equally relevant. Nevertheless, for the 
sake of completeness we present them all. A critical discussion follows 
subsequently. 
 
1. Two types of processes. The distinction between discovery and justification 
might be understood as the distinction between two types of processes. For the 
purposes of the present work, relatively short-time psychological processes are 
especially relevant. 
 Processes of discovery and processes of justification are typically understood 
to be temporally disjoint processes. More precisely, the process of justification is 
often supposed to take place after the process of discovery (see our discussion 
below for examples). 
 
2. Processes of discovery vs. methods of justification. In this second sense, the 
distinction between discovery and justification is understood as the distinction 
between the process of discovery and the methods of justification or the 
reconstruction of that which confers justification. According to Hoyningen-
Heune, in the present sense the distinction between discovery and justification is 
understood as one between the factual and the normative respectively (ibid., 
p.504). 
 Hoyningen-Heune furthermore points out that, when formulated in this 
manner, no distinction is made between methods or reconstructions of 
justification that have been endorsed at some time in the past on the one hand and 
present or “eternal” standards on the other (ibid.). This point is dealt with next. 
 
3. Processes of discovery vs. logic. Understood in this way, the methods of 
justification or the reconstruction of justification is considered the business of 
logic, for example, logic in the modern, post-Fregean era.84 Other methods or 
ways of reconstruction that have been endorsed in the past do not deliver 
justification. What counts as a justification is an eternal affair and is accordingly 
time-independent. 
                                                 
83
 In fact, the distinction has been understood in different ways, or in terms of a combination of 
different ways (see ibid., p.504). 
84
 Hoyningen-Heune evidently endorses a broad conception of logic. 
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4. Logic vs. psychology (and sociology and history). Understood in this way, 
the distinction concerns one between several academic disciplines. On the one 
hand, it would be logic addressing the methods or reconstruction of justification. 
On the other hand, a discipline such as psychology (or sociology, or history) 
would be concerned with matters that one could put under the heading of 
discovery. 
 The relation between logic on the one hand and psychology on the other is 
not symmetric. Thus, psychology can learn from logic what the method of 
justification of, for example, a discovery belonging to the field of psychology is. 
In the other direction, there is nothing to learn for a logician from the findings of 
a psychologist (or a sociologist, or a historian). The correctness or adequacy of a 
method or reconstruction of justification is a matter of logic alone. 
 
5. Types of questions. Hoyningen-Heune points out that the distinction 
between discovery and justification is often introduced by means of 
distinguishing between the types of questions that might be asked about 
discovery and the types of questions that might be asked about justification (see 
Hoyningen-Heune [82], pp.505-6, including the references given there). One the 
one hand, for example, it may be asked how it is that one comes to a certain 
discovery. On the other hand, it may be asked whether the discovery can be 
justified, and if so, how. Subsequently, one frequently turns to distinctions that 
seem to be “implied” (as Hoyningen-Heune puts it) by the distinction between 
these two types of questions. One distinction that may be taken as being implied 
by these two types of questions is the distinction between context of discovery 
and context of justification. 
 
Discussion. Items 1-4 are particularly relevant for us. They are respectively 
discussed below.85 
1. The distinction between discovery and justification understood as a 
distinction between two types of processes can be illustrated by way of cases that 
belong to the folklore of the history of science (cf. Salmon [141], p.11). 
 The first example concerns the famous Indian mathematician Srinivasa 
Ramanujan. Thus, the editors of Ramanujan’s collected papers report that the 
latter was often prompted mathematical theorems by the Goddess of Namakkal 
during his sleep (Ramanujan [131], p.xii). Presumably, Ramanujan’s sudden 
hunches do not count as proofs. Proving the theorem, we may suspect, is 
something that takes place after the divine communication. 
 The second example concerns Henri Poincaré, another and no less famous 
mathematician. In a lecture to the Société de Psychologie in Paris, Poincaré 
reports a well-known case concerning discovery in mathematics (Poincaré [123], 
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 For a discussion concerning item 5, see Hoyningen-Heune [82], pp.511-2. 
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p.387). Poincaré tells us that he once took part in a geological conference. During 
the conference, Poincaré recalls, his mind was occupied with matters completely 
different from those on his day-to-day mathematical work. On one day during the 
conference, a group of participants, including Poincaré himself, went for a bus-
drive. While stepping on the footboard of the bus that would bring the group to 
the place of destination, Poincaré suddenly and seemingly out of the blue saw the 
light on a mathematical problem he had been pondering over for days before the 
conference. He ends his story by telling us that he proved the theorems that his 
discovery led to a few days after this remarkable event.86 
 Wesley Salmon has pointed out, however, that one should realize that such 
cases of discovery in terms of dreams or proverbial “flashes of light,” though 
certainly interesting, are nevertheless often somewhat dramatic and perhaps a-
typical to some extent (Salmon [140]). In any case, these examples do not entitle 
us to conclude that processes of discovery and processes of justification are in 
general temporally disjoint. There are situations where the process that lead one 
to a discovery virtually goes hand in hand with the justification of what is 
discovered accordingly. 
 In order to illustrate this, Salmon draws attention to those cases where one 
comes to know something by executing what he calls a “sound algorithmic 
procedure” (cf. ibid.). Though Salmon does not give any concrete examples, we 
can easily come up with one by ourselves. Thus, consider the simple case where 
one is requested to find (i.e., to come to know) the greatest common divisor of 
two integers. To this end one may apply, for example, Euclid’s algorithm. One’s 
knowledge that the greatest common divisor of the integers given is actually the 
number found by the application Euclid’s algorithm, is intimately related to 
certain characteristics of this algorithm. Among these characteristics is that 
applying the algorithm always does what it is designed for: it delivers the greatest 
common divisor of any pair of integers that is given as input. In a case like this, it 
seems hard to tell apart the process of discovery and the process of justification. 
In a sense, the process of discovery appears virtually identical with process of 
justification. 
2. In the second sense, the discovery/justification dichotomy was understood as 
a distinction between processes of discovery on the one hand and the methods or 
reconstruction of justification on the other. 
 As opposed to this, one might wonder, however, whether and to what extent 
there would be certain methodological aspects connected processes of discovery 
too. Within the philosophy of science this has led to an investigation into “logical 
aspects of discovery” (in a broad sense of logical). While this idea is by no 
means considered unproblematic (cf. Hoyningen-Heune [82], p.507, including 
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 It should be noted that within the context of the present work, this example is strictly speaking 
somewhat beside the mark. For considering Poincaré’s own words, the “discovery” he in fact made 
on this occasion was not a theorem or a proof but a definition. (This was pointed out by Jean-Paul 
van Bendegem.) 
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the references given there), it would nevertheless seem plausible that there are 
several systematic aspects underlying at least a certain restricted class of 
processes of discovery. 
 Related to this, solving mathematical problems evidently involves elements 
of discovery. In the light of this, the mathematician George Polya [124], [125] 
has put such systematic methods to the end of solving mathematical problems 
under the general heading of “plausible reasoning.” For example, Polya points 
out that reasoning by way of analogy or induction (i.e., making certain 
generalizations on behalf of a restricted class of specific cases) may be promising 
when one tries to solve problems in mathematics. 
 However, not only mathematical problem solving involves elements of 
discovery. A similar point holds for problem solving generally. In this respect, 
we should mention the work on problem solving that has been undertaken in 
cognitive science and AI. See, for example, Newell and Simon [116] for 
groundbreaking work in this area. 
3. In the third sense, the distinction between discovery and justification was 
understood as the distinction between processes of discovery and logical methods 
of justification or reconstruction of justification. The difference is that the 
methods of justification, or reconstruction of justification, are now considered 
eternal instead of time-dependent. Nevertheless, the same points can be made 
here, with the only difference that they now apply to eternal standards of 
justification. 
 4. Finally, in the fourth sense, the distinction between discovery and 
justification was understood in terms of a distinction between various academic 
disciplines. In particular, some proponents of the distinction are inclined to think 
that the relation between logic and psychology is asymmetric. The findings of a 
psychologist are not relevant for the logician but not necessarily vice versa. 
 This way of understanding becomes especially relevant when we turn our 
attention to the anti-psychologism, a theme that seems so dominant within the 
tradition of modern logic. 
 Originally, Frege and other anti-psychologists claimed that the method of 
justification is not a matter of psychology (cf. Frege [45], especially the preface). 
Now while Frege certainly seems right here, we must not readily conclude that 
psychological considerations simply are of no relevance for the method of 
justification or the reconstruction thereof. For example, given a certain method of 
proof, considerations of complexity may lead one to conclude that it is practically 
impossible to prove a theorem. Therefore, the conclusion at this point is that 
either justification is impossible to obtain in practice, or that justification is less 
intimately related to proof than is initially suggested. Accordingly, it is not clear 
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that considerations bearing on an agent’s available cognitive resources are 
irrelevant for what the method of justification is.87 
 
Discovery of what? One question we have as yet not considered is what, exactly, 
it is that one discovers when one discovers something. 
 Some seem to have thought that discovery in general concerns the discovery 
of a proposition.88 However, proofs, too, are things that might be discovered. For 
example, how logical proofs might be discovered in a way that can be emulated 
by a computing machine forms an important concern of a branch of AI called 
automated theorem proving (see Gelernter [54] for an early contribution to this 
field; see also Jamnik [85], chapter 1). 
 In the light of this, the following point is especially relevant for the purposes 
of the present study. Considering, for example, The Passage, we notice that even 
a proof itself might involve certain elements that might be put under the heading 
of discovery. Thus, Kant describes a proof as a procedure that involves, among 
other things, the addition of several auxiliary lines to a triangle. The production 
of these auxiliaries and putting them in the right place is of crucial importance for 
the proof. One might reasonably suggest that the production of these auxiliaries 
has certain aspects that pertain to the context discovery. Furthermore, one might 
even propose that the production of the triangle in the earliest stage of the proof 
is an act of discovery (or, as the case may be, invention) to begin with. 
 The upshot of this brief discussion is that if we look at proofs from a 
procedural point of view, then the boundary between discovery and justification 
starts to blur. A proof may itself involve various elements of discovery. 
 
 
§ 2.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have investigated the logical conception of proof. According 
to the logical conception of proof, a mathematical proof is (ideally) a logical 
proof relative to a system of natural deduction. By way of conclusion, let us state 
the following four points. First, according to the logical conception of proof, 
proving a theorem fundamentally takes place by way of propositions. One proves 
a theorem by inferring propositions from other propositions by applying logical 
rules of inference to them. This point is intimately related to the fact that the 
logical conception of proof sees language (sentences) as the prime medium of 
reasoning. Propositions are expressed only by sentences. Second, an important 
philosophical idea lying at the background of the logical conception of proof is 
                                                 
87
 See Rood [135] for a discussion of psychology-related factors that might be relevant for matters 
of justification. 
88
 For example, Hoyningen-Heune clearly suggests some such thing when he without further ado 
speaks in terms of someone having “discovered that p”; Hoyningen-Heune [82], p.508. 
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the close relationship between logic and scientific methodology. In particular, the 
method of mathematical proof is typically taken to be the method of natural 
deduction. Third, and related to this, we argued that the logical conception of 
proof is to a considerable extent motivated by the distinction between context of 
discovery and context of justification. However, we have argued that elements of 
discovery and justification are often subtly and delicately interrelated. Thus, the 
logical conception of proof loses a considerable part of its initial motivation. 
Fourth, upon closer inspection of the rules of natural deduction, we where able to 
distinguish between two types of logical inference: simple logical inference and 
annotated logical inference. In contrast with a simple logical inference, an 
annotated logical inference involves a constructive element of a sort: in order to 
draw a conclusion, one first has to produce (or construct) a certain derivation. We 
have suggested that if it makes sense at all to seek for certain similarities between 
Kant’s views on mathematical proof and the logical conception of proof (and any 
such similarity should be taken with care), it is precisely on this point—that 
construction plays a role in proving a theorem. All the themes raised will return 
in later chapters. 
  
 
Chapter 3 
 
Mathematical ways: Kantian 
construction and intuition 
 
 
 
In the present chapter, we discuss the most central and important elements of 
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, namely, the notion of construction and the 
related notion of intuition. As it turns out, both these elements play a key role in 
Kant’s philosophical underpinning of the method of proof exemplified in The 
Passage (see chapter 4). 
 The outline of this chapter is as follows. We begin by providing some 
background by briefly considering Locke’s views on proof (§ 3.1). Next, in § 3.2, 
we turn to a discussion of Kant’s notion of intuition. In § 3.3, we consider the 
related notion of construction. In § 3.4, we return to Kant’s notion of intuition 
and bring out the diagrammatic structure of intuitions. We end up with stating 
our conclusions (§ 3.5). 
 
 
§ 3.1. Background: Locke on reasoning 
  as reasoning with ideas 
 
In the present section, we discuss Locke’s views on proof. Our aim is to argue (1) 
that for Locke, reasoning is primarily reasoning with ideas, and (2) that, 
according to Locke, logic is not a useful instrument for proving theorems. The 
first point may be taken to challenge the idea that reasoning is propositional. The 
second raises questions concerning the relation between logic and the 
methodology of mathematical proofs. 
 Locke’s views on proof are of interest since they exemplify an interesting 
stepping-stone towards Kant. Locke’s point that a mathematician reasons with 
ideas can be considered as something to which Kant adds interesting and 
important new elements. This will become clear in § 3.2. 
 We begin with considering how, in Locke’s view, a mathematician proves 
theorem 1 from § 1.1. Subsequently, we discuss Locke’s suggestion that this 
proof is to be understood primarily as a succession of ideas. Next, we argue that 
such a succession of ideas can nonetheless be reconstructed as a train of 
syllogisms. Finally, we discuss Locke’s views on the relation between proof and 
logic. 
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 Before we start, we would like to emphasize that we are only interested in 
certain general traits of Locke’s views on proof. We realize that there are many 
details to be desired in what follows. It is not even clear whether Locke’s views 
can be maintained when put under closer scrutiny. However, this is not an issue 
deserving our main interest. Our point is to highlight that certain developments in 
logic are not merely developments towards more richer and expressive logical 
systems (e.g., first-order logic as an improvement of traditional syllogistic logic). 
In many respects, these more formal developments mark fundamental shifts in 
our thinking of what we take a proof to be. Related to this, these developments 
were also accompanied by a change in view concerning the role and place of 
logic in the process of reasoning and proof. 
 One of the functions of the current section is to lead our attention away from 
a conception of proof that exclusively sees the proposition as the fundamental 
unit of cognitive organization. Furthermore, this section forms an interesting 
stepping-stone towards our discussion of Kant’s view of proof (cf. the rest of this 
thesis). It is illuminating to think of Kant’s views on proof as constituting a 
further development of a view as exemplified by Locke. 
 
Proof according to Locke. Recall that in The Passage Kant describes how he 
thinks a mathematician proves that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle 
equals two right angles (§ 1.1, theorem 1). Strikingly, in his Essay concerning 
human understanding (Locke [107]), Locke also gives a description of the way a 
mathematician proves this theorem (clarification will be given shortly): 
 
[…] the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or disagreement in 
bigness, between the three Angles of a Triangle cannot by an immediate 
view and comparing them, do it: Because the three Angles of a Triangle 
cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two 
Angles; […] In this Case the Mind is fain to find out some other Angles, to 
which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; and finding those 
equal to two right ones, comes to know their Equality to two right ones. 
 Those intervening ideas, which serve to shew the Agreement of any two 
others, are called Proofs; and where the Agreement or Disagreement is by 
this means clearly perceived, it is called Demonstration, it being shewn to 
the Understanding, and the Mind made see that it is so (Locke [107], 
p.532). 
 
Locke’s formulations are somewhat odd and confusing. Let us provide some 
clarification. 
 The gist of the quotation above is reasonably clear. In the above quotation, 
Locke considers an agent (“the Mind”) who is willing to know “the Agreement 
or disagreement in bigness, between the three Angles of a Triangle.” In other 
words, what Locke considers is an agent who desires to know what the sum of 
the internal angles of a triangle is. This becomes obvious when we consider the 
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rest of the quotation. What the agent considered by Locke eventually comes to 
know (or proves), of course, is that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is 
equal to two right angles. This is theorem 1 from § 1.1. 
 Interestingly, for Locke, to prove this theorem means to show that a certain 
connection (“agreement”) obtains between two ideas. More specifically, we may 
say that to prove this theorem means to show that the idea of the (sum of the) 
three angles of a triangle and the idea of (the sum of) two right angles in are in 
some sense connected to one another. These exact wordings may not be precisely 
clear from Locke’s own formulations. Nevertheless, we think this come down to 
a reasonable interpretation of what he says.  
 As did Kant in The Passage, Locke, too, describes his proof first of all as a 
certain cognitive procedure. Like Kant, Locke is considering an agent whose goal 
is to prove (and hence to come to know) a theorem. Accordingly, Locke 
orientation towards proof is primarily cognitive in nature. It turns out, however, 
that Locke’s views on the structural organization of a proof process are 
somewhat different from Kant’s. A full appreciation of this point can only be 
achieved at the end of chapter 4. In the meantime, let us first consider Locke’s 
view on the issue somewhat more closely. 
 
Reasoning with ideas. In the quotation cited above, Locke says that an agent 
cannot come to know immediately that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle 
is equal to two right angles. In other words, an agent cannot immediately see that 
a connection obtains between the two ideas mentioned. What Locke subsequently 
suggests is that in order to show this connection, a mathematician attempts to 
find several intervening ideas. “Those intervening ideas,” Locke says, “are called 
Proofs.” Furthermore, when those intervening ideas make the connection 
between two ideas “clearly perceived,” Locke together calls them a 
demonstration. 
 What, in Locke’s view, is precisely an idea? We will not pursue this question 
in any detail, since this would quickly deter our attention away from the main 
purpose of this study (see, e.g, Chappell [29]).89 Instead, let us simply quote 
Locke: 
 
[…] the word Idea […], I think, serves best to understand whatsoever is the 
Object of the Understanding when a man thinks (Locke [107], p.47). 
 
An idea is whatever is the object of the understanding when an agent thinks. 
Connecting with the terminology used in the present work, we may say that, in 
Locke’s view, an idea is an item of knowledge (broadly understood). In order to 
give some examples, Locke says that ideas 
 
                                                 
89
 Locke devotes the entire Book II of his Essay concerning human understanding to a discussion 
of ideas (see ibid.). 
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[…] are those expressed by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, 
Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness, and others […] 
(ibid., p.104). 
 
We henceforth write ideas in courier. For example, the idea of a triangle is 
written as triangle, the idea of a circle is written as circle. 
 In order to facilitate the discussion of the present section, let A abbreviate the 
idea of a triangle (or the idea triangle). Let B abbreviate the idea of being 
such that the sum of the (three) internal angles is equal to two right angles (i.e., 
the idea the sum of the (three) internal angles being 
equal to two right angles). 
 Locke’s point is that, in order to prove that the sum of the internal angles of 
a triangle is equal to two right angles, a mathematician seeks for several ideas 
intervening between A and B. Let us refer to these ideas as C1,…, Cn. We suspect 
that these ideas can be best understood as forming a succession. Accordingly, the 
way they intervene between A and B can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
A  C1    C2    ……    Cn       B. 
 
 
The impression we get is that, in order to prove the aforementioned theorem (and 
similar theorems), one starts with the idea A, makes several successive transitions 
to intermediate ideas Ci, until one arrives at the idea B.90 
 For convenience, we refer to a succession of ideas C1,…, Cn aiming to 
establish a connection between ideas A and B, a Lockean proof with respect to the 
ideas A and B, or a Lockean proof for short. 
 That said, we can now make the following point: compared with a modern 
logic-oriented conception of proof (see chapter 2), Locke has different views as 
to what the fundamental building blocks of a proof are. While modern logic 
thinks that the items of knowledge an agent reasons with are at the fundamental 
level propositional, Locke thinks that they are formatted in terms of ideas. What 
we have before us, then, is a different view on the internal organization of a 
proof. Let us address a final issue that will be of relevance for the next section. 
 Besides ideas, Locke also acknowledges propositional knowledge, which he 
explains as “the perception of the certain agreement, or Disagreement of two 
Ideas (cf. Locke [107], p.685).91 In other words, propositional knowledge is a 
                                                 
90
 See Descartes [36] (especially p.25), for a strikingly similar view. 
91
 To be more precise, Locke distinguishes between two types of propositional knowledge: intuitive 
knowledge and rational knowledge. 
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perception of a relation—a relation of agreement or disagreement—between two 
ideas. For Locke, then, propositional knowledge in some way involves ideas. 
That is why for Locke ideas form the principal type of item of knowledge. With 
respect to ideas, the proposition may be considered an item of knowledge in a 
derived sense. 
 Locke himself no doubt believed that typical propositions are categorical 
propositions. Indeed, this was quite commonly accepted among philosophers in 
Locke’s time. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to conclude that the two ideas 
involved in a proposition are precisely the subject idea and the predicate idea of a 
categorical proposition. In the light of this, a proposition is affirmative when the 
two ideas “agree”; a proposition is negative if the two ideas “disagree.” In order 
to simplify the discussion, we henceforth only consider affirmative propositions. 
When two ideas are “made to agree,” then we think of this as if an operation is 
applied to them. We write this operation as is (in italics). A (affirmative) 
proposition with subject idea S and predicate idea P is written as S is P.92 
 Accordingly, given the notations introduced earlier, the proposition that the 
sum of the internal angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles can be written 
as A is B. The Lockean proof C1,…, Cn described above is a proof of the theorem 
A is B. What we see, then, is that in general, a Lockean proof connects the subject 
idea and the predicate idea of a categorical proposition. Perhaps we may say that 
a Lockean proof shows these two ideas to agree. 
 
Syllogistic reconstruction of Lockean proofs. A Lockean proof can be easily 
reconstructed as a series of syllogisms. Let us see how such a reconstruction 
might go. 
 Recall that A stood as an abbreviation for the idea of a triangle; B stood as an 
abbreviation for the idea of the sum of the (three) internal angles being equal to 
two right angles. Conceived of as a categorical proposition, both the ideas A and 
B are respectively associated with the subject term and the predicate term of 
theorem 1 from § 1.1. For convenience, let us consider theorem 1 again: 
                                                                                                                         
Intuitive knowledge, is the perception of the certain Agreement, or Disagreement of 
two Ideas immediately compared together. Rational knowledge, is the perception of 
the certain Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas, by the intervention of 
one or more other Ideas (Locke [107], p.685). 
 
 (Besides that, Locke also acknowledges judgment, which he thinks of as a kind of probable belief; 
cf. ibid.) Note that, in Locke’s view, rational propositional knowledge and proof are two very 
closely related notions. Insofar as our purposes are concerned, Locke’s notion of intuitive 
knowledge is different from Kant’s notion of intuition. From the point of view adopted in the 
present study, they differ in that Locke’s intuitive knowledge is primarily a form of propositional 
knowledge, while Kant’s intuitions are primarily non-propositional items of knowledge. See the 
rest of this chapter for more details on Kant’s notion of intuition. 
92
 In order to make the discussion not unnecessarily complicated, we ignore the quantity of 
categorical propositions. 
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The sum of the internal angles of every triangle equals two right angles. 
 
In order to make the aforementioned categorical structure of this proposition 
more vivid, let us rewrite it as follows: 
 
Every triangle is such that the sum of its internal angles is equal to 
two right angles. 
 
Conceived of as an item of propositional knowledge, let us write this theorem as 
A is B. 
 A train of ideas as depicted in the diagram above can be reconstructed as a 
series of syllogisms, as follows. When the mathematician has made a transition 
from the idea A to the idea C1, we may say that he has proved the proposition A is 
C1. When the mathematician has made a transition from C1 to C2, we may say that 
he has established the proposition C1 is C2. The proposition A is C2 can now be 
inferred. 
 Taken together, we can say that the idea C2 corresponds to the “middle term” 
of the following syllogism: 
 
A is C1 
 C1 is C2 
A is C2 
 
(cf. also Locke [107], pp.673-5). 
 Collectively, we can reconstruct the following series of syllogisms from the 
original proof (i.e., the original succession of ideas C1,…, Cn):  
 
          A is C1 
         C1 is C2 
 
 
 
 
 
We call the above series of syllogisms the series of syllogisms associated with 
the (original) Lockean proof C1,…, Cn (of the proposition A is B). What we have 
shown is how, in general, an associated series of syllogisms can be reconstructed 
from any Lockean proof. 
 Given the close connection between a Lockean proof and an associated 
series of syllogisms, it would seem that for Locke, reasoning could also be seen 
A is C2 
C2 is C3 
 A is C3 
   … 
→ → 
  A is Cn 
 Cn is B 
→ A is B. …    →
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as reasoning with propositions.93 However, reasoning is reasoning with 
propositions only in a derivative sense: one first needs to reconstruct an original 
proof as a series of syllogisms. This is why we said that for Locke, reasoning is 
primarily reasoning with ideas. 
 Note that important logical notions such as validity and soundness (cf. § 2.1) 
can be straightforwardly applied to the above series of syllogisms. In fact, both 
notions apply without problems to any inferential step that can be discerned in 
this series of syllogisms.94 However, the point does not hold in case of the 
original Lockean proof this series of syllogisms aims to reconstruct. As regards 
this Lockean proof, both validity and soundness cannot be naturally discerned, 
and distinguished from one another. The main cause of this is that the items of 
knowledge reasoned with are ideas. Truth, a central notion figuring in the 
respective definitions of validity and soundness, does not seem to apply naturally 
to ideas. Thus, it would seem that a Lockean proof is not simply suitable for 
logical study. In particular, in order to apply logical notions such as validity and 
soundness, the original Lockean proof needs to be logically reconstructed first. 
But perhaps a qualification is in order here. 
 In case of the above series of syllogisms, one may say that the theorem A is 
B is inferred by means of a series of valid inferential steps. On top of that, the 
truth of this proposition will be secured by the soundness of the inferential steps. 
However, in case of the original Lockean proof, every step undertaken is a 
transition from one idea to another. Starting with the idea A, a transition from one 
idea (possibly A itself) to a subsequent idea P (say) evidently secures the truth of 
the proposition A is P (P  {C1,…, Cn, B}). Accordingly, due to the specific 
structure of the procedure, such a transition can be seen as being in some sense 
an inferential step that is valid and sound at once. Therefore, insofar as validity 
and soundness do apply to Lockean proofs, they go firmly hand in hand. 
 
Lockean proofs and Syllogistic logic. For Locke, an important part of proving a 
proposition A is B consists in finding intermediate ideas C1,…, Cn that establish 
the relevant connection between the ideas A and B. Note that this means that, in 
Locke’s view, a proof is permeated by elements of discovery (cf. Locke [107], 
p.532). Thus, Locke’s view on proof brings with it almost a complete a blurring 
of the boundary between context of discovery and context of justification (§ 2.3). 
 Locke holds that to the end of proving a theorem, a reconstruction in terms 
of syllogistic logic is of no use (cf. Locke [107], pp.672-3.). To find intermediate 
ideas C1,…, Cn means to find the respective middle terms C1,…, Cn of the series 
                                                 
93
 The assumption is that syllogistic logic is indeed a logic of propositions. This assumption may 
gain some plausibility if one is inclined to think as syllogistic logic in terms of a fragment of 
monadic first-order logic. But see also footnote 62. 
94
 Strictly speaking, the notions of validity and soundness apply to arguments. However, in the 
present case, it is obvious how they also apply to inferential steps. 
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of syllogisms associated with the original proof. However, the very possibility of 
a syllogistic reconstruction presupposes that one already has those middle terms. 
 Locke typifies logic in rather negative terms. More specifically, for Locke a 
series of syllogisms associated to a Lockean proof in terms of “perplexed 
Repetitions” and a “Jumble” of syllogisms. Furthermore, Locke suggests that the 
original Lockean proof reveals much more clearly the connection between two 
relevant ideas than when this proof is “transposed and repeated, and spun out to a 
greater length in artificial Forms” (Locke [107], p.673). 
 As a result, Locke holds that syllogistic logic is not the “proper instrument of 
reason” (cf. ibid., p.670). In the light of the foregoing considerations, we think 
that this might be interpreted as follows: syllogistic logic does not deliver the 
means for finding the intervening ideas that are so crucial for proving a theorem. 
Thus, when it comes to proof, logic does not seem to play a very significant role. 
Very likely, this is intimately related to the fact that Locke was mainly interested 
in those aspects of proofs that concern their discovery. 
 We shall not enter into the question what, according to Locke, the proper 
instrument for proving theorems is. We suffice to note that Locke seems to 
associate it with a certain mental power (as we may call it) he refers to as 
“sagacity”: 
 
A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate Ideas [i.e., proofs], 
(that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other,) and to 
apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called Sagacity (Locke [107], 
p.532). 
 
 
Concluding remarks. In the present section, we have made the following two 
main points. First, in Locke’s view, reasoning is primarily reasoning with certain 
non-propositional items of knowledge, viz. ideas. This conclusion is not harmed 
by the fact that a Lockean proof can be reconstructed as a series of syllogisms. 
For the latter shows that, in Locke’s view, reasoning is propositional reasoning 
only in a derivative or secondary sense. Second, Locke does not think that logic 
is instrumental for proving theorems. This raises questions concerning the 
relations between logic and the methodology of proofs. 
 Though the points raised in the present section may be interesting and 
relevant, we are left with the impression that Locke’s views on proof are 
intimately related to traditional syllogistic logic in many respects. This is 
particularly because a Lockean proof is so easily reconstructed as a series of 
syllogisms. In the light of this, it seems hard to see, for example, how Locke 
would account of the fact that a proof typically involves reasoning with relations 
(e.g., a relation such as IS PARALLEL WITH). This is no doubt because from the 
standpoint of modern first-order logic, syllogistic logic is a system of monadic 
first-order logic. This system does not allow for reasoning with relations. 
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 However, we believe that this does not form a good reason to dismiss 
Locke’s views on proof in their entirety. The points raised in this section stand to 
some extent independent of matters concerning the expressiveness of syllogistic 
logic with respect to systems of modern logic. First, to say that reasoning is 
primarily propositional reasoning is something that now turns out less obvious 
than it may have seemed to those trained in modern logic. An argument on this 
score cannot be provided simply by pointing to logical systems in the modern 
tradition and the advantages they have in terms of expressiveness. For these 
systems presuppose that reasoning is propositional reasoning. Second, Locke 
opens up questions pertaining to the relation between logic and the methodology 
of proofs. In particular, though modern systems of natural deduction where 
surely unknown to Locke, we cannot resist wondering what reasons we have for 
believing that the way of mathematical proof is indeed the way of natural 
deduction. The issue at stake is what one takes logic to be. We return to this point 
in § 5.3. 
 
 
§ 3.2. Kantian intuitions 
 
Philip Kitcher once said that “‘[i]ntuition’ is one of the most overworked terms in 
the philosophy of mathematics” (Kitcher [97], p.49). This puts heavy demands on 
our attempts to clarify Kant’s notion of intuition. The present section aims to 
fulfill these demands partly. We shall be especially concerned with the more 
epistemological dimensions of the notion. 
 This section proceeds as follows. We begin by considering the various items 
of knowledge Kant has distinguished. Next, we briefly review readings of Kant’s 
notions of intuition that have been defended in the literature (we focus mainly on 
the views put forward by Jaakko Hintikka and Charles Parsons). Finally, we turn 
our attention mainly to intuitions and discuss Kant’s distinction between a priori 
and a posteriori intuitions. 
  
Items of knowledge, according to Kant. What Locke calls an idea can be put 
more or less in the same box as what Kant calls an Erkenntnis. In the English 
translation of the Critique of pure reason we are using as our source, Kant’s term 
Erkenntnis is translated as cognition. However, in line with our own terminology, 
we use item of knowledge instead. 
 We may say that Locke acknowledged only one fundamental type of item of 
knowledge: the idea (§ 2.1). Kant, in contrast, held that an item of knowledge “is 
either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus)” (A320/B376; see also 
Kant [93], p.589).95 It will turn out that intuitions and concepts can in some sense 
                                                 
95
 Kant did also recognize the judgment as an item of knowledge, but only in a derivative sense; see 
below. 
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be considered as the fundamental or prime types of items of knowledge: for Kant, 
other types of items of knowledge (propositions) or in some way built from 
concepts or intuitions. 
 Kant considers an item of knowledge as a kind of representation.96 More 
specifically, Kant says, an item of knowledge is a “representation with 
consciousness” (cf. A320/B377).97 It may seem plausible to hold that what Kant 
has in mind here is that an item of knowledge is a representation whose object an 
agent is conscious of.98 However, there are considerations that certainly do not 
exclude that the representation itself is also something an agent is conscious of. 
Indeed, as we will argue shortly, Kant does not seem to make a clear distinction 
between a representation on the one hand and an object on the other.  
 Kant does not think an item of knowledge to be a mere representation with 
consciousness. Something along these lines is already indicated by what we said 
in the previous paragraph. Explicitly, Kant holds that an item of knowledge is an 
objective representation with consciousness (ibid.). We think that, according to 
Kant, objectivity means just that: having a reference to an object (broadly 
understood) (cf. A155/B194, A320/B376).99 
 It may be considered remarkable that Kant sometimes tends to speak about 
intuitions not as representations (of objects) but as objects instead. For example, 
at some point Kant says that an intuition, “as intuition, is an individual object” 
(A713/B741; the emphasis is Kant’s).100 Perhaps this can be in part explained by 
pointing out that Kant has a tendency to conflate the object of an item of 
knowledge refers to on the one hand with the content of that item of knowledge 
on the other (A55/B79; A58-9/B83; A63/B87; cf. A239/B298). It seems as if 
Kant thinks that, at least in case of intuitions, content and object do not exist on 
two separate levels, but are more or less melted together so to speak. Thus, we 
can begin to understand how it is that an item of knowledge, conceived of as a 
representation cum content, is easily taken for an object.101 
 Seemingly conflicting an earlier point, Kant sometimes also appears to 
recognize the proposition as an item of knowledge.102 For example, when he says 
that “[j]udgment is […] the mediate cognition of an object” (A68/B93). Although 
Kant’s theory of propositions (i.e., judgments) is not particularly relevant for our 
                                                 
96
 Kant’s own German term is Vorstellung. 
97
 “Vorstellung mit Bewußtsein.” 
98
 Therefore, in Kant’s view, knowledge, at least in the form of either concepts or intuitions, 
presupposes an agent (namely, and agent having this knowledge) in the possession of conscious 
intentionality. Cf. also footnote 10. 
99
 In contrast, a sensation (Empfindung) Kant considers subjective. The reason he gives is that a 
sensation only refers to the subject, viz. “the modification of the subject’s state” (see ibid.). 
100
 See also A165/B206, where Kant appears to say that (pure) intuition forms the object of 
geometry. 
101
 The content of intuitions is something we shall return to later. 
102
 Reading proposition where Kant uses judgment (Urteil). 
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purposes, it is of some future interest to make a couple of clarifying remarks on 
this point.103 
 In the Jäsche logic, Kant explains what, in his view, propositions are: 
 
A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of 
various representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as 
they constitute a concept (Kant [93], p.597).104 
 
Kant explains a proposition as a kind of representation, which, in Kant’s view, all 
items of knowledge are (see above). 
 Kant acknowledged several types of propositions. Besides categorical 
propositions, Kant also distinguished hypothetical and disjunctive propositions, 
among other things.105 The latter goes beyond a view as expounded by Locke, 
who only seemed to have recognized categorical propositions (§ 3.1). 
 A proposition, Kant suggests, is in part constituted by several (other) 
representations. These representations, in turn, are not merely representations, 
but items of knowledge instead. This, we think, is confirmed by a 
characterization of judgment in the Critique of pure reason, which, in many 
respects, seemingly runs along similar lines as the one quoted above. Says Kant: 
“a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the 
objective unity of apperception” (B141). In other words, then, a judgment is a 
way of bringing given items of knowledge to the objective unity of apperception. 
 What could those items of knowledge that in part constitute a proposition 
be? The currently available options are the following: intuitions, concepts or 
propositions. In case of the latter, exactly the same question may be asked as 
before, and the same answer can be given to it. A proposition possibly involved 
in a proposition may again involve intuitions, concepts, or propositions. If we 
assume some sort of “principle of well-foundedness,” it seems reasonable to 
conclude that a judgment ultimately involves only intuitions or concepts. 
 The main point is that, in Kant’s view, there are only two prime types of 
cognition: intuitions and concepts. Kant also recognizes the proposition as an 
item of knowledge, but only in a derivative sense. In the end, a propositional item 
of knowledge is constituted by concepts, intuitions, or both. 
 
 
 
                                                 
103
 See also A70-6/B95-101, B140-2. 
104
 Kant here defines a judgment in terms of a unity (of the consciousness of) several presentations. 
In the Critique of pure reason, Kant seems to consider this an improvement with respect to those 
who hold that a judgment is merely a representation of the relation between two representations (or 
items of knowledge—see below). For example, Locke may be more or less considered a 
representative of such a view (§ 3.1). See B140-2. 
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 Besides the ones mentioned in the main text, Kant distinguished other (nine, to be exact) main 
types of proposition; see A70/B95. 
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Intuitions: review of the literature. There has been considerable discussion as 
to how Kant’s notion of intuition has to be understood. Given the importance of 
Kant’s notion of intuition for our understanding of his philosophy of 
mathematics, the discussion is of considerable interest. We will review the debate 
and point out certain weak spots. We focus on the main contributions, put 
forward by Hintikka and Parsons. 
 Much discussion on Kant’s notion of intuition has been triggered by what 
Kant says in the following citation: 
 
[An intuition] is immediately related to the object and is singular; [a 
concept] is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several 
things (A320/B377; cf. also Kant [93], p.589). 
 
Kant says that an intuition relates immediately to the object and is singular. With 
Parsons, let us say that an intuition satisfies (1) the immediacy condition and (2) 
the singularity condition (Parsons [118]). 
 Parsons thinks that the singularity condition seems clear enough: it means 
that an intuition “can have only one individual object” (ibid., p.44). A concept, 
Parsons goes on, relates to the objects that fall under it, i.e., the objects in the 
extension of that concept (ibid.). Parsons states provisionally that, thus far, the 
distinction between intuition and concept corresponds to what we would 
nowadays refer to as the distinction between individual constant (or singular 
term) and general term respectively (ibid.). 
 An intuition, Kant says, is related to an (or the106) object in a way that is 
typified as immediate. A concept, in contrast, is related to an (or any) object (or 
thing), “by means of a mark, which can be common to several things.” We may 
say that a concept is mediately related to an object. We may illustrate the point as 
follows. Consider the concept triangle. This concept, we may say, relates to 
an object via a property that can be common among a certain collection of 
objects. We may reasonably enough surmise that this property is the property TO 
BE A TRIANGLE. 
 However, what does it mean to say that an intuition is immediate? It is at this 
point that controversy begins to arise. In Hintikka’s view, an intuition is “simply 
anything which represents or stands for an individual object” (Hintikka [72], 
p.130). In this respect, then, Hintikka agrees with Parsons: an intuition satisfies 
the singularity condition. Furthermore, however, Hintikka has argued that the 
immediacy condition is in effect noting but an alternative way of stating the 
singularity condition (Hintikka [74]; see also Hintikka [73], [75]). Consequently, 
Hintikka claims that 
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 Kant: “[…] bezieht sich unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand […].” 
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Kant’s notion of intuition is not very far from what we would call a 
singular term (Hintikka [74], p.45).107 
 
Something very close to this is also assumed by Beth [16], [17], [18] (especially 
chapter 4).  
 It may not be clear how the immediacy of individual constants can be 
understood as to coincide effectively with their singularity. Howell [81], p.210-1, 
has argued that the immediacy of intuitions should be understood in terms of the 
notion of direct reference as it applies, at least according to some theorists, to 
individual constants. An individual constant is said to refer directly, roughly if its 
referent, would it exist, is not determined by the content of that constant.108 A 
directly referring individual constant may be thought of as a mere label (or “tag”) 
of its referent (again, would it exist). According to Howell, the immediacy of 
intuitions has to be understood in analogy with this notion of direct reference. 
Parsons reports that, in conversation, Hintikka has confirmed that Howell’s 
reading of the immediacy condition (as being analogous to direct reference) was 
precisely what Hintikka maintained all along (Parsons [118], p.78, n.44).109 In 
sum, then, Hintikka holds that intuitions are very close to individual constants, 
when the latter are understood as directly referring expressions. 
 We now also have a way of understanding Hintikka when he says that the 
immediacy condition is in effect nothing but an alternative way of stating the 
singularity condition. When Hintikka says that an intuition is “simply anything 
which represents or stands for an individual object” (see above), we may take this 
as if he claims that an intuition is like a label for an individual object. 
Consequently, an intuition is at the same immediate in a way as explained above 
(namely, in terms of an analogy with the notion of direct reference). Let us 
continue our original discussion. 
 Parsons disagrees with Hintikka in that the immediacy condition and the 
singularity condition effectively coincide. According to Parsons, the immediacy 
of intuitions really adds something over and above their singularity. More 
specifically, Parsons holds that, for Kant, immediacy “evidently means that the 
object of an intuition is in some way present to the mind, as in perception” 
(Parsons [118], p.44). In a later paper, Parsons rephrased his proposal in more 
phenomenological terms: “immediacy for Kant is direct, phenomenological 
presence to the mind, as in perception” (Parsons [119], p.66). Note that an 
analogy with perception remains a constant factor in his understanding of the 
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 As suggested several times before, in the present study, we use individual constant instead of 
singular term. 
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 Frege, for one, would disagree: for him, the referent of an individual constant, if it exists, is 
always determined by the content (or Sinn, as Frege called it) of that individual constant. 
Accordingly, reference is mediated by content. 
109
 Hintikka indeed often tends to read immediacy as “direct reference to objects” (e.g., 
Hintikka [75], p.342). 
72    MATHEMATICAL WAYS 
 
 
immediacy condition. In Parsons view, the immediacy of an intuition relates it to 
perception. 
 Parsons’ proposal seems to presuppose a specific philosophical theory of 
perception. According to this theory, perception is to be understood as direct 
perception. Accordingly, the immediate objects of perception are objects 
themselves, and not, as for example representationalists would hold, certain 
representations of those objects (e.g., sense-data) (see, for example, Pitcher 
[122]). 
 Let us note that Parsons need not deny outright that intuitions are like 
individual constants. In particular, he may very well be willing to admit that 
intuitions are like individual constants in some respect, namely, insofar as they 
satisfy the singularity condition. However, what Parsons would deny is that this 
is in effect all there is to be said about intuitions, as Hintikka seems to do. In 
Parsons view, the immediacy condition really adds something new. 
 On Parsons proposal, it is especially immediacy what makes intuitions 
genuinely “intuitive.” This may already be indicated by the connection Parsons 
makes between intuitions and perception (see above).110 Parsons goes on to point 
out that the intuitive character of intuitions gains plausibility once we realize that 
for Kant geometry is an applied science. Parsons believes that for Kant, geometry 
is about physical space and the figures constructed in it (Parsons [118], p.58). 
(The objects of intuitions, Parsons seems to hold, are precisely those figures in 
physical space.) The figures in actual space, Parsons seems to believe, appear as 
objects given to the senses. What a mathematician does is, among other things, to 
prove theorems about these figures in physical space—or so Parsons holds. It 
seems, then, when Parsons relates the immediacy of intuition to perception, he 
quite literally means sense perception, and visual perception in particular. 
Accordingly, in Parsons view, the object of an intuition would be in some way 
perceived visually. 
 Parsons views on this score gain some credibility once we realize that Kant 
himself has made a seemingly intrinsic connection between intuition and 
sensibility: Kant says that all intuitions are supplied to us only by sensibility 
(A19/B33).111 However, other considerations, in contrast, go against Parsons’ 
views. For example, Parsons’ belief that mathematician proves theorems 
concerning objects given to the senses seems to conflict with Kant’s own belief 
that mathematical knowledge (which, for Kant, includes geometry) is a priori (cf. 
B14). Parsons himself has pointed out that the a prioricity of mathematics is 
secured by the fact that, at least on some points, a mathematician proves (some 
of) his theorems in a peculiar way. For Kant, a mathematician would prove 
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 Parsons is not fully explicit on this point, but we suspect that he intends to construe the 
immediacy of intuition in terms of an analogy with the supposed directness of what may be very 
broadly called visual perception. In the light of this, it is perhaps of some interest to add that the 
Latin root of intuition is inturi, which means “to look at.” 
111
 We will return to this in § 3.3. 
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(some of) his theorems by only taking account of the essential (or definitional) 
properties of the specific figures that are given to his senses. This would secure 
Kant’s belief that mathematical knowledge is a priori (cf. Parsons [118], p.61). 
 The point seems besides the mark, however. To say that a mathematician 
only takes account of the essential properties of a specific figure implies that the 
knowledge obtained accordingly is general instead of merely bearing on that one 
single figure. It does not seem to imply, however, that this knowledge is therefore 
a priori. For roughly speaking, knowledge is a priori if it is based only on reason. 
However, it seems that on Parsons construal, Kant believed mathematical 
knowledge to be at least partly based on experience. However, we think it 
doubtful that Kant believed this. Indeed, it is even doubtful whether Kant 
believed that mathematics involves any experience at all (cf. § 3.3). (See the next 
section for further discussion of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori.) 
 In contrast with Parsons, Hintikka denies that Kant’s notion of intuition has 
“intuitivity” built into it: 
 
In Kant and his immediate predecessors, the term “intuition” did not 
necessarily have to do with imagination or to direct perceptual evidence. In 
the form of a paradox, we may perhaps say that the “intuitions” Kant 
contemplated were not necessarily very intuitive (Hintikka [72], p.130). 
 
Interestingly, Hintikka not only denies a necessary connection between intuition 
and (direct) perceptual evidence. He also denies a necessary connection between 
intuition and something he refers to as imagination (see also § 3.3). Before we 
close off this section, let us return once more to Hintikka’s belief that Kantian 
intuitions are very much like individual constants. 
 Recall Hintikka saying that, for Kant, an intuition is “anything which 
represents or stands for an individual object as distinguished from general 
concepts.” As a result, Hintikka claimed that an intuition is not far from what we 
would call an individual term. Taken together, this seems to imply that Hintikka 
believes that anything that represents or stands for an individual object is or 
comes close to an individual constant. 
 This, however, does not seem to be the case. Diagrams may form a serious 
counterexample in this respect. We may say that a diagram (e.g., any of the 
diagrams presented in § 1.1) represents or stands for an individual object.112 
However, prima facie at least, a diagram does not seem to be an individual 
constant. In fact, it may even be suggested that a diagram is quite different from 
an individual constant. For to begin with, the latter is a certain type of linguistic 
expression, while the former, in contrast, seems to belong to a quite different 
category (though it need not be clear to what category). 
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 Though it is not clear that the relation between diagram and object should be or can be 
understood as being in some way analogous to direct reference. 
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 As it stands, this objection is not very precise. Accordingly, it lacks a clear 
point. However, even granted its imprecision, it need not even be taken very 
seriously. What Hintikka surely could deny that the eventual diagrammatic 
features of intuitions—whatever they precisely are—are employed in the course 
of a proof. On the positive side, it would be primarily with respect to its role in 
the course of a proof that an intuition is not very far from an individual constant. 
Put differently, it is in the light of the specific way mathematicians prove their 
theorems that intuitions come close to being individual constants. As a matter of 
fact, Hintikka appears to believe that the role of intuitions in this respect is 
mainly determined by the rules for the quantifiers in a system of natural 
deduction.113 As to its nature, an intuition may very well be diagrammatic.114  
 Note that Hintikka’s point is a legitimate one. Speaking of individual 
constants, we are typically inclined to think of a certain category of linguistic 
expressions, for example, Plato, 15, or ABC115 (as we tended to do in § 2.2). 
However, from an abstract mathematical point of view, a system of natural 
deduction on itself does not put many constraints on what it is to be an individual 
constant. Insofar as the present point is concerned, the most significant 
constraints available within such a system are restrictions on the possible use of 
an individual constant. These restrictions, in turn, are precisely the ones 
constituted by the introduction rules and the elimination rules for the quantifiers 
(i.e., ∀ and ∃). 
 The Hintikka-Parsons debate formed only the beginning of a long discussion 
on Kant’s notion of intuition. See, for example, Thompson [156], Howell [81], 
and Brittan [21]. However, we shall lay the matter to rest. In order to close off 
this section, we notice two weak points in the views discussed thus far. Let us 
state them. 
 First, Hintikka thinks that the immediacy condition is an alternative 
formulation of the singularity condition. This supports a view according to which 
mathematical reasoning is in many respects like natural deduction. However, this 
view brings along with it that, for Kant, reasoning in mathematics is a form of 
propositional reasoning. We shall find reason, however, to reject this. It will turn 
out that, in Kant’s view, reasoning in mathematics is essentially a form of 
diagrammatic reasoning (§ 4.2). 
 Second, in contrast with Hintikka, Parsons understands the immediacy of 
intuitions in such a way that the immediacy of an intuition means that (the object 
of) that intuition is in some sense immediately present to the mind, as in 
perception. Accordingly, we may run the risk that mathematical knowledge turns 
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 Hintikka [73], p.175, pays particular attention to the elimination rule for the existential 
quantifier (see § 2.3). 
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 Of course, Hintikka holds that this is not simply Kant’s own view. For in that case, Hintikka’s 
point would be a bare anachronism. What he does seem to maintain, however, is that this is a 
reasonable reconstruction of Kant’s views (cf. Hintikka [72], p.131). 
115
 For example, in case one refers to a triangle. 
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out to be a posteriori after all, something that runs counter to one of Kant’s 
fundamental beliefs with respect to (pure) mathematical knowledge. We think 
that Parsons has not correctly understood Kant’s claim that intuitions in 
mathematics are supplied to us by sensibility. This is something that we shall 
return to later (see especially § 3.3). 
 
Types of intuitions. Contrary to what Hintikka and Parsons seem to assume, 
Kant’s notion of intuition is not one. It turns out that he distinguishes between 
several types of intuitions. One distinction he makes is that between a posteriori 
and a priori intuitions. Besides that, he also acknowledged pure intuitions.116 It is 
the aim of this section to clarify these distinctions. We begin by considering the 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori. Next, we turn our attention to pure 
intuitions. 
 
1. A posteriori and a priori intuitions. For Kant, the qualifications a priori and a 
posteriori apply to items of knowledge generally, and not only to intuitions (as 
does the qualification pure—see below). It is useful to start from this somewhat 
broader perspective and thus to consider items of knowledge generally first. 
 In general, Kant thinks of the qualification a priori, together with its cognate 
a posteriori, primarily in terms of so-called sources of knowledge (cf. B2-3). In 
other words, the qualifications a priori and a posteriori more or less turn on the 
question: “where does this or that item of knowledge come from?” 
 Kant distinguishes two main sources of knowledge (cf. A50/B74). One of 
these, Kant calls experience (B2). The other source of knowledge he does not 
seem to give a single separate name, but we may broadly refer to it as reason.117 
An item of knowledge is a posteriori if it primarily has its source in experience; 
an item of knowledge is a priori if it has its source in reason alone. An item of 
knowledge that is a posteriori Kant alternatively calls empirical (B2; cf. B3). 
 The characterization of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori in 
terms of sources of knowledge may strike one as somewhat odd. More 
positively, one may be inclined to think that the distinction between a priori and 
a posteriori should mark off a distinction between two types of justification, and 
not, as Kant seems to think, between two sources of knowledge. Thus, one may 
suggest that knowledge is justified a priori roughly if it were justified on the 
basis of reason only. Knowledge would be justified a posteriori roughly if it were 
justified on the basis of experience. 
 Accordingly, there may seem to be some tension between Kant’s 
characterization of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge 
and what one would normally understand this distinction. However, from Kant’s 
point of view, the tension is only apparent. For Kant, matters concerning the 
                                                 
116
 Besides intuitions a priori, intuitions a posteriori, and pure intuitions, Kant also distinguished 
intellectual intuitions (B68). 
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 Kant appears to recognize yet a third source of cognition, namely, apperception; see B132. 
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origin of an item of knowledge do not stand independently of matters concerning 
its justification. In particular, Kant seems to have believed that justification is 
intimately related to the specific procedures that are carried out in order to get an 
item of knowledge. Thus, for example, the proof described in The Passage is on 
the one hand a procedure that serves to get a proposition as an item of 
knowledge (which in this case is a priori). On the other hand, this procedure at 
the same time justifies this item of knowledge. A similar point applies to items 
of knowledge a posteriori. 
 The supposed oddity of Kant’s way of understanding the distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori seems to presuppose a distinction along the 
lines of the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification 
(§ 2.4). At any rate, while Kant may have acknowledged some distinction along 
these lines,118 we nevertheless think that for Kant matters of discovery and 
matters of justification where much closer than proponents of this distinction are 
often inclined to believe.119 The upshot is that the point does not constitute an 
objection against Kant in this respect. Rather, it may very well be taken as 
providing a further qualification of Kant’s views. Let us now provide some 
further elucidation on intuitions a posteriori and intuitions a priori. 
A. Intuitions a posteriori. When Kant’s talks about intuitions and related matters, 
he tends to appeal to a diverse terminological arsenal. In order to clear things up 
a bit, imagine the following relatively simple set up, which is certainly not 
uncongenial to Kant. We have an agent who is engaged with getting items of 
knowledge. We think of our agent as situated in what we refer to as its 
“environment.” This environment is such that it possibly affects the sensory 
apparatus of our agent in certain ways. 
 Now, we may generally say that an item of knowledge has its source in 
experience—i.e., is a posteriori or empirical—if the way it arises involves the 
processing of “experiential input,” or, as we shall say, appearances (cf. 
A20/B34). These appearances, in turn, come as the result of certain operations or 
actions of the environment upon an agent’s sensory apparatus.  In this respect, 
Kant characterizes an agent getting an a posteriori item of knowledge primarily 
as receptive (A19/B33; A50/B74). An agent operates certain receptive powers—
its sensory faculties. The idea particularly applies to intuitions, yielding intuitions 
a posteriori, or empirical intuitions (cf. B2). Thus, the way an empirical intuition 
arises involves the processing of appearances that an agent receives as the result 
of environmental operations upon his sensory apparatus. 
 However, besides the appearances that an agent receives from its 
environment, an empirical intuition also involves a certain subjective 
contribution by that agent himself (B1). Kant explains this in quite elaborate 
terms in the part of the Critique of pure reason called the Transcendental 
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 This point may very well hold for Kant’s contemporaries in general; see also our discussion of 
Locke’s views on proof in § 3.1. 
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Aesthetic.120 Here, Kant points out that, in case of empirical intuitions, this 
subjective contribution specifically concerns the organization of appearances in 
terms of spatio-temporal relations, that is, in terms of relations in space and/or 
time (A20/B34; A22/B36). That knowledge accordingly involves a subjective 
contribution may be considered a typical trait of Kantian philosophy. 
 Pursuing this line of thought, the aforementioned relations in space and/or 
time Kant refers to as the form of an empirical intuition (cf. A20/B40). The 
appearances, on the other hand, together constitute what Kant calls the matter of 
that intuition (A50/B74; A723/B751). Alternatively, Kant tends to refer to these 
appearances as the content of that empirical intuition (A59/B83; A723/B751).121 
It becomes suggestive to think of the form of an empirical intuition as a 
configuration of relations in space and/or time. In the light of this, we may say 
that an unorganized collection of corresponding (sensory) relata—i.e., 
appearances—forms the content of that intuition. 
 The above suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic primarily concentrates 
on empirical intuitions. We think that this is indeed the case, as is confirmed by 
the following. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant clearly indicates that the 
way experience (i.e., appearances) comes about is pretty much a passive (or 
receptive) affair. For example, Kant says: “[t]he effect of an object on our 
capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by the object, is 
experience” (A19-20/B34). In terms of our explanatory set-up presented earlier, 
this clearly suggests that experience arises from operations of the environment 
on an agent’s sensory apparatus. Therefore, the intuition that arises accordingly 
must be empirical (cf. A20/B34; cf. also above). 
 Since the form of an empirical intuition resides in the subject, what makes an 
empirical intuition genuinely empirical seems to bear on its content and not so 
much on its form. This point can be linked to the idea of sources of knowledge 
introduced above. We may say that, insofar as an empirical intuition (which, in 
Kant’s view, is an item of knowledge of a sort) is concerned, its source does 
strictly speaking not concern that intuition per se but much more its content. 
Thus, it is primarily the content of an empirical intuition that comes from 
experience and not the form of that intuition. 
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 In the second edition, this corresponds to B33-73. 
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 Kant says: 
 
[…] there are two components to the appearance through which all objects are 
given to us: the form of intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and 
determined completely a priori, and the matter (the physical), or the content, which 
signifies a something encountered in space and time […]. 
 
We think that Kant’s parenthetical addition “the physical” makes clear that Kant is mainly thinking 
in terms of empirical intuitions here. There appears nothing, however, that should prevent us from 
applying the form-content distinction also to intuitions a priori. We shall return to this later. 
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 An empirical intuition, Kant says, is one “which is related to the object 
through sensation” (A20/B34). Very likely, this object is an individual object. 
What we see, then, is that an empirical intuition satisfies the singularity 
condition. This agrees with what Hintikka and Parsons claimed about intuitions 
generally (see § 3.2). 
 Having mentioned Hintikka again, observe also the following: the short 
quote given in the previous paragraph may suggest that an empirical intuition 
does not refer “directly” (as we may put it) to its object. Again, Kant says that it 
refers to its object through experience, which appears to give the reference a kind 
of “indirect” flavor. Perhaps we may say that the reference of an intuition a 
posteriori is mediated by the sensory processes giving rise to its content. 
 At any rate, if this conclusion would hold, then the way Hintikka (and 
Howell) understand the immediacy of intuitions seems to become particularly 
problematic. For Hintikka held that intuitions referred to their object in a way 
that can be typified as “direct” (i.e., in a way that is analogous to direct reference 
in case of individual constants). Thanks to this, he could subsequently say that 
intuitions are in effect very close to what we call individual constants (see 
above). However, it may very well be that this comes down to a 
misunderstanding. We have found some indication to think that Kant thought 
intuitions not to refer to their objects in a way that can be typified as “direct.” 
Accordingly, the analogy of intuitions with (directly referring) individual 
constants seems to break down on this point. Let us make one further remark on 
behalf of the short quote that prompted these considerations. 
 It seems very difficult to explain how the spatio-temporal organization of 
content—i.e., appearances—can bring about a reference to an object. We do not 
want to answer this question here since this obviously brings us beyond the scope 
of this study. Furthermore, we think that there are also other problems 
surrounding the objects that are associated with empirical intuitions. These 
problems at least concern their nature and their ontological status. Furthermore, 
the nature of the relation between an empirical intuition and its object is likewise 
far from clear. Issues like these seemingly touch upon very fundamental 
questions, such as “what, in Kant’s view, is the nature of representation?”122 
 We think it nevertheless plausible to say that an empirical intuition can be 
typically associated with, or seen as arising from, something like an occurrence 
or episode of visual perception of an object. Insofar as Kant’s broader 
philosophical interests are concerned, one can easily imagine that empirical 
intuitions would play their role in what we may roughly refer to as the empirical 
sciences. 
 If the aforementioned occurrence or episode of visual perception can be 
characterized as being akin to something like “direct perception” (as Parsons 
seems to do; cf. § 3.2) then we find that empirical intuitions also satisfy the 
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immediacy condition. In this respect, we tend to go with Parsons, but only in the 
case of empirical intuitions. How things stand in case of intuitions a priori is as 
yet undecided (see below). Let us now turn to intuitions a priori, which play a 
substantial role in Kant’s view on the mathematical method, and the 
mathematical method of proof in particular (cf. § 3.3). 
B. Intuitions a priori. Generally, if an item of knowledge has its source in 
reason—i.e., is a priori—, then the way it arises does not involve the processing 
of appearances that come as the result of environmental operations on an agent’s 
sensory apparatus. In contrast, this item of knowledge now arises independently 
of the sensory input he receives from his environment (cf. B2-3). More 
positively, an item of knowledge a priori is one that arises from reason alone. 
This particularly holds for intuitions a priori: an intuition a priori has its source 
merely in reason (see below for a possible qualification). 
 Recall the form-content distinction as it applies to empirical intuitions. The 
line of thought presented there was essentially the line of thought offered by Kant 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic. We argued that this line of thought concentrated 
primarily on empirical intuitions. That said, we do not mean to say, however, that 
it is simply out of the question that the considerations put forward in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic also apply to intuitions a priori. In particular, we do not 
mean to say that Kant had no idea of a distinction between form and content in 
the case of intuitions a priori. Nevertheless, considering what Kant says in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, it appears somewhat hard to see how, exactly, this 
distinction is to be understood. The trouble is that the content of an intuition a 
priori cannot arise from experience. In other words, the content of an intuition a 
priori does not consist of appearances that come as the result of environmental 
operations on an agent’s sensory apparatus. However, if the content of an 
intuition a priori does not arise from experience, from what else does it arise? We 
postpone this question to § 3.3. 
 Related to the previous paragraph, note also the following. If the content of 
an intuition a priori does not come from experience in the way indicated, then we 
would expect that intuitions a priori do not refer to their object though experience 
(as empirical intuitions apparently do; see above).123 We would expect that they 
refer to their object through something else instead. As a result, it seems to 
become difficult to compare an intuition a priori with an occurrence or episode of 
visual perception, as Parsons does (see above). This, then, is yet another point on 
which an intuition a priori differs from an empirical intuition.124 
 We can make two further points on behalf of intuitions a priori that were 
also made in case of empirical intuitions. First, an intuition a priori no doubt 
satisfies the singularity condition: it refers to an individual object. Second, for the 
similar reasons that where brought up in case of empirical intuitions, it seems 
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 As to this object, the same difficulties apply as in the case of empirical intuitions (cf. above). 
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 The other being that the respective contents of empirical intuitions and intuitions a priori have a 
different source. 
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problematic to say that intuitions a priori satisfy the immediacy condition as 
understood by Hintikka (and Howell). As in the case of empirical intuitions, there 
is some reason to believe that the reference of intuitions a priori, too, has an 
“indirect” or mediate flavor. In particular, we suggested that the reference to an 
object in case of intuitions a posteriori may very well be mediated by certain 
sensory processes. However, what would the nature of the processes be that 
mediate reference in case of intuitions a priori? We return to this question in       
§ 3.3. 
 
2. Pure intuitions. Kant often discusses empirical intuitions in tandem with what 
he calls pure intuitions (e.g., A19-20/B34-5; A42/B59-60; A50/B74). He 
sometimes characterizes pure intuitions—or indeed, pure items of knowledge 
generally—rather negatively as intuitions that are not mixed up with anything 
that stems from experience (cf. A20/B34; A50/B74). Reasonably enough, then, 
pure intuitions are not empirical intuitions. 
 On other occasions, Kant is more extensive in his explanations concerning 
pure intuitions and accordingly gives us some positive information. This is 
particularly the case in the Transcendental Aesthetic. One line of thought 
presented there we have met earlier. Let us nevertheless repeat it here. 
 Recall that in case of an empirical intuition, we can distinguish between, on 
the one hand, the appearances that come as the result of certain environmental 
operations on an agent’s sensory apparatus. On the other hand, there is a certain 
subjective contribution by that agent himself. This subjective contribution turned 
on the organization of the appearances in terms of relations in space and time. 
The former—the appearances—Kant referred to as the content (or matter) of an 
empirical intuition; the latter as its form. (See above.) 
 Remarkably, however, Kant goes on to refer to the form of an empirical 
intuition itself as an intuition of a sort. He calls it a pure intuition (A20/B34-5). 
It would seem, then, that at least insofar as the Transcendental Aesthetic is 
concerned, pure intuitions could be seen as forming a kind of reified formal 
aspect or feature of empirical intuitions.125 This formal feature of an empirical 
intuition precisely consists in the spatio-temporal structure of its content. 
 Pure intuitions appear to have a somewhat ambiguous status in Kant’s 
thought. One the one hand, Kant introduces them in terms of a formal feature of 
empirical intuitions (in the Transcendental Aesthetic). On the other hand, he 
apparently considers them as intuitions, and hence as items of knowledge (§ 3.2). 
Consequently, we would expect that pure intuitions are not mere form; as items 
of knowledge, they would be in the possession of content instead. 
 Rather than in terms of form alone, it indeed appears that Kant sometimes 
tends to think of pure intuitions as a configuration of relations in space and time, 
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 Pure intuition, Kant holds, can be examined apart from the matter of an empirical intuition 
(A20/B34). This is precisely what Kant does the Transcendental Aesthetic (cf. A21/B35-6). 
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but seemingly with content. For example, at one point, Kant explains how to 
judge synthetically concerning a concept, either a priori or a posteriori: 
 
[…] I can go from the concept to the pure or empirical intuition 
corresponding to it in order to assess it in concreto and cognize a priori or 
a posteriori what pertains to its object (A721/B749). 
 
The way Kant puts pure intuitions on a par with empirical intuitions suggests 
that he considers them similar in many respects. Though the case is not entirely 
clear, we may particularly suspect, then, that, at least on this occasion, pure 
intuitions have content just as empirical intuitions do (though their respective 
contents may arise from a different source). (See, e.g., also A719/B747; 
A722/B750). 
 It is perhaps of some interest to add that the above quote is taken from the 
part of the Critique of pure reason where Kant, among other things, outlines his 
views on the methodology of mathematics.126 It is especially there where Kant 
occasionally, but not always, seems to think of pure intuitions not as pure form 
but as items of knowledge with content instead. Even more so, in this part of the 
Critique of pure reason, Kant sometimes seemingly tends to identify pure 
intuitions with intuitions a priori. For example, when he says: “off all intuition 
none is given a priori except the mere form of appearances, [i.e.,] space and 
time” (A720/B748; cf. also A724/B752). 
 However, Kant suggests that an item of knowledge a priori is in general not 
pure. In fact, Kant provides us with an explicit counterexample (cf. B3). 
Consider the proposition that every change has its cause (which Kant takes as an 
item of knowledge). In Kant’s view, this proposition is a priori, though it is not 
pure. The reason Kant offers is that the concept change involved in it is an item 
of knowledge “that can be drawn only from experience.” 
 Note also the following. Reasonably enough, the concept change is, in 
Kant’s view, not a priori.127 What the example suggests is that though a 
proposition may be a priori, the concepts involved in it need not. In Kant’s view, 
the proposition that every change has its cause arises from reason alone. This 
does not hold, however, for all the concepts involved in it. Consequently, this 
example suggests that, in Kant’s view, discovery and justification do not always 
go entirely hand in hand. While an item of knowledge may be justified a priori, 
certain elements involved in it may still arise from experience. Let us return to 
intuitions. 
 What we have found is that if item of knowledge is a priori, it is not always 
pure. A natural question now is the following: is every pure item of knowledge a 
priori? As may be expected, Kant’s answer to this question is affirmative (see 
B2; cf. also A20/B34-5). When we restrict ourselves to (pure) mathematics, all 
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 This part is titled: The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Use; see A712-38/B740-66. 
127
 Presumably, it is a posteriori. 
82    MATHEMATICAL WAYS 
 
 
items of knowledge are pure, and hence a priori (cf. A713/B741, A718/B746). 
We conclude that, insofar as mathematics is concerned, “a prioricity” and 
“pureness” coincide: in (pure) mathematics, every item of knowledge a priori is 
pure and vice versa. This conclusion holds for intuitions in mathematics in 
particular. Thus, in mathematics, an intuition a priori is pure and vice versa. 
Whether they should be distinguished outside mathematics is a question we shall 
not discuss here. 
 
Summary and conclusions. Let us recap the discussion thus far. Kant 
distinguished at least three types of intuitions: intuitions a priori, empirical 
intuitions (or intuitions a posteriori), and pure intuitions. Insofar as intuitions in 
pure mathematics are concerned, intuitions a priori coincide with pure intuitions. 
An intuition a priori is one whose source lies in reason alone. An empirical 
intuition, in contrast, is one whose source lies in experience. More specifically, 
the content of an intuition a priori arises independently from the environmental 
actions on an agent’s sensory apparatus. It merely arises by exercising certain 
powers that have to be associated with reason alone (see the next section). The 
content of an empirical intuition, in contrast, arises as the result of the processing 
of sensations that arise from environmental actions on an agent’s sensory 
apparatus. It appears, then, that intuitions must not be considered independently 
of the specific processes delivering these intuitions as their respective products. 
In case of intuitions a priori, these processes have to be associated with reason; 
in case of empirical intuitions, these processes have to be associated with sense 
perception. This may very well be a point that Hintikka did not realize. Parsons, 
in contrast, may have been aware of something along these lines when he 
connected the intuitiveness of intuitions with sense perception (and hence 
perceptual processes). However, in the next section, we shall see that Parsons 
point is in need of adjustment. 
 
 
§ 3.3. Kantian construction 
 
At the beginning of the previous section we quoted Philip Kitcher saying that, 
insofar as the philosophy of mathematics is concerned, the term intuition suffers 
from being overworked. A similar point could certainly be made on behalf of 
construction.128 As is the case with intuition, this puts heavy demands on our 
explanations turning on Kant’s notion of construction. 
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 Hesseling [67], chapter 4, discusses several conceptions of construction in the foundational 
debate during the first decades of the twentieth century. He also includes a short history of different 
notions of construction that have been in the air since antiquity (ibid., pp.108-11). In the light of 
this, “constructivism” is not a label for a group of people who all have more or less the same 
philosophical views with respect to mathematics. In contrast, there are various different forms of 
constructivism. See also Detlefsen [34] for a discussion. 
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 The purpose of this section is to come to grips with Kant’s notion of 
construction. We begin by pointing out that Kant saw construction primarily as a 
methodical feature of mathematics, and the method of proof in mathematics in 
particular. Next, we clarify Kant’s idea that construction is an act or process of 
exhibition a priori. 
 
Construction as a feature of the mathematical method. Construction, Kant 
appears to hold, primarily applies to concepts—it is concepts that are 
constructed. Kant considers the construction of concepts as an essential 
methodical means in mathematics: 
 
The essential feature of pure mathematical cognition, differentiating it from 
all other a priori cognition, is that it must throughout proceed not from 
concepts, but always and only through the construction of concepts […] 
(Kant [95], p.65; A713-4/B741-2). 
 
The construction of concepts is something that concerns the procedure (or 
method) of mathematics (A718/B746, A726/B754).129 In Kant’s view, the 
method followed by a mathematician to the end of proving theorems is 
constructive: a mathematician proving a theorem essentially constructs concepts. 
Even more so, Kant holds that without constructing concepts, a mathematician 
cannot take a single step forward (cf. Kant [95], p.77). In particular, without 
construction, a proof would not get “off the ground,” so to speak. 
 Construction first and foremost concerns the cognitive procedure or method 
a mathematician executes when he proves a theorem. Furthermore, based on 
what Kant says in the above citation, it seems to follow that if a procedure would 
not proceed by means of the construction of concepts, it would not be a 
mathematical procedure. In contrast, it would seem to be another type of 
procedure at best. Therefore, it is part of Kant’s views on proof that mathematical 
proof is a distinctly mathematical procedure, as opposed to other types of proof 
procedures (see § 5.2). It is precisely construction forming the distinguishing 
feature of mathematical proof. A mathematician, Kant sometimes says, reasons 
demonstratively (or intuitively). To reason demonstratively means to reason by 
means of the construction of concepts (cf. A735/B763). Alternatively, Kant also 
says that a mathematician reasons in concreto, i.e., by means of the construction 
of concepts in terms of intuitions (cf. A734/B762; see also below).130 
 The upshot of this section is a short one indeed: Kant claimed that a 
mathematician, qua mathematician, essentially proves his theorems by means of 
constructing concepts in concreto. Let us try to come to closer grips with this 
idea. 
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 Kant’s term is Verfahren. 
130
 A philosopher, in contrast, would reason in abstracto (A734/B762). Alternatively, Kant says 
that a philosopher reasons acroamatively instead of demonstratively  (A735/B763). 
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Construction as exhibition a priori. What Kant means by construction of 
concepts in mathematics he explains as follows: 
 
[…] mathematical cognition is [rational cognition] from the construction 
of concepts. But to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the 
intuition corresponding to it (A713/B741). 
 
Construction in mathematics, as Kant explains it, is the construction of a 
concept.131 Construction in mathematics is a process of exhibition, which is 
qualified as being a priori. That what is exhibited is an intuition. This intuition, 
in turn, in some sense corresponds to the concept that is constructed accordingly. 
 Note that Kant does not seem to qualify the intuition exhibited as a priori but 
rather the exhibitive procedure. This may seem strange in view of things said in § 
3.2. What we found there was intuitions admitting of the qualification a priori. 
Recall, however, that we also noticed that the a prioricity of an intuition hardly 
stands independent of the processes producing that intuition. It is reasonable to 
assume that we have now found a point in case: an intuition that is exhibited a 
priori is an intuition a priori and vice versa.132 
 What does it mean—to exhibit an intuition? We have found it hard to find a 
place where Kant offers some useful and elaborate explanation on this point. 
Except, perhaps, where Kant says that “[t]o be given an object […] is […] to be 
exhibited immediately in intuition” (A156/B195). We may perhaps say that to 
exhibit an intuition means to give an object to that intuition. This point can be 
pursued a little bit further. 
 Remember that we found indication to believe that, in Kant’s view, an 
intuition (be it empirical or a priori) refers to its object through its content. Also, 
we noticed that Kant manifests a general tendency to conflate the object of an 
item of knowledge with its content, a point that hence applies to intuitions (§ 
3.2). We may perhaps conclude that to exhibit an intuition means to provide that 
intuition with content. In other words, then, to exhibit an intuition means 
providing the relations (i.e., the relations in space an time) in part constituting 
that intuition with content. However, where this content comes from? 
 Kant says that in mathematics, an intuition is exhibited a priori. We think it 
is the qualification a priori providing the clue to the aforementioned question. To 
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 The opening sentence of The Passage (“He begins at once to construct a triangle.”) does not 
necessarily conflict with this. One may point out that construction here is primarily the construction 
of an object (i.e., an individual triangle). Note, however, that an inclination to think so may very 
well be merely caused by Kant’s way of speaking. Compare: we naturally speak of the definition of 
a triangle. What is typically meant, however, is not the definition of an object (i.e., an individual 
triangle) but rather of a concept (or a term) (cf. also A718-9/B746-7). 
132
 The German text, however, goes both ways: “Einen Begriff aber konstruieren heißt: die ihm 
korrespondierende Anschauung a priori darstellen.” Here, the qualification a priori may apply to 
the intuitions, the exhibitive procedures, or both. 
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exhibit an intuition a priori means to provide an intuition with a content 
independently of all the sensations resulting from the environmental operations 
on an agent’s sensory apparatus. Looking ahead to things yet to come, we 
suggest that it is mainly on this point where many readings of Kant’s notion of 
intuition in mathematics go wrong. However, to say that the content of an 
intuition arises independently of environmental actions on an agent’s sensory 
apparatus merely amounts to a negative characterization of the ‘a priori’ in 
exhibition a priori. We postpone the issue to the next section. 
 It is natural to wonder whether Kant also acknowledges exhibition a 
posteriori. As far as we can see, Kant does not literally speak in these terms. 
However, we can easily imagine that he would have acknowledged it. In the light 
of things said in the previous paragraph, we may propose that to exhibit an 
intuition a posteriori means to provide an intuition with a content, one that comes 
as the result of environmental operations on an agent’s sensory apparatus. We 
would expect that the product delivered a running a procedure of exhibition a 
posteriori is an empirical intuition. Indeed, the content of an empirical intuition 
comes from experience (§ 3.2). Perhaps, then, we may compare a procedure of 
exhibition a posteriori with a perceptual procedure. Running such a procedure 
yields something that can perhaps be compared with something like perceptual 
state or episode. 
 
The productive imagination. We shall now try to answer a question that 
remained open in the previous section: if not from experience, where does the 
content of an intuition a priori in mathematics come from? 
 As suggested in the previous section, this forms an issue that has puzzled 
many commentators on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. In particular, many 
scholars concerned with Kant’s philosophy of mathematics have found trouble in 
Kant’s suggestion that all intuitions are sensible (Parsons [118], Hintikka [73]). 
As observed earlier, Kant says that only sensibility supplies us with intuitions 
(A19/B33). Part of the problem lies herein that Kant is not always very clear 
about what he precisely means by sensibility.  
 We argued that (§ 3.2), in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant appears to 
associate sensibility primarily with a certain receptivity of an agent, namely, a 
receptivity for being affected by environmental operations on an agent’s sensory 
apparatus. It strikes us as if many Kant commentators have understood Kant’s 
notion of sensibility primarily in these receptive terms, by mainly concentrating 
on the Transcendental Aesthetic. Note, however, that accordingly, intuitions are 
effectively identified with intuitions a posteriori. As a result, it becomes hard to 
make sense of intuitions in mathematics, except if we identify them with 
intuitions a posteriori (as, for example, Parsons seems to have done; cf. § 3.2). It 
should be clear, however, that the intuitions that play their distinct role in pure 
mathematics are, in Kant’s view intuitions a priori. It seems that the crux of the 
difficulty turns on the respective sources of an intuition. 
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 An important point that needs to be made is that Kant not only relates 
sensibility to sense perception (as he mainly seems to do in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic) but also to what he broadly refers to as the imagination: “[…] the 
imagination […] belongs to sensibility” (B151133). In general, Kant characterizes 
the imagination in general as “as the faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition” (ibid.). In this respect, the imagination contrasts 
with sense perception, by means of which objects can be represented that are 
present. It strikes us as if most Kant commentators have overlooked precisely this 
point: that Kant associates sensibility not only with sense perception, but also 
with the imagination. 
 In the previous paragraph, one difference between sense perception and the 
imagination was mentioned. However, there is another and related way in which 
the imagination differs from sense perception. Thus, Kant says that 
 
its [i.e., the imagination’s] synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, 
which is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable (B151-2). 
 
Kant thinks that the productive imagination is spontaneous (but see below for a 
qualification). It is especially the spontaneity of the imagination occasionally 
making Kant’s use of the term sensibility somewhat misleading. For, as we have 
seen, Kant often tends to typify sensibility primarily in receptive terms 
(especially in the Transcendental Aesthetic). However, we can now conclude that 
this is only part of the story: in the form of imagination, sensibility is 
spontaneous. 
 Upon closer inspection, Kant’s notion of the imagination is quite subtle. In 
particular, Kant succeeded in making a couple of pertinent distinctions: 
 
Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the 
productive imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive 
imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely 
those of association of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to 
the explanation of the possibility cognition a priori, and on that account 
belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology […] (B152). 
 
Kant explains the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination in 
more elaborate terms in the Anthropology: 
 
The imagination (facultas imaginandi), as a power to intuit even when the 
object is not present, is either productive or reproductive. As productive, it 
is a power of original exhibition of the object (exhibitio originaria), and 
hence of an exhibition that precedes experience. As reproductive, it is a 
power of derivative exhibition (exhibitio derivativa), an exhibition that 
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 This citation is not from the Transcendental Aesthetic, but from that part of the Critique of pure 
reason called the Transcendental Logic. 
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brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that we have had before 
(Kant [89], p.p.167; cf. also Kant [96], p.240). 
 
Kant makes a distinction between the productive and the reproductive 
imagination. What we now see is that the imagination is not a spontaneous 
(rather than receptive) power per se. Spontaneity primarily applies to the 
productive imagination. Furthermore, note that, in Kant’s view, the reproductive 
imagination contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori 
cognition. (Kant adds that the reproductive imagination is solely subject to 
empirical laws and the laws of association in particular.) Therefore, if the 
imagination is of any relevance for Kant’s account of mathematical knowledge, it 
must be in the form of productive imagination. 
 The productive imagination, Kant says, is a power of original exhibition (cf. 
above). It is a power that enables an agent to exhibit an object in a way that the 
object exhibited need not be experienced first. Accordingly, we may say that the 
productive imagination is, in contrast with the reproductive imagination, properly 
creative in this respect.134 Furthermore, since exhibition by way of the productive 
imagination precedes experience, we see no other way but concluding that 
exhibition by way of and exercise of the productive imagination is in fact 
exhibition a priori. The latter leads us to construction in mathematics. 
 Where does this all lead to in view of the question posed at the beginning of 
this section? We think that, in Kant’s view, there are no other ways of exhibiting 
intuitions—i.e., providing them with content—except by way of experience or by 
way of the imagination. Since in the former case only empirical intuitions can 
arise, we are led to conclude that the content of intuitions a priori comes as the 
result of exercising the productive imagination. Hence, an intuition a priori in 
mathematics refers to its object not through experience, but through the 
productive imagination instead. 
 We can now see why it is so difficult to understand the immediacy of 
intuitions in general with the supposed immediacy of a state or episode of visual 
perception, as Parsons did (cf. § 3.2). While such a comparison seems to make 
sense in case of empirical intuitions, it does not work in the case of intuitions a 
priori. From Kant’s point of view, we may say that visual perception involves an 
exercise of an agent’s receptive powers. More specifically, it involves the 
processing of the sensations that arise as the result of environmental operations 
on his sensory (i.e., visual) apparatus. However, in the case of an intuition a 
priori, such environmental operations do not play any significant role: the way an 
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 Another way of understanding the productivity of the productive imagination, Kant says, is in 
terms of the voluntary production of imaginings. The voluntary production of imaginings Kant calls 
fantasy (which he relates to fiction in turn; Kant [89], pp.167-8). However, Kant goes on that this 
does not mean that the productive imagination, as understood accordingly, is properly creative. In 
contrast, Kant holds that in case of fantasy, we can always show from where the (productive) 
imagination took its content (cf. ibid.). 
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intuition a priori arises is entirely independent of such operations. An intuition a 
priori involves the exercise of a spontaneous power, namely the productive 
imagination. 
 As a result, we see that construction in mathematics is an act of the 
productive imagination. In particular, construction, in Kant’s view, should not be 
understood in terms of mechanical construction by means of, for example, ruler 
and compass (the ruler is an unmarked straight edge). Of course, in case of 
traditional elementary geometry, many Kantian constructions are also 
constructible by means of ruler and compass. However, not all of the Kantian 
constructions are mechanically constructible, as is indicated by the following. 
 A polygon is a closed plane figure with n sides (n  3). In particular, we call 
a 3-gon, a closed plane figure with 3 sides, a 4-gon a closed plane figure with 4 
sides, and so on. A polygon is called regular if all its sides have the same length 
and if all its angles are of the same size. 
 Now, it is known that, for example, a regular 9-gon is not constructible by 
means of ruler and compass (cf. Stewart [152], p.58).135 However, it would seem 
that (the concept of) a regular 9-gon can be exhibited, for example, by imagining 
one. Accordingly, it would seem to be constructible in the sense of Kant.136 
 It appears that Kantian construction should be mainly characterized in terms 
of what may be called imaging. Kantian construction does not primarily take 
place by mechanical means such as ruler and compass. In contrast, Kantian 
construction first and foremost takes place by means of exercising a particular 
mental power: the productive imagination. 
 Collectively, we conclude that the immediacy of intuitions a priori cannot be 
construed in terms of the supposed immediacy of a state or episode of immediate 
visual perception of an object. The main reason is that intuitions a priori do not 
turn on objects that come “from the outside,” so to speak. It is the mathematician 
himself, in contrast, who produces intuitions a priori. In mathematics, intuitions a 
priori come as the result of running a creative procedure that is driven by the 
productive imagination. 
 The upshot of this section is a striking one indeed: in Kant’s view, the source 
of mathematical knowledge is the productive imagination. Especially today, the 
imagination is typically associated with literary or other forms of artistic creation. 
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 A theorem due to Gauss (dated 1796) says that a sufficient condition for regular n-gon to be 
constructible is that n is of the form 2kp1p2  pr, where k is a nonnegative integer and the pi (1  i 
 r) are distinct Fermat primes. A Fermat prime is a prime number of the form 
 
122 +=
n
nF , 
 
where n  0 is an integer. (In 1836, Wantzel proved that this condition is also necessary.) 
136
 That construction in the sense of Kant goes beyond mechanical construction is further confirmed 
by Kant’s point that constructions also play an essential role in algebra. In Kant’s view, 
construction in algebra is more specifically referred to as symbolic construction. The latter, in turn, 
can be understood in terms of the creation of notations. See A717/B745. 
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Accordingly, one finds hardly any connection between matters pertaining to the 
imagination on the one hand and matters of rationality and scientific knowledge 
on the other.137 However, for Kant, the connection between the imagination and 
scientific (or rational) knowledge is an intimate one indeed. This particularly 
holds for mathematics, which is traditionally often taken to form the paradigm 
type of scientific knowledge. Construction in the sense of Kant (i.e., as an 
exercise of the productive imagination) is a rational procedure yielding rational 
knowledge (A724/B752; cf. also A713/B741). 
 As a final point, recall from § 3.2 that Parsons attempted to come to grips 
with the “intuitiveness” of intuitions by making a connection with sense 
perception. We can now say that this proposal is in general not correct and needs 
to be adjusted. Although Parsons may be right in case of empirical intuitions, he 
point does not hold in the case of intuitions a priori. The intuitiveness of 
intuitions a priori should be understood in terms of their connection with the 
productive imagination. 
 
 
§ 3.4. The diagrammatic structure of intuitions 
 
The aim of the present section is to argue that intuitions are diagrammatic. Since 
Kant’s own remarks do not give us enough footholds, we will not hesitate to 
resort to recent insights on the nature and structure of diagrams. Accordingly, the 
present section provides a reconstruction of Kant’s views. 
 
Intuitions as diagrams. As we have seen (§ 3.2), an intuition is in general 
constituted by, on the one hand, a certain configuration of relations in space and 
time. On the other hand, an intuition also involves an unorganized collection 
relata (the content of that intuition). The relations locate the relata relative to one 
another in space and time: 
 
Whatever in our cognition belongs to intuition contains nothing but mere 
relations: of places in intuition (extension), of change of places (motion) 
[…] (A49/B66-7; cf. A22-3/B37; cf. also § 3.2). 
 
Consequently, intuitions are themselves fundamentally characterized by their 
being in space and time. This does not imply that intuitions are physical 
particulars. Kant sometimes suggests that he thinks of intuitions in terms of 
shapes and durations (A21/B35; A141/B180). More specifically, Kant sometimes 
suggests that an intuition can be seen as a shape developing itself in time (cf. 
A724/B752). Shapes and durations, in turn, are in some sense abstract objects. 
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 Recently, however, Heal [64] has given a prominent place to the imagination in her analysis of 
knowledge of other minds. 
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 Note also the following. A typically modern complaint against Kant is that 
he could not offer an account of reasoning with relations. Reasoning in geometry, 
however, employs relations very often, witness examples such as “is parallel 
with,” “lies adjacent to,” “lies to the left of,” etc. Such an account of relational 
reasoning would only be possible since the theory of relations was developed 
around the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. This point has been 
stressed by Russell [137], pp.457-8, and was repeated many times afterwards. 
 We now see, however, that in Kant’s views, intuitions are to considerable 
extent constituted by relations. This observation may very well put Russell’s 
complaint against Kant in an entirely different light. If the relations constitutive 
for an intuition are employed in the course of a proof (and we think that they are; 
see § 4.2), then, contrary to what Russell says, then we possibly have here the 
beginnings of a Kantian account of reasoning with relations. Whatever the details 
of such an account would look like, the least we can say is this. In Kant’s view, 
relations would not be expressed in terms of relational expressions such as is 
parallel with, lies adjacent to, lies to the left of, etc. (as Russell would have it), 
but intuitively, i.e., in terms of intuitions. 
 Of course, relational reasoning, as we nowadays see it, heavily involves the 
use of variables and quantifiers, and it is far from clear how Kant would take 
account of that. Nevertheless, it clearly appears that Kant does at least have a 
means to represent relations. This seems to give reasoning with intuitions—if 
there is such a thing—a potential expressive richness going significantly beyond 
the syllogistic logic forming the standard in Kant’s time. For syllogistic logic, 
due to its “monadic” nature, cannot take account of reasoning with relations. It is 
interesting to wonder to what extent Kant himself was aware of this potential 
richness of intuitions with respect to standard syllogistic logic. Let us return to 
our original discussion. 
 We noticed that, in Kant’s view, an intuition is to a considerable extent 
constituted by spatio-temporal relations—relations in space and time, that is. In 
what follows, we mainly consider intuitions insofar as they are constituted by 
relations in space. In Kant’s view, temporal relations typically come into play in 
case of inferences involving, for example, continuity (cf. A162-3/B203-4; A168-
71/B210-3). However, entering into this vast territory would quickly make this 
work too lengthy. See Friedman [49], chapter 1, and especially pp.71-80, for a 
historical discussion of various issues involved. 
 Thus, as we think of them, intuitions can be seen as content organized in 
space (in terms of spatial relations). This suggests that intuitions are items of 
knowledge of a quite specific format. We submit that intuitions are in this respect 
diagrammatic. In order to come to closer grips with this proposal, Kant himself 
does give us enough footholds. Therefore, we set our discussion of Kant on a 
hold for a while, and briefly turn our attention to more recent discussions of 
diagrammatic representations and diagrammatic reasoning. Thus, we hope to find 
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convenient and illustrative concepts serving us as a means in order to deepen our 
understanding of Kant’s notion of intuition. 
 Using modern resources in order to increase understanding of Kant’s views 
is not uncommon in contemporary Kant scholarship. For example, people have 
often found it profitable to resort to modern, logical means as an instrument in 
order to interpret Kant. Hintikka [72], [73], [75] is a notable example in this 
respect. Parsons also holds that “one must use what one knows” in order to gain 
understanding of a philosopher, and modern logic need to form no exception in 
this respect (cf. Parsons [118], pp.43-4). However, rather than logic we think it is 
also quite useful—appropriate, indeed—to turn our eyes towards certain insights 
arising from disciplines such as cognitive science and AI. And this is precisely 
what we shall do. Kant’s views on reasoning and proof raise themes that, from a 
contemporary point of view, not only pertain to logic, but also have close 
affiliations with problems and issues discussed in these fields (cf. § 2.4). Let us 
briefly review the relevant literature in order to see what main characteristics are 
attributed to diagrams. 
 Though there is no general agreement on how to characterize a diagram 
(Jamnik [85], p.3), many scholars are of the opinion that diagrams are spatial 
representations, that is, diagrams are representations in space. See, for example, 
Glasgow and Papadias [57], p.356; Chandrasekaran [28], p.2. In this respect, 
diagrams are thought to contrast with propositions or sentences. For example, a 
written sentence is written in some space (e.g., the flat, two-dimensional surface 
of a piece of paper). However, the spatial arrangement of the constituents of that 
sentence does not seem to be constitutive for that sentence. We may say that the 
spatial structure is a feature of the medium in which the sentence in realized, and 
not of the sentence itself. In a way, the medium constrains the sentence to be 
structured in a certain spatial way. 
 The point may be strengthened by noting that the same sentence may be 
spoken. Accordingly, the constituents of that sentence are primarily arranged in 
time, and not so much in space. By the same token, neither the temporal structure 
of a spoken sentence is constitutive for that sentence. In contrast, the temporal 
structure of a spoken sentence is a feature of the medium in which that sentence 
is realized as a spoken sentence. Perhaps, then, we better not speak of a written 
sentence, but of “a sentence-as-it-is-written” instead. A similar point holds for 
spoken sentences.138 
 A visual aspect is often thought to form another characteristic feature of 
diagrams. Diagrams are supposed to be visually perceivable. Again, see Glasgow 
and Papadias [57], p.356; Chandrasekaran [28], p.2. Kulpa has argued that the 
visual aspect of diagrams implies that diagrams are at least two-dimensional 
(Kulpa [98], p.81). We return to this point later. 
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 This distinction between sentences on the one hand and the media in which they are realized on 
the other is adapted from Lyons [108], p.60. Below, we apply the distinction to diagrams. 
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 Note that insofar as diagrams are visual, it becomes problematic to think of 
Kant’s intuitions a priori as diagrams. However, a caveat is in order here. For it 
appears that the cognitive science and AI literature on diagrammatic reasoning 
has its focus almost exclusively on what are often called external diagrams. 
These are defined as certain artifacts printed (or written, or drawn) on, for 
example, a piece of paper or on a computer screen. Agents in the possession of 
the appropriate faculties can visually perceive external diagrams. External 
diagrams contrast with internal diagrams, which are diagrammatic 
representations in the mind. Internal diagrams are also called images (cf. 
Glasgow, Chandrasekaran, Narayanan [58], introduction, p.xvii)). 
 It does not seem, however, that intuitions a priori can be compared with 
external diagrams, precisely because the latter are visible (cf. § 3.3). However, 
we should note the following. Suppose a mathematician proving a theorem 
employs an intuition a priori. Typically, this mathematician will have his proof 
accompanied by a diagram he draws on, say, a piece of paper (or on the 
blackboard). The latter is an external diagram. We may suspect, that the structure 
of this external diagram supplies us interesting information about the structure of 
the intuition a priori which plays an essential role in the proof. Perhaps, then, a 
consideration of external diagrams will yield us an interesting inside view on 
Kantian intuitions a priori. 
 Can intuitions a priori be compared with internal diagrams? This is a 
question difficult to answer. One consideration that seems relevant here is that, in 
Kant’s view, intuitions are representations whose objects live at the conscious 
level (§ 3.2). However, it is not clear that the object of an internal diagram is 
always something an agent is conscious of. Though admittedly, our impression is 
that the literature is not always very clear on this point. Thus, in order for us to 
decide whether or not intuitions a priori can be identified with internal diagrams, 
we at least need to know at what level the objects represented by internal 
diagrams are supposed to live. For otherwise, the question has no “bite” and 
every answer to it would more or less float in the air. 
 
Geometric diagrams. In line with the scope of the present study (§ 1.2), we 
focus on geometric diagrams. Iwasaki makes the following suggestive remarks, 
indicating some sort of demarcation of geometric diagrams (“geometry 
diagrams”) from other types of diagrams: 
 
Geometry diagrams have characteristics that are not shared by diagrams in 
any other domains. Most importantly, geometry diagrams stand for 
themselves. In other words, they are not abstractions of the real world or 
anything else that is the real object of interest. In almost every other 
domain, diagrams represent something other than themselves that one is 
trying to study (Iwasaki [84], p.661). 
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Iwasaki’s point, we take it, is somewhat as follows: in case of geometric 
diagrams, we typically take lines, circles, triangles, cubes, etc. to be just that: 
lines, circles, triangles, cubes, etc..139 In this respect, geometric diagrams are 
different from the diagrams as they are typically used in, for example, other 
branches of mathematics, where we often take diagrams as representing 
“something other than themselves.” For example, in case of diagrams as they are 
used in category theory, we take an arrow as a morphism between two objects. In 
elementary set theory, we take, say, an oval (or circle) as a set. In discrete 
mathematics (e.g., graph theory), we take a line as an edge in a graph, etc. Much 
more examples could be added. 
 Below are four examples of geometric diagrams: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We note that diagrams (I) and (IV) differ from diagrams (II) and (III) in that in 
the latter several textual labels occur. In particular, diagram (II) involves the 
labels A, B, and C; diagram (III) involves the label . 
 Hammer [62], pp.11, 13-6, has argued that diagrams typically occur in the 
context of larger documents that also involves text, and hence language. In this 
respect, labels would serve to assist cross-referencing between text and diagram 
(ibid., p.16). Note that this suggests that Hammer mainly considers external 
diagrams. As the diagrams we are interested in, figure in certain cognitive 
procedures (i.e., proof procedures) carried out by a mathematician, we do not 
think that they deserve explicit study. We need not to assume that this 
mathematician adds these labels himself. In particular, since in Kant’s view on 
mathematical proof language does not seem to play a very significant role, the 
function of labels that Hammer indicates hardly comes into play. Nevertheless, in 
what follows, we will frequently talk and reason about certain diagrams. To this 
end, the addition of labels by us is extremely convenient. We take it that labels 
form a means to access diagrams for us talking and reasoning about diagrams, 
and not so much for a mathematician who in Kant’s view reasons with them. We 
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 Iwasaki furthermore states that it is precisely this property of geometric diagrams making them 
the ideal object of study (ibid. [84], p.660). 
 A 

(I) (II) (III) (IV) 
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may imagine that this mathematician accesses his diagrams by other means, for 
example, by attending to them. Let us address a further issue. 
 The question may arise whether diagram (IV) is a two-dimensional diagram 
representing a three-dimensional object (namely, a cube), or that diagram (IV) is 
itself three-dimensional. The literature appears to be divided on the issue. For 
example, some are inclined to think of diagrams (insofar as they are spatial 
representations) as two-dimensional. Such authors have a tendency to think of a 
diagram in terms of an inscription, or a two-dimensional pixel-like representation 
(e.g., Furnas [51]). Others, in contrast, also allow that diagrams can be either 
two- or three-dimensional (cf. above). In this respect, then, diagram (IV) is seen 
as a three-dimensional diagram. See, for example, Horn [80], pp.28, 67-68. 
Engelhardt, too, holds that the standard drawing of a cube (i.e., diagram (IV) 
above) is three-dimensional. Specifically, Engelhardt identifies a diagram with 
what we see in the representation, which, in this case, is a three-dimensional cube 
(Engelhardt [38], p.21; see also below). We found no indication in the literature 
indicating that the dimensionality of diagrams may be other than two or three. 
 In what follows, we tend to go with the latter view. Accordingly, we think of 
diagram (IV) has having a three-dimensional spatial structure. The others, in 
contrast, we think of as having a two-dimensional spatial structure. (Diagram (I) 
we think of as a line in two-dimensional space.) In short, then, diagrams are 
either of dimension two or three. 
 We distinguish between a diagram and the medium in which it is realized 
(cf. above). Diagrams can be realized in different media. For example, diagrams 
(I)-(IV) above come in the drawn (or printed) medium. As such, they are external 
diagrams. Alternatively, a diagram may be merely imagined, making it an 
internal diagram.140 One may propose that a diagram can also be stored or 
represented in a computer. Without denying this, it nevertheless seems that the 
typical spatial properties of a diagram will get lost accordingly (at least on some 
level of representation). Related to this is the following. 
 It has been pointed out in the literature that a diagram is expressible as a set 
of sentences (e.g., Lindsay [105], p.116). Consequently, it may seem that a 
diagram can also come in the linguistic medium. However, even if we grant this 
point—though it is not clear whether and why we should—, it may again be said 
that the typical spatial properties of diagrams would be lost in this case. Perhaps 
it is more accurate to say that we can describe a diagram in terms of a set of 
sentences. The point is that certain typical diagrammatic features may not be 
adequately reflected in such a description. 
 The point can perhaps be rephrased as follows. Although it may be that a 
diagram and a set of sentences have the same content, they may express it in 
different modes. A set of sentences expresses a certain content in a linguistic 
mode (let us call it), while a diagram expresses a content in a diagrammatic 
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 See also A713/B741. 
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mode. Shimojima has suggested that these differences in mode of expression turn 
on a match or mismatch between certain structural constraints on a representation 
(a sentence or a diagram) on the one hand and their targets on the other. These 
structural constraints on a representation are intimately related on the geometric 
structure of the medium in which they are realized. See Shimojima [144] for 
details. 
 In the light of the above considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
a diagram is to a considerable extent constituted by features of certain specific 
media in which it is possibly realized, and not by those of other media (cf. 
Sloman [148], p.217). These features turn on the spatial structure of the realizing 
medium. If a medium is not in the possession of an appropriate spatial structure, 
then it seems that a diagram cannot be realized in that medium as a diagram. In 
this case, the structure of the realizing medium is such that it cannot adequately 
reflect certain specifically diagrammatic features of a diagram. Thus, one reason 
why diagrams cannot be adequately realized in language is perhaps that 
sentences are typically not in the possession of spatial structure. 
 Since spatial structure is a geometrical notion, diagrams are in part 
constituted by the geometry of the realizing medium. The geometric structure of 
the media in which diagrams are realized is what we call diagrammatic space.141 
One can conceive of diagrammatic space in terms of Kant’s a priori intuition of 
space (cf. A22-30/B37-45). Given our terminology, it is certainly in line with 
Kant’s thought to say that the structure of diagrammatic space is Euclidean 
(A25/B40). 
 
Intuitions as diagrammatic items of knowledge: a reconstruction. We define 
a diagram as a complex object comprised by a collection of diagrammatic 
relations among diagrammatic objects in a diagrammatic space (cf. also 
Engelhardt [38]). We represent diagrammatic space either as 2 or 3. Thus, it is 
not to be assumed that diagrammatic space is 2 or 3; in contrast, 2 or 3 are 
two models of diagrammatic space. In the former case, we refer to diagrammatic 
space as two-dimensional space; in the latter case, we refer to it as three-
dimensional space. We assume that the geometrical structure of these spaces is 
Euclidean, something which is certainly not uncongenial to Kant’s views on 
space (cf. A25/B40-1). 
 Since, because of certain contextual factors, the same configuration of 
diagrammatic relations among diagrammatic objects can determine different 
diagrams (cf. above), we also take these contextual factors as constitutive for a 
diagram. Somewhat more precisely, then, we can represent a diagram as a 
quadruple (Σ, ℜ, C, ). Here, Σ is a diagrammatic space, ℜ is a set of 
diagrammatic relations in Σ among the diagrammatic objects in C, and  is a 
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 This terminology is adapted from Engelhardt [38], pp.21-2, who understands it somewhat 
differently. 
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context (see below). A diagram is not a quadruple (Σ, ℜ, C, ). In contrast, such 
a quadruple records certain relevant features of a diagram. 
 Occasionally, we wish to add labels to diagrams in order to facilitate talking 
and reasoning about diagrams. We wish to think of labels as a specific type of 
diagrammatic objects. We can frame the following definition. A labeled diagram 
is a quadruple (Σ, ℜ, C  Λ, ). Here, Λ is set of diagrammatic objects whose 
members we refer to as labels. The quadruple (Σ, ℜ, C, ) is a diagram in the 
usual sense (cf. above). As suggested earlier, it should be understood that labels 
are typically added to diagrams by us talking and reasoning about diagrams, and 
not necessarily by a mathematician who, in Kant’s view, reasons with them. Let 
us provide some further elucidation. 
 Consider any labeled diagram. Examples of diagrammatic objects are those 
we refer to as points, lines, curves, or labels. Labels typically are textual objects 
such as letters (e.g., A, B, C, etc.). Diagrammatic relations are spatial relations—
or so we have assumed. By this we do not mean relational expressions such as, 
for example, x lies to the left of y or u lies above v.142 In contrast, diagrammatic 
relations are relations in space—diagrammatic space, that is. Thus, the following 
may be considered as a representation of two respective examples of 
diagrammatic relations (in two-dimensional space): 
 
 
 
             u 
      
    x   y 
 
             v 
 
 
 
The leftmost diagrammatic relation can be described in terms of the relational 
expression x lies to the left of y; the rightmost diagrammatic relation can be 
described in terms of the relational expression u lies above v. Diagrammatic 
objects are objects entered on the places of the variables.  
 Engelhardt [38], § 2.5, discusses a broad inventory of diagrammatic 
relations. We consider only the following: spatial clustering (of which labeling 
forms a specific case), lineup, and linking. 
1. Spatial clustering is the spatial grouping of several different diagrammatic 
objects into a separate cluster by way of a proximity relation. Diagrammatic 
objects that are related according to such a proximity relation are said to form a 
spatial cluster. 
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 Adding variables where objects (relata) can be entered. 
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 Labeling is specific case of spatial clustering. As an example, reconsider 
diagram (III), a geometric diagram we presented earlier. In this case, the letter  
forms a spatial cluster together with a closed curve. Naturally enough, we say 
that the letter  labels the circle represented.  
 A caveat must be mentioned, however. In order let  be the label and the 
circle be the labeled object (and not, for example, the other way around) the 
object  needs to have a different so-called syntactic role than the circle. See 
Engelhardt [38], 32, and 74-8 for further discussion. 
2. In case of a lineup, several diagrammatic objects are related in terms of a 
string. A lineup may be ordered or unordered. In case of an ordered lineup, a 
permutation of the diagrammatic objects constituting the lineup changes the 
diagram; in case of an unordered lineup the diagram will not change. An 
example of an ordered lineup is a comic strip. An example of an unordered 
lineup is a sequence of icons on a window of a word processor. 
3. Linking involves several diagrammatic objects any of which functions as a 
node or as a connector. (These correspond to two respective syntactic roles. See 
above.) For example, lines or arrows can link several points. When such a 
configuration involves no branching it is called a linear chain. An example of a 
linear chain is the diagram below: 
 
 
     •  •  
         •  •  • 
 
 
 
When a configuration of nodes and connectors forms a closed loop, it is called a 
closed chain. A tree is a linking configuration that involves branching from one 
node (the root) and involves no circular chains. A network is a linking 
configuration that involves at least one closed loop. It follows from this 
definition that every closed chain is a network. An example of a closed chain is a 
diagram representing a triangle. We may say that the nodes represent the corner 
points and the connectors represent the sides. Examples of networks are diagrams 
(IV), (V) and (VI) above. 
 What a diagram is depends in part on the intentions of a possible user of a 
diagram. In order to illustrate this, reconsider diagram (II) above. It is natural to 
refer to this diagram as a triangle (or triangle ABC), especially within the current 
context (i.e., a discussion of geometric diagrams). However, within the context of 
a discussion on, for example, graph theory, we may equally naturally refer to it as 
a complete planar graph with three nodes labeled A, B, and C. It seems that the 
context in which it is produced and used in part constitutes that diagram. We 
think that this context at least includes the intentions of the user of a diagram. 
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 Accordingly, the notion of diagram we have described is in some sense non-
reductionistic. In particular, a diagram is not anything neutral like an inscription 
or a collection of inscriptions. In contrast, a diagram corresponds to what we 
“see” in an inscription. What we see in an inscription involves context. We do 
think that Kant’s notion of intuition also involves the kind of intentionality we 
have in mind here (cf. § 3.2). What an intuition is depends at least on the 
intentions of an agent. Changing these intentions changes the intuition. See also § 
4.2, where we speculate on the workings of intentionality. 
 Suppose a diagram  is given. Which objects are recognized as 
diagrammatic objects constituting , will generally depend on certain contextual 
factors. For example, the diagrammatic objects recognized in diagram (II) above 
may be three lines and the labels A, B, and C. Alternatively, the diagrammatic 
objects recognized may be a triangle and the three labels. In the latter case, we 
consider the triangle as primitive, in the former case as composite. 
 There are still other interesting possibilities. Thus, in case of diagram (II), 
one may also recognize a certain region of two-dimensional space as a 
diagrammatic object, namely, the region enclosed by the lines AB, BC, and AC. 
Something along these lines seems to be suggested by Euclid’s definition of a 
triangle. Thus, Euclid defines a line as a “breadthless length.” A straight line “is 
a line which lies evenly with the points on itself.” A boundary is “an extremity of 
anything.” A figure is defined as that what is contained by any boundary or 
boundaries. Finally, then, triangle is a figure contained by three straight lines 
(Euclid [41], I, pp.153-4). The impression we get is that Euclid conceives of a 
triangle more or less as a certain region of the plane. 
 Consider also consider Hilbert’s definition of a triangle. Hilbert [69], p.5, 
defines a line143 as a “system of two points.”144 A line is referred to as, for 
example, AB (or, what Hilbert takes to be the same line, BA). A and B are called 
the endpoints of the line. A line combination145 is a “system of lines” AB, BC, 
CD,…, KL, connecting endpoints A and L of respectively the lines AB and KL. A 
polygon is a line combination AB, BC, CD,…, KL such that A and L coincide. 
The lines AB, BC, etc are called the sides of the polygon. Finally, a polygon with 
three sides is called a triangle. (Cf. ibid., p.9) 
 It appears that Hilbert conceives of a line as something like a set of two 
points (the end points of the line). In the light of this, a triangle is conceived of as 
something like a set of three lines, that is, as a set any member of which is a set 
consisting of two points. In diagrammatic terms, then, Hilbert would perhaps 
recognize the points A, B, and C as diagrammatic objects, or perhaps something 
like the sets {A, B}, {B, C}, and {A, C}. 
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 Hilbert’s own German term is Strecke. 
144
 The term point remains undefined; cf. Hilbert [69], p.2. 
145
 Hilbert’s own German term is Streckenzug. 
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 What we observe is that Euclid and Hilbert appear to have two different 
conceptions as to what a triangle is (these conceptions manifest themselves in the 
respective definitions they provide). In the light of this, the point we wish to 
make is that, in the case we are currently considering (i.e., diagram (II) above), 
what diagrammatic objects are recognized will in part depend on one’s 
conception of a triangle. Let us address a final issue. 
 Consider again diagram (II) above. In order to fix our thoughts, suppose we 
adopt the first option. Then we may refer to the lines as AB, BC, and AC 
respectively. These three lines and the three labels are interrelated by way of 
several diagrammatic relations we refer to as R1,…, Rn.146 Collectively, given a 
context  (about which we will not bother now), may represent diagram (II) as 
follows: 
 
 = (2, {R1,…, Rn}, {AB, BC, AC}  {A, B, C}, ). 
 
Besides the three lines AB, BC and AC (and the labels A, B, and C), it is natural to 
distinguish other diagrammatic objects. For example, the three corner points of 
the triangle may also be recognized as diagrammatic objects. These corner points 
may be referred to as A, B, and C respectively. Note that we now do not think of 
the labels primarily as constituents of the diagram . In contrast, we use the 
labels as a means to refer to the aforementioned corner points. 
 The corner points A, B and C, however, are strictly speaking not 
diagrammatic objects in . We call such objects emergent diagrammatic objects. 
Roughly, emergent diagrammatic objects are diagrammatic objects that can be 
recognized provided that others diagrammatic objects are. Besides the corner 
points A, B, and C, other emergent diagrammatic objects may be recognized, for 
example, ∠ABC, ∠BAC, and ∠ACB. Also, triangle ABC may be recognized as an 
emergent diagrammatic object in this case. 
 Once we have emergent diagrammatic objects, we also have the possibility 
of what we may call emergent diagrammatic relations. For example, once we 
have recognized ∠ABC and ∠BAC as (emergent) diagrammatic objects, one may 
also wish to speak in terms of a relation of incidence between those two angles. 
 
Dynamic diagrams. Diagrams, as we’ve seen them thus far, are static objects. 
However, there is also the possibility of diagrams that change through time. Such 
diagrams may be called dynamic.147 The relevance of considering diagrams lies 
in the fact that, in Kant’s view, intuitions are constituted by a configuration of 
relations in space and time.148 In order to facilitate our discussion, we assume 
                                                 
146
 Assuming that there are a finite number of such relations. 
147
 Nowadays, dynamic (or interactive) diagrams have been studied mainly in the area of computer 
graphics. See Card, Mackinlay, Schneidermann [25]. 
148
 See especially A162-3/B203 for an illustration for the temporal nature of intuitions. 
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discrete time. That is, we shall assume that time consists of a succession of 
discrete instants. 
 More elaborately, a dynamic diagram is a diagram that changes through time 
by means of the successive addition or deletion of diagrammatic objects and 
diagrammatic relations by an agent. Thus, a dynamic diagram is one that evolves. 
We can understand the dynamics of diagrams in terms of several operations that 
are performed on it. Given a diagram, an agent operates on it and thus produces 
another diagram. 
 At any instant of time, the development of a dynamic diagram is in a certain 
stage. This stage can be taken as a static diagram. Accordingly, we can trace a 
dynamic diagram by recording the successive stages enters in the course of its 
development. We often tend to refer to such a stage as a diagram stage. A 
diagram stage can be seen as a dynamic diagram projected on a time instants. 
 In the present study, dynamic diagrams are extremely important. In regard of 
Kant’s views on proof, the dynamics of the diagrams we will meet comes 
precisely as the result executing several constructive procedures. These 
constructive procedures either create a diagrammatic representation or modify a 
once created diagrammatic by performing a certain operation upon it. Thus, for 
example, in the course of a typical proof in geometry, one starts by creating a 
diagram of a triangle (say) and subsequently operates upon it by adding several 
auxiliary lines (see chapter 4, especially § 4.2). 
 
Concluding remarks. In view of § 3.3 (where we discussed Kant’s notion of 
construction), the main conclusion we draw from this section is that the product 
of a constructive process is a non-propositional, diagrammatic item of 
knowledge, i.e., an intuition. To construct a concept, therefore, means to exhibit 
that concept diagrammatically, in terms of an intuition a priori. We have 
construed an intuition as a configuration of spatial relations among diagrammatic 
objects in a diagrammatic space. The diagrammatic relations naturally 
correspond to what Kant calls the form of an intuition. The diagrammatic objects, 
in turn, naturally correspond to their content. Diagrammatic space, furthermore, 
more or less corresponds to Kant’s a priori intuition of space. In the next chapter 
(especially § 4.2), we shall see how, in Kant’s view, the diagrammatic structure 
of intuitions a priori is employed in the course of proving a theorem. 
 
 
§ 3.5. Conclusions 
 
In the present chapter, we investigated two crucial elements of Kant’s philosophy 
of mathematics: Kant’s notion of intuition and the intimately related notion of 
construction. In Kant’s view, a mathematical proof essentially proceeds 
constructively. This means that a mathematician, qua mathematician, essentially 
proves his theorems by means of constructing concepts. To construct a concept 
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means to exhibit a priori the intuition to that concept. The intuition produced by a 
process of exhibition a priori is itself an intuition a priori. 
 In Kant’s view, an intuition is an item of knowledge that is singular and 
immediate. Kant distinguished at least three different kinds of intuitions: 
intuitions a posteriori, intuitions a priori, and pure intuitions. Intuitions a priori 
play a crucial—indeed, essential—role in mathematics. Within the context of 
mathematics, intuitions a priori coincide with pure intuitions, that is, any intuition 
a priori playing a role in mathematics is a pure intuition and vice versa. Empirical 
intuitions come into play in what may be broadly referred to as the empirical 
sciences. 
 As to intuitions generally, we can distinguish between form and content. The 
former turns on the spatio-temporal organization of the latter. The form of an 
intuition resides in the knowing subject. In case of an intuition a posteriori, the 
content arises from experience. In case of an intuition a priori in mathematics, the 
content arises is produced by the productive imagination. It is precisely this point 
that makes it hard to compare an intuition a priori in mathematics with a state or 
episode of visual perception, since the latter typically involves the processing of 
sensations that come as the result of environmental actions on an agent’s sensory 
apparatus. The important role of the productive imagination in mathematical 
proof forms an aspect of Kant’s views on mathematical proof that has been 
overlooked by many Kant commentators. 
 The intuitions that form the product of constructive processes are 
fundamentally characterized by their being in space and time, which suggests that 
intuitions are non-propositional, diagrammatic items of knowledge. In the light of 
this, we have construed an intuition as a configuration of diagrammatic relations 
among diagrammatic objects in a diagrammatic space. Intuitions are made 
dynamic by adding a temporal dimension. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Proof in action 
 
 
 
  
The aim of the present chapter is to provide a thorough analysis (or 
interpretation) of The Passage. We shall carry out our analysis in the light of a 
methodological framework for proving theorems in mathematics due to the neo-
Platonic philosopher Proclus (410-485 A.D.149). Accordingly, this chapter 
consists of two main sections. We present and discuss Proclus’ methodological 
framework in § 4.1. Next, in § 4.2, The Passage is analyzed in terms of this 
framework. A concluding section brings this chapter to and end (§ 4.3). 
  
 
§ 4.1. Proclus’ methodological framework 
 
This section consists of three parts. In the first part, we shall present and discuss 
Proclus’ framework. In the second part, we will provide an elucidation. In the 
third concluding part we open up a few broader issues. 
 
Presentation and discussion. Proclus discusses his framework in his famous 
commentary on the first book of Euclid’s Elements [129]. It is summarized in the 
following: 
 
Every problem and every theorem that is furnished with all its parts should 
contain in itself all of the following: an enunciation, an exposition, a 
specification, a construction, a proof, and a conclusion (Proclus [129], 
p.159). 
 
Proclus sees every problem and every theorem ideally (“furnished with all its 
parts”) as broken up into six “parts” (see the next section for an elucidation). We 
make three terminological points. 
1. As can be seen from the citation above, one of the parts of a “theorem or 
problem” is called the proof. This word is a translation of the originally Greek 
word apodeixis (see Euclid [41], I, p.129). Motivated by this, we shall henceforth 
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 Cf. Heath, in Euclid [41], I, p.29. See also Morrow, in Proclus [129], xvi n.6. 
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use the term apodeixis rather than proof in order to refer to the relevant part of a 
problem or theorem. 
 The reason is that, from a modern point of view, it is more appropriate to 
refer to a proof as that what is comprised by what Proclus calls the exposition, 
specification, construction, apodeixis (using our terminology) and conclusion 
(see below). Accordingly, the term proof would suffer from overload had we 
used it also in order to refer to what we have now called the apodeixis. 
2. What Proclus calls a problem we henceforth call an existence theorem.150 
This terminological switch gives the impression that existence theorems are 
simply treated as a special kind of theorems. This is indeed what we intend (see 
point also point b. below). Accordingly, we won’t have to keep track of theorems 
as well as problems but we simply treat them as one of a kind. This will greatly 
facilitate our discussion. Henceforth, when we speak of theorems, we mean to 
include existence theorems as well. 
 The historical question to what extent this terminological point forms an 
adequate representation of Proclus’ own views (or anyone else’s views) is 
something that shall not be treated here.151 
3. In the citation above, one of the parts of a theorem or existence theorem is 
called the construction. Here, construction is traditionally often understood as 
mechanical construction, for example, by means of ruler and compass. It turns 
out that construction in this sense is typically different from the way Kant 
understands the term construction (see    § 3.3). It turns out, however, that 
Kantian construction, within the context of traditional geometry, can be naturally 
associated with what Proclus calls construction (§ 4.2). This motivates us not too 
choose a different term for what Proclus calls construction in order to distinguish 
it from Kantian construction. As a consequence, the term construction now 
becomes somewhat ambiguous. We do not consider this very harmful, however. 
The context will always make clear what sense of construction we have in mind. 
For more on Proclus’ understanding of the term construction, see the elucidation 
below. 
 Collectively, then, we find that every theorem (existence theorems included) 
ideally consists of the following six parts (henceforth referred to as items):  
 
                                                 
150
 The term construction problem is also used in the literature. 
151
 For example, Proclus himself clearly suggests that there is a difference between existence 
theorems (i.e., what he calls problems) and theorems when he says: 
 
Again the propositions that follow from the first principles he [i.e., Euclid] divides 
into problems and theorems, the former including the construction of figures, the 
division of them into sections, subtraction from and additions to them, and in 
general the characters that result from such procedures, and the latter concerned 
with demonstrating inherent properties belonging to each figure (Proclus [129], 
p.63). 
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 • enunciation, 
 • exposition,152 
 • specification, 
 • construction, 
 • apodeixis, 
 • conclusion. 
 
For convenience, let us refer to the above list as Proclus’ methodological 
framework for proving theorems in mathematics, or Proclus’ framework for 
short. That Proclus’ framework is indeed a methodological framework for 
proving theorems in mathematics will be argued below. 
 We need to discuss a few more terminological points.  
a. Looking at, for example, a mathematics textbook or journal article, a proof is 
typically presented in combination with a statement of the theorem proved.153 It 
will turn out that the statement of a theorem can be associated with what Proclus 
calls the enunciation. Furthermore, the proof can be naturally associated with the 
remaining five parts of Proclus framework—or so we shall argue. Therefore, the 
modern subdivision in terms of theorem and proof can be easily seen as a kind of 
superstructure imposed on Proclus’ own six-fold subdivision. Both Proclus’ 
framework and a copy of it with the imposed superstructure are depicted below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152
 Instead of exposition, the term ecthesis is also sometimes used in the literature. E.g., Hintikka 
and Remes [79]. 
153
 See the appendix for examples. 
• enunciation 
• exposition 
• specification 
• construction 
• apodeixis 
• conclusion 
theorem/ 
existence theorem 
Proclus’ framework 
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In what follows, we shall use the modern point of view. Hence, we think of a 
proof as (ideally) consisting of five items. 
b. Earlier, we introduced the term existence theorem. How it is that we can treat 
existence theorems as a kind of theorems?  From a more traditional point of 
view, a construction problem can be seen as a request to produce a certain object, 
typically by some mechanical means such as a ruler and a compass. For example, 
a well-known existence theorem asks us to produce an equilateral triangle on a 
given finite straight line by means of a ruler and a compass (cf. Euclid [41], I, 
p.241).154 Accordingly, an existence theorem is not primarily something—i.e., a 
theorem—that one proves to be true. 
 However, from a more modern point of view, an existence theorem can be 
easily reformulated in such a way that it becomes a genuine theorem. For 
example, the existence theorem mentioned above can be reformulated as follows: 
“For every straight-line segment, there exists an equilateral triangle having that 
line segment as one side.” One now easily sees why the term existence theorem is 
used. What is required is to prove that a certain object exists. 
 One way of proving this theorem is by producing an equilateral triangle as 
required by means of a ruler and a compass (cf. Euclid [41], I, pp.241-2). 
However, there may be alternative ways to prove this theorem. For example, one 
may suggest proving it by means of a reductio ad absurdum, in broad outlines as 
follows. One first assumes that the required equilateral triangle does not exist and 
subsequently derives a contradiction from that assumption. Hence, it exists. 
 If one finds this an acceptable strategy (which not everyone does), then one 
may hold that, according to this strategy, the existence of the equilateral is being 
proved without producing one. At any rate, how one specifically proves an 
                                                 
154
 In this case, the ruler is an unmarked straight edge. 
• enunciation 
• exposition 
• specification 
• construction 
• apodeixis 
• conclusion 
theorem/ 
existence theorem 
proof 
Proclus’ framework from a 
modern point of view 
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existence theorem is not so important for us, however. Again, what is important 
is that one can treat the original construction problem as a theorem to prove. 
 
Elucidation. In this section we elucidate the respective items of Proclus’ 
framework. We proceed as follows. Given any item, we first consider what 
Proclus himself says on the point; subsequently we provide an illustration by 
referring to the corresponding part of a theorem or proof from Euclid’s Elements. 
In this respect, we will take theorem 32 from the first book of the Elements 
(henceforth simply referred to as theorem 32) and its proof as our example. 
 Euclid’s theorem 32 is in effect a identical to theorem 1 from § 1.1. Also, 
Euclid’s proof matches Kant’s description of the proof in The Passage closely. 
We shall exploit this in our analysis of The Passage in   § 4.2. 
 This is Euclid’s statement of theorem 32: 
 
In any triangle, if one of the sides be produced, the exterior angle is equal 
to the two interior and opposite angles, and the three interior angles of the 
triangle are equal to two right angles (Euclid [41], I, p.316). 
 
He subsequently presents the following proof (ibid., pp.316-7): 
 
Let ABC be a triangle, and let one side of it BC be produced to D; 
 I say that the exterior angle ACD is equal to the two interior and 
opposite angles CAB, ABC, and the three interior angles of the triangle 
ABC, BCA, CAB are equal to two right angles. 
 For let CE be drawn through the point C parallel to the straight line AB.                                   
           [I. 31] 
Then, since AB is parallel to CE, and AC 
has fallen upon them, the alternate angles 
BAC, ACE are equal to one another.    [I. 29] 
 Again, since AB is parallel to CE, and the 
straight line BD has fallen upon them, the 
exterior angle ECD is equal to the interior 
and opposite angle ABC.                [I. 29] 
 But the angle ACE was also proved equal to the angle BAC; therefore 
the whole angle ACD is equal to the two interior and opposite angles BAC, 
ABC. 
 Let the angle ACB be added to each; therefore the angles ACD, ACB are 
equal to the three angles ABC, BCA, CAB. 
 But the angles ACD, ACB are equal to two right angles;        [I. 13] 
 therefore the angles ABC, BCA, CAB are also equal to two right angles. 
 Therefore etc. 
Q.E.D. 
 
The expressions between square brackets are taken over from Heath’s edition of 
the Elements. They indicate Euclid’s appeal to other theorems (or postulates, or 
common notions, or definitions). For example, the expression ‘[I. 31]’ means that 
 E 
 B 
 A 
C  D 
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Euclid has made an appeal to theorem 31 from the first book of the Elements. In 
case of other proofs (but not in case of the example we are currently 
considering), we also find expressions such as ‘[C.N. 1]’ or ‘[Post. 5],’ indicating 
an appeal to a common notion or a postulate respectively. Also, expressions 
referring to a definition are found; these are indicated by, for example, ‘[Def. 
10]’ (e.g., Euclid [41], I, p.269). Let us now clarify the status of Proclus’ 
framework. 
 Very likely, Proclus formulated his framework based on a written version of 
(the first book of) the Elements. Accordingly, the impression may arise that 
Proclus’ framework primarily aims at describing a certain type of texts, namely, 
the proofs as they are written in the Elements. We think that this way of looking 
at Proclus’ framework is somewhat one-sided. For as it will turn out, Proclus’ 
explanations of the respective parts of his framework suggest a somewhat 
different perspective. Specifically, Proclus strongly suggests that the items of his 
framework concern certain types of procedures that are carried out when a 
Euclidean theorem is proved (e.g., the making of a construction, or the making of 
an inference, etc.; see below for details). The impression arises that Proclus’ 
framework is a methodological framework for proving Euclidean theorems. We 
will return to this point at the end of our elucidations. 
 Let us now explain the successive items of Proclus’ framework, beginning 
with the enunciation. We make a few observations along the way, without taking 
a definite stand on the issues raised. Most of these issues will receive due 
attention in our analysis of The Passage (see below). 
 
1. The enunciation. As to the enunciation, Proclus says: 
 
[…] the enunciation states what is given and what is being sought from it, 
for a perfect enunciation consists of both these parts (Proclus [129], p.159). 
 
Apparently, an enunciation is twofold: it concerns something that is supposed to 
be given as well as something that is supposed to be sought from it. Put 
differently, we may say that an enunciation concerns something given on the one 
hand and a goal to be achieved on the other. A first impression that may 
accordingly arise is that the enunciation sets forth a certain task or problem: a 
goal that needs to be reached from something given. This point will be elaborated 
on in § 5.4. 
 In view of the example we are currently considering, it is natural to associate 
the enunciation with Euclid’s statement of theorem 32. 
 Setting details aside, can we distinguish the two aforementioned components 
in case of Euclid’s statement of theorem 32. In other words, considering the 
enunciation of theorem 32, can we distinguish between  what is given and what is 
sought? Broadly speaking, what is given appears to be something like “any 
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triangle” (or “a triangle” or “triangles”155), or any triangle having one of its sides 
extended. 
 In case of theorem 32, the goal (“what is sought”) seems twofold. In 
particular, the goal can be associated with two propositions, namely 
 
 (i) that the external angle is equal to the two opposite and internal angles 
 (ii) that the sum of the internal angles is equal to two right angles. 
 
Apparently, then, to reach the goal (or “to find what is sought”) means: to 
establish (i) and (ii). 
 
2. The exposition. As regards the exposition, Proclus says: 
 
The exposition takes separately what is given and prepares it in advance for 
use in the investigation (ibid.). 
 
In the exposition, one takes apart one component of the enunciation, namely, that 
what is supposed to be given. Furthermore, Proclus suggests, a certain 
preparation takes place of the component that is taken apart. Furthermore, the 
“investigation” Proclus refers to presumably concerns the items 2-4 of Proclus’ 
framework. 
 In view of what Euclid has written down for us in the Elements, two things 
seem relevant to consider in this respect, namely a sentence fragment and a 
diagram. First, we have Euclid saying: 
 
Let ABC be a triangle, and let one side of it BC be produced to D; […]. 
 
Second, and related to this, we have the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155
 Heath’s translation of the Elements speaks in terms of any triangle and accordingly uses the 
indefinite pronoun any. However, he doesn’t so generally on other occasions. Therefore, no general 
conclusions can be based on Euclid’s use of the indefinite pronoun on this particular occasion. For 
example, Euclid sometimes alternatively uses the indefinite article a. See, e.g., his statement of 
theorem 6 from the first book of the Elements: “If in a triangle two angles be equal to one another, 
the sides which subtend the equal angles will also be equal to one another” (Euclid [41], I, p.255). 
At other occasions, he uses neither any nor a but simply speaks of “triangles” and the like. For 
example, theorem 5 of the same book is formulated as follows: “In isosceles triangles the angles at 
the base are equal to one another, and, if the equal straight lines be produced further, the angles 
under the base will be equal to one another (Euclid [41], I, p.251). As far as we can see, Euclid 
does not appear to use quantifiers such as all or every in this respect. 
PROOF IN ACTION 
 
110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We note that the extension of BC to the point called D is secured by Euclid’s 
second postulate which says that every finite straight line can be continuously 
extended in a straight line (Euclid [41], I, p.154). We do not find an indication of 
this in the quotation above. Furthermore, one may speculate that Euclid’s “Let 
ABC be a triangle” together with the corresponding constituent of the above 
diagram in one way or another involves an appeal to Euclid’s definition 19, 
which says, among other things, that a triangle is a figure enclosed by three 
straight lines (cf. Euclid [41], I, p.154).156 This is neither indicated in the 
quotation. 
 
3. The specification. Proclus says: 
 
The specification takes separately the thing that is sought and makes clear 
precisely what it is (Proclus [129], p.159). 
 
In other words, the specification takes apart and makes precisely clear the other 
component of the enunciation, namely, the goal that has to be reached. Note that, 
in Proclus’ view, the specification apparently involves an element of 
clarification: the specification not merely states the goal—it makes clear 
precisely what it is. We suspect that this element of clarification takes place in 
view of the diagram presented above: once the diagram is given, it can be made 
precisely clear what needs to be proved. In this respect, the enunciation on itself 
is considerably less clear. 
 In case of Euclid’s proof of theorem 32, the specification seems to concern 
the following: 
 
I say that the exterior angle ACD is equal to the two interior and opposite 
angles CAB, ABC, and the three interior angles of the triangle ABC, BCA, 
CAB are equal to two right angles. 
 
                                                 
156
 Written out in full, Euclid’s definition 19 reads: “Rectilineal figures are those which are 
contained by straight lines, trilateral figures being those contained by three, quadrilateral those 
contained by four, and multilateral those contained by more than four straight lines” (ibid.). 
 A 
C D 
 B 
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The impression may arise that the specification refers to the diagram that 
appeared to be associated with the exposition. (These references are facilitated by 
means of several combinations of labels.) In this respect, note in particular that 
Euclid refers to several spatial relations that constitute the diagram. For example, 
one angle is referred to as exterior, others as interior, or interior and opposite.157 
The reference to these spatial relations would seem to make no sense apart from a 
diagram in which these spatial relations occur as constituents. 
 
4. The construction. Proclus says: 
 
The construction adds what is lacking in the given for finding what is 
sought (ibid.). 
 
Apparently, the construction modifies that what is given in the exposition. 
 In the case of the proof of theorem 32, two things seem relevant for the 
construction. First, we have Euclid saying: 
 
[…] let CE be drawn through the point C parallel to the straight line AB. [I. 
31] 
 
Second, and related to this, we have the addition of a line to the diagram 
associated with the exposition. This results in a new diagram, for example, the 
diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of the diagram in particular is not obvious. The further remarks that can 
be made are similar to those made on behalf of the exposition. 
 We note that the construction involves an appeal to theorem 31 from the first 
book of the Elements (as indicated by the text). Let us quote Euclid’s own 
“enunciation” of this theorem: 
 
Through a given point to draw a straight line parallel to a given straight 
line (Euclid [41], I, p.315). 
 
                                                 
157
 See § 3.4. 
 E 
 A 
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Given the terminology we have chosen in this study, this may be taken as an 
example of an existence theorem. In the light of this, it can be reformulated thus: 
 
THEOREM 31. Given a point P and a straight line 	, there exists a line through P 
parallel to 	. 
 
In the history of Euclidean geometry, this theorem has been taken as a substitute 
for Euclid’s axiom of parallels. When taken accordingly, theorem 31 is more 
commonly known as Playfair’s axiom. 
 
5. The apodeixis. Proclus says:  
 
The proof [i.e., apodeixis] draws the proposed inference by reasoning 
scientifically from the propositions that have been admitted (Proclus [129], 
p.159). 
 
In drawing the inference, a mathematician typically uses other theorems that have 
already been proved (“admitted”). 
 Proclus seems to suggests that only one inference is being drawn in the 
apodeixis. However, one naturally feels inclined to say that, Euclid draws several 
inferences: 
 
Then, since AB is parallel to CE, and AC has fallen upon them, the alternate 
angles BAC, ACE are equal to one another.                                          [I. 29] 
 Again, since AB is parallel to CE, and the straight line BD has fallen 
upon them, the exterior angle ECD is equal to the interior and opposite 
angle ABC.                                                                                             [I. 29] 
 But the angle ACE was also proved equal to the angle BAC; therefore 
the whole angle ACD is equal to the two interior and opposite angles BAC, 
ABC. 
 Let the angle ACB be added to each; therefore the angles ACD, ACB are 
equal to the three angles ABC, BCA, CAB. 
 But the angles ACD, ACB are equal to two right angles;                 [I. 13] 
 therefore the angles ABC, BCA, CAB are also equal to two right angles. 
 
To be exact, five inferences can be distinguished. Remaining close to the original 
text, we can formulate these respective inferences as follows: 
 
(1) Line AB is parallel to CE, and AC intersects both. Therefore, 
 
∠BAC 
 ∠ACE. 
 
(2) Line AB is parallel to CE, and line BD intersects both. Therefore 
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∠ECD 
 ∠ABC. 
 
(3) ∠ACE 
 ∠BAC. Therefore, 
 
∠ACD 
 ∠BAC + ∠ABC. 
 
(4) ∠ACD 
 ∠BAC + ∠ABC. Therefore, 
 
∠ACD + ∠ACB 
 ∠BAC + ∠ABC + ∠ACB. 
 
(5) ∠ACD + ∠ACB 
 180°. Therefore, 
 
∠BAC + ∠ABC + ∠ACB 
 180°. 
 
We note that, as an addition to inference (1), we find a reference to theorem 29 
from the first book of the Elements: 
 
A straight line falling on parallel straight lines makes the alternate angles 
equal to one another, the exterior angle equal to the interior and opposite 
angle, and the interior angles on the same side equal to two right angles 
(Euclid [41], I, p.311). 
 
The theorem may be may be more conveniently formulated thus: 
 
THEOREM 29. If a line EF intersects two parallel lines AB and CD, in points G 
and H respectively, then () ∠AGH = ∠GHD,                    () ∠EGB = 
∠GHD, and () ∠BGH + ∠GHD = 180°. 
 
The diagram below provides clarification: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
C 
B 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
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Inference (2) is annotated by a reference to the same theorem. 
 There is no similar addition to inference (3), but we may suspect that it 
appeals to Euclid’s common notion 2: 
 
If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal (ibid., p.155). 
 
A similar point holds for inference (4). 
 Finally, as an addition to inference (5), we find a reference to theorem 13 
from the first book of the Elements: 
 
If a straight line is set up on a straight line make angles, it will make either 
two right angles or angles equal to two right angles (ibid., p.275). 
 
The theorem may be more conveniently formulated as: 
 
THEOREM 13. If a line AB is set upon a line CD, then both ∠CBA and ∠ABD are 
a right angle or ∠CBA + ∠ABD = 180°.  
 
The diagram below provides clarification: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The conclusion. Finally, we arrive at the conclusion, of which Proclus says: 
 
The conclusion reverts to the enunciation, confirming what has been 
proved (Proclus [129], p.159). 
 
Although Proclus is very brief on this point, it appears that in the conclusion a 
mathematician finally recollects what has been achieved previously. By 
reconsidering the enunciation, he makes clear that the theorem that had to be 
proved has indeed been proved. 
 It seems difficult to illustrate the conclusion by means of Euclid’s proof of 
theorem 32. Perhaps Euclid suppressed the conclusion at the moment he wrote 
“Therefore etc.” It is not obvious, however, what Euclid means by “etc.” Perhaps 
Euclid meant to say something to the effect that every triangle is such that the 
sum of its internal angles is equal to two right angles.  This proposition, then, 
belongs to what Proclus calls the conclusion. Clearly, however, the inference to 
A 
B C D 
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this proposition does not belong to the conclusion. For, as Proclus himself 
indicates, inference belongs to the apodeixis. 
 In the light of this, Proclus makes the following interesting remark: 
 
[…] mathematicians are accustomed to draw what is in a way a double 
conclusion. For when they have shown something to be true of a given 
figure, they infer that it is true in general, going from the particular to the 
universal conclusion (ibid., p.162). 
 
What Proclus seems to have in mind is that the conclusion is drawn with 
reference to a specific diagram (figure). Presumably, this is the diagram 
associated with the exposition, or the construction (see above). Next, a general 
conclusion is drawn. Perhaps, then, we must say that now the conclusion is 
drawn with reference to every diagram (or all diagrams) that could result after the 
exposition and construction. 
 It remains somewhat unclear why Proclus speaks of “what is in a way a 
double conclusion” (emphasis added). The impression arising is that Proclus 
means to say that the general conclusion is in a sense nothing but a repetition of 
the conclusion true of that one diagram. Furthermore, note that Proclus suggests 
that the conclusion is about a (or any) diagram, or every diagram. Indeed, Proclus 
speaks of showing something to be true of a given diagram. Presumably, then, the 
previous parts where also about that diagram (except, perhaps, for the 
enunciation and possibly also the exposition).158 
 
Concluding remarks. Let us take a few steps backwards and make a few general 
points. 
1. Let us first readdress and confirm a point that was made earlier. In view of 
what Proclus’ has said, we can now clearly see that several parts of his 
framework comprise a more or less foxed collection of procedures that are 
carried out in order to prove a theorem. Again, this entitles us to call Proclus’ 
framework a methodological framework en henceforth look at it accordingly. 
2. The method followed by Euclid in order to prove theorem 32 is considerably 
clear-cut, especially in the light of Proclus’ framework. In particular, it appeared 
that Euclid treats the items of Proclus’ framework more or less successively: 
Euclid starts with the enunciation; next comes the exposition, the specification, 
and so on. We must not expect, however, that every statement of a theorem and a 
proof proceed in such a neat manner. See our analysis of The Passage below. 
3. The precise range of Proclus’ methodological framework is not clear. Recall 
that Proclus’ presented his framework in a commentary on the first book of 
Euclid’s Elements. So, it would seem to apply at least to the theorems and proofs 
presented there. It would seem reasonable enough, though, to believe that 
Proclus’ framework applies to the whole of the Elements and not only to the first 
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 This suggests that, in Proclus’ view, the objects of geometry are diagrams (or figures). 
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book. Consequently, Proclus framework is a methodological framework for 
proofs at least for the whole of elementary traditional geometry. 
 Whether Proclus framework is intrinsically tied to elementary traditional 
geometry and is therefore only relevant in this specific setting is an interesting 
question to consider. For example, it is interesting to wonder to what extent 
Proclus’ framework applies to proofs in contemporary mathematics. However, 
we shall not discuss this point here. 
4. At least two views on the method followed by Euclid are possible. On the 
one hand, one can think of the methods followed by Euclid in order to prove 
theorem 32 as being reflected primarily by the text. For example, one may more 
specifically think that the text reflects the making of assumptions and several 
logical inferences. In this respect, on may proceed, the diagram provides merely 
a convenient but dispensable aid to illustrate this method. For example, 
commenting on a proof from Euclid’s Elements, Clark Glymour says: 
 
“The proof is like a short essay in which one sentence follows another in 
sequence. […] The proof comes with a picture […]. The picture illustrates 
the idea of the proof and makes the sentences in the proof easier to 
understand. Yet the picture itself does not seem to be part of the argument 
for the proposition [i.e., theorem], only a way of making the argument 
more easily understood (Glymour [59], pp.14-5).159 
 
Although Glymour’s words on the role of the diagram are cautionary, he clearly 
suggests that a proof is like a piece of text (“a short essay”). The diagram forms 
merely a psychological means in order to facilitate the interpretation of the 
text.160 However, one may alternatively propose that the proof primarily concerns 
the diagram and not the text. Thus conceived, the relation between text and 
diagram appears to be a rather different one. One may even go further and 
suggest that the text must be primarily understood as elucidating the proof, which 
is in itself diagrammatic. 
 As regards the question “what is the proof,” one primarily focuses on the 
text in the first case. In the second case, one primarily focuses on the diagram. 
Many logicians and philosophers nowadays seem to take the first rather than the 
second road. A proof is something that primarily relates to text; diagrams merely 
form a psychological aid in order to understand a textual proof. Again, in the first 
case, a proof is something that turns on language (sentences); in the second case, 
a proof turns on diagrams. 
                                                 
159
 Glymour makes his remark on behalf of a quotation of Euclid’s theorem 1 and the 
corresponding proof (cf. Euclid [41], I, pp.241-2). It is clear, however, that his remark at least 
applies to the theorems and proofs to be found in the Elements generally and that Glymour intends 
it to do so. 
160
 Mueller [112], in contrast, holds that diagrams play an essential role in the proofs from the 
Elements. 
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 Glymour’s almost exclusive focus on text manifests a conception of proof 
that has close affinities with the logical conception of proof. As we have seen in 
§ 2.2, a logical proof can also be understood as a text. In the light of 
considerations like these, we think that views as those expressed by Glymour 
manifest a way of looking at proofs that is heavily determined by the modern 
notion of a logical proof (chapter 2). 
 
 
§ 4.2. Analysis of The Passage 
 
In this section, we set ourselves the task of analyzing the proof described in The 
Passage. We begin by connecting The Passage with Proclus’ framework. Next, 
we turn to our analysis, again treating the respective items of Proclus’ framework 
successively. 
 
The Passage and Proclus’ framework. As noted already, Hintikka [73] has 
likewise considered Kant’s views on the method of proof in mathematics. The 
novelty of our approach manifests itself on two points. First, our analysis of The 
Passage goes much deeper than Hintikka’s. Second, our conclusions one behalf 
of our analysis will be somewhat different. (See the concluding remarks at the 
end of this section.) 
 Let us now address the following preliminary question: is Proclus’ 
framework the appropriate means in order to analyze The Passage? Somewhat 
more specifically: is there reason to believe that the method described in The 
Passage is, at least grosso modo, structured in conformity with Proclus’ 
methodological framework? We think that the answer to this question is 
affirmative. Indeed, this much will become clear after we have carried our 
analysis in the light of Proclus’ framework. However, in order to forestall the 
suspicion that we simply read Proclus’ framework into The Passage, we need to 
come up with considerations that are independent of such an analysis. 
 The most important reason we have for using Proclus’ framework is the 
following: the method described by Kant in The Passage is grosso modo similar 
to the one followed by Euclid in order to prove his theorem 32 from the 
Elements. As we have seen in the previous section, Euclid’s method of proof 
accords with Proclus’ methodological framework. Indeed, Proclus set up his 
framework on behalf of a study of the theorems proved by Euclid in the 
Elements. Consequently, there is ample reason to believe that the method of 
proof described The Passage also corresponds with Proclus’ methodological 
framework. 
 Accordingly, our primary justification for using Proclus framework comes 
with hindsight, by looking backwards into history and noticing certain 
similarities between Euclid and Kant. Are there also historical reasons for 
believing that Kant really accepted Proclus framework? That is, is there reason to 
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believe that Kant knew of Proclus’ framework and that he deliberately structured 
the proof he described in The Passage in accordance with it? Several strategies 
are available in order to answer this question. 
1. One may try to find an explicit or reasonable explicit reference or allusion to 
Proclus’ methodological framework in Kant’s own writings. As far as we can 
see, however, Kant himself does not make any such reference or allusion. 
Therefore, this strategy does not appear to bring the matter to an end. 
2. We would have reason to believe that Kant accepted Proclus’ framework if 
we could make plausible that it belonged more or less to the commonly accepted 
background knowledge in Kant’s time (e.g., like syllogistic logic did).  
 Unfortunately, however, it is hard to find good evidence for the claim that 
Proclus’ framework belonged to the common ground of Kant’s time. We have 
found one explicit reference to something very closely akin to Proclus’ 
framework in Leibniz’ New essays on human understanding.161 Says Leibniz: 
 
Geometers start their demonstrations with the ‘proposition’ which is to be 
proved, and then prepare the way for demonstration of it by offering the 
‘exposition,’ as it is called, in which whatever is given is displayed in a 
diagram; after which they proceed to the ‘preparation,’ drawing in further 
lines which they need for the reasoning—the finding of this preparation 
often being the most skilful part of the task. When that has been done, they 
conduct the ‘reasoning’ itself, drawing conclusions from what has been 
given in the exposition and what has been added to it in the preparation; 
and, with the aid of truths already known or demonstrated, they arrive at 
the ‘conclusion’ (Leibniz [102], p.476). 
 
The difference with the framework as presented by Proclus is that in the above 
citation there is nothing that corresponds to what Proclus calls the specification. 
 The above citation shows that at least some people writing in Kant’s time 
knew of Proclus’ framework, or at least something closely akin to Proclus’ 
framework. Moreover, as the editors of the 1996 edition of Leibniz’ New essays 
indicate, Kant read the New essays in 1769 (Leibniz [102], p.x). This indicates 
that Kant may very well have known of something closely akin to Proclus’ 
framework. 
 The upshot of these considerations is the following: on historical grounds, it 
is as yet not entirely clear that Kant accepted Proclus’ methodological 
framework. Perhaps further historical research will help to decide the matter. 
 
Analysis. It will be convenient to recall The Passage (§ 1.1): 
 
                                                 
161
 Leibniz published his New essays in 1765, though he had a draft already in 1704. For the history 
of the New essays, see Leibniz  [102], vii-x. 
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He [a mathematician] begins at once to construct a triangle. Since he 
knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent 
angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one side 
of this triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles that together are equal to 
two right ones. Now he divides the external one of these angles by drawing 
a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and sees that there arises 
an external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal one, etc. In such a 
way, through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he 
arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the 
question (A716-7/B744-5). 
 
Kant characterizes a proof in terms of a certain procedure (§ 1.3), namely, a 
procedure to the end of establishing the truth of a theorem. The proof Kant 
describes is a combination of “subroutines,” i.e., other procedures. As it turns 
out, two main types of sub-procedures can be distinguished: 
 
 • constructive procedures; 
 • inferential procedures.162 
 
Running the constructive procedures yields the items of knowledge that are 
needed in the course of the proof. In Kant’s view, these items of knowledge are 
intuitions (§§ 3.2-3), and hence are diagrammatic (§ 3.4). The inferential 
procedures, in turn, serve to establish the truth of several intermediate 
conclusions by means of the items of knowledge created (how this is done will 
become clear later). Accordingly, the reasoning always proceeds in concreto (§ 
3.3). 
 We can look at inference in two different ways, namely from a “static” point 
of view and from a “dynamic” point of view. From the first, static point of view, 
the inference is seen in terms of the grounding relations among several 
propositions. From the second, dynamic point of view, the inference turns on 
items of a diagrammatic format. Since the point will reoccur for several times 
later, it is useful to illustrate it here and to introduce some convenient 
terminology. 
 First, consider the following definitions: 
 
DEFINITION 1. A triangle is a plane figure contained by three lines. 
 
DEFINITION 2. A right-angled triangle is a triangle having one right angle. 
 
Consider also the following theorems: 
 
                                                 
162
 See Lindsay [105], [106], for a striking parallel with more recent theorizing about inference in 
cognitive science. 
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THEOREM 1. Given a line, there exists a line through any point not on that line 
which is perpendicular to it. 
 
THEOREM 2. If in a right-angled triangle a perpendicular were drawn from the 
right angle to the base, the triangles adjoining this perpendicular are 
congruent to this right-angled triangle and to one another.163 
 
Note that, in case of theorem 2, the perpendicular indeed exists. This is secured 
by theorem 1. Now consider the following inference. 
 Let ABC be a right-angled triangle having ∠ABC right. Let AD be a line 
perpendicular to the base side BC. We can infer the following: 
 
 Q: the triangles ABD and ADC are congruent to one another and to triangle 
ABC. 
 
Now, the point we want to bring out concerns two different but intimately related 
inferential roles of definition 2, theorem 1 and theorem 2 in relation to the 
inferring of Q. 
 First, we may say that the conclusion Q is based on definition 2, theorem 1, 
and theorem 2. This concerns primarily the “static” grounding relation between 
definition 2, theorem 1, theorem 2 on the one hand and Q on the other. This 
relation is made vivid below: 
 
 
 
Q 
 
 
definition 2   theorem 1  theorem 2 
  
 
Note that it is reasonable to assume the following: a known proposition based on 
propositions known a priori is itself a priori. Since, according to Kant, all the 
known propositions of mathematics are a priori, we can conclude that Q is also a 
priori. 
 To the above diagram, we can straightforwardly associate the following 
simple inference: 
 
definition 2, theorem 1, theorem 2 
Q. 
 
                                                 
163
 Cf. Euclid [41], I, p.154, p.270; ibid., II, p.209. 
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The impression arising is the following. When we think of inferring Q in terms of 
a simple inference, then we have our eye first of all on the grounding relations 
among several propositions (i.e., definition 2, theorem 1 and theorem 2 on the 
one hand and Q on the other). It is accordingly that the inference leading to Q 
gets a strong propositional flavor: the inference is in effect a simple inferential 
transition from a number of propositions to another proposition. 
 Second, instead of first considering the aforementioned grounding relation, 
we may alternatively concentrate on the structure of the inferential procedure 
delivering Q as its product. This leads to a different picture. Let us explain. 
 The inferential procedure we are currently considering can be naturally seen 
as a sequencing of the following three sub-procedures. 
 
 1:  construct a right-angled triangle ABC; 
 2: construct a line through the point B, perpendicular to AC; 
 : infer the conclusion. 
 
Carrying out 1 and 2 in sequence yields a composite constructive procedure 
we may write as 1;2. (We let ‘;’ denote a (binary) sequencing operation on 
procedures.)  
 The establishment of Q’s truth is the product of (a run of) another composite 
procedure. Assuming that the operation ‘;’ is associative, we may write this 
procedure as 1;2;. However, along the way, two intermediate items of 
knowledge (i.e., intuitions) are also produced. Together, the procedure 1;2; 
may be traced as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In case of the specific example we are currently considering, the procedural role 
of definition 2, theorem 1 and theorem 2 is somewhat as follows. Definition 2, 
theorem 1 and theorem 2 together guide the execution of the procedures 1, 2 
and  respectively. Specifically, we may say that a run of 1 is in accordance 
with definition 1. Similarly, we may say that a subsequent run of 2 is in 
accordance with theorem 1. Finally, we may say that a run of  is in accordance 
with theorem 2. What we see is that from this procedural point of view, the 
inference turns out to be made up of items of a different format, viz. 
diagrammatic instead of propositional. 
 A 
 B 
 C 
 Q  1  2    
 A 
 B 
 C 
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 Note that that logical notions such as validity and soundness 
straightforwardly apply when we think of the inference as a simple inference. 
However, it is not so easy to see how these notions apply when we focus 
primarily on the structure of the inferential procedure. In the first case, we may 
say that the truth of Q is secured via the validity of the inference and its 
soundness. In the second case, in contrast, the truth of Q is secured via a 
procedure that is in some sense valid and sound at once. In other words, Q’s truth 
is not primarily secured via logical properties such as validity and soundness, but 
via the specific structure of the process delivering Q as its product (cf. § 2.1). 
 Note also that the establishment of Q’s truth is not merely the product of a 
run of the inferential procedure . In contrast, establishing Q’s truth involves an 
execution of the constructive procedures 1 and 2 as well. In other words, the 
establishment of Q’s truth comes as the product of running a constructive-
inferential procedure, which is precisely the composite procedure 1;2;. 
 However, this inferential procedure, as Kant sees it, does not refer to logical 
rules of inference of an underlying logical system. In contrast, it refers to the 
axioms, definitions and theorems of an underlying mathematical theory (or 
science). In particular, these axioms, definitions and theorems are not 
propositional items reasoned with. The items reasoned with are themselves 
primarily diagrammatic. On the other hand, the mathematical theory constituted 
by the axioms, definitions and theorems serves as a kind of background 
knowledge that can be utilized in order to carry out inferences. From a procedural 
point of view, then, the inferential regime of the inference does not seem to be a 
logical one, but primarily a mathematical one. Let us now turn to a detailed 
analysis of The Passage, treating the six parts of Proclus’ framework successively 
(cf. also § 1.1). 
 
1. The enunciation. Recall that, according to Proclus, the enunciation concerns 
something given and a goal (“what is sought”). In the light of this, we suggested 
that the enunciation appears to set forth a certain task or problem (§ 5.1). This 
suggestion becomes actually quite plausible in the case we are currently 
considering. In order to see this, let us take a look at the wider context from 
which The Passage is quoted. 
 Kant describes how he thinks a mathematician proves theorem 1 from § 1.1 
in a context where he contrasts the philosopher’s use of reason with the 
mathematician’s use of reason.164 Kant says: 
 
Give to a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him discover in his 
own way what the relation of the sum of its angles to a right angle might be 
(A716/B744). 
 
                                                 
164
 The Passage is intended to exemplify the typical mathematician’s use of reason. 
PROOF IN ACTION 
 
123 
 
Kant goes on by pointing out that the philosopher comes not further than 
analyzing the concept of a triangle into, for example, the concept of a straight 
line, or an angle, or of the number three (cf. ibid.).165 Then he proceeds by 
saying: “[b]ut now let the geometrician take up this question” (ibid.). 
Subsequently, The Passage follows. 
 Clearly, Kant sees The Passage as an answer (or solution) to a certain 
question. This is further confirmed by the final words of The Passage: “[…] he 
arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the 
question.” As a question can be naturally seen as a kind of problem,166 we can 
conclude that in The Passage, Kant describes a mathematician who is busy 
solving a problem. Note that Kant accordingly interprets theorem proving in a 
quite specific way, namely, as a species of problem solving. 
 Given the wider context from which The Passage is taken, it seems plausible 
to hold that what is given in case we are currently considering is (the concept of) 
a triangle. Furthermore, the goal is to find the proportion between the sum of its 
internal angles and a right angle. As will be expected, this proportion is 1 : 2.167 
Equivalently, then, the goal is to show that the sum of the internal angles is equal 
to two right angles. 
 
2. The exposition. Kant says: “He [i.e., a mathematician] begins at once to 
construct a triangle.” In Kant’s view, the exposition concerns the execution of a 
constructive procedure. For Kant, to construct a triangle means to exhibit an 
intuition corresponding to the concept triangle.  We have seen that an 
intuition is a diagrammatically formatted item of knowledge. In order to fix our 
thoughts, then, let us assume that he exhibits this intuition in terms of the 
following diagram (which we henceforth refer to as diagram I ): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to facilitate later cross-referencing and identification, we have added the 
labels A and B and C to the diagram (cf. Euclid’s diagram from § 4.1; for more 
                                                 
165
 What Kant has effectively in mind is presumably that the philosopher comes no further than 
analyzing the concept of a triangle into the defining properties of a triangle (cf. A718-9/B746-7). 
166
 See Hintikka [77]. 
167
 That is, one times the sum of the internal angles stands to two times a right angle. 
Diagram I 
 B 
 A 
C 
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on labels, see also § 4.4). There is no evidence that the mathematician added 
these labels himself. Nor, by the way, is there any evidence that shows that he 
didn’t. 
 Prima facie, there is even no need for this mathematician to identify an angle 
or side by means of labels. For example, he may identify an angle or side by 
means of its relative position with respect to other diagrammatic objects. 
Furthermore, the mathematician may have wished to add a label if he intended to 
communicate the proof he is currently carrying out. For example, when he was 
writing a paper by means of which he intended to communicate the proof to a 
third party, or when he was proving the theorem stated in front of a group of 
students. However, considerations like these go far beyond the purposes of the 
present work. 
Diagram I comes as the outcome of what is in Kant’s view a distinctly 
mathematical procedure, viz. a constructive procedure. Consequently, the 
mathematician’s constructive activities are in Kant’s view already operative in 
the exposition. This appears to be a difference with Proclus. For the latter did not 
explicitly speak of construction in case of the exposition (§ 4.1). 
 It would seem that a mathematician cannot exhibit an intuition in terms of 
any diagram he likes. For example, in the case we are currently considering, he 
cannot exhibit an intuition in terms of the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, to construct a concept means: to exhibit an intuition corresponding to that 
concept. What could corresponding mean under such a reading?  
We think that part of the answer is that diagram I.a does not “correspond” to 
the concept of a triangle. For example, Euclid defines a triangle as a rectilinear 
figure enclosed by three straight lines (see definition 1 above; cf. Euclid [41], I, 
p.154). In contrast, Euclid defines a circle as a figure enclosed by one line such 
that all the points on that line are equidistant from a given point (the center of the 
circle) (cf. ibid., p.153). Accordingly, diagram I.a corresponds to a circle rather 
than a triangle. 
 
Diagram I.a 
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3. The specification. We would expect that the specification, if Kant would 
have mentioned it in The Passage, is a statement to the effect that the sum of the 
angles ∠ABC, ∠BCA, ∠CAB is equal to two right angles (cf. diagram I). 
However, there appears to be nothing in The Passage that can be naturally 
interpreted as corresponding to such a specification. 
 As a possible alternative for the specification, one might consider the 
mathematician’s knowledge “that two right angles together are exactly equal to 
all of the adjacent angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line.” 
However, a little reflection on The Passage shows that this is not properly 
speaking the goal that needs to be reached. In contrast, it is what motivates the 
proof. Let us conclude, then, that The Passage contains no explicit 
specification.168 
 Note that Kant does not seem to choose his words very carefully when he 
describes the knowledge that motivates the proof. Kant says: “that two right 
angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent angles that can be drawn at 
one point on a straight line.” What Kant evidently has in mind is that all of the 
adjacent angles to be drawn lie on one side of the line.169 Put differently, what 
Kant evidently has in mind is: 
 
THEOREM 3. Two right angles together are equal to all the angles that can be 
drawn at one point on a straight line in such a way that all these angles lie on 
the same side of that line. 
 
Theorem 3 is evidently a theorem of Euclidean geometry. However, it is not 
stated as such in Euclid’s Elements. The theorem it comes most close to is 
theorem 13 from the first book of the Elements (see § 4.1). In a sense, theorem 3 
is more general then theorem 13. 
 
4. The construction. During the construction, the mathematician carries out 
two extra constructive procedures on top of the one carried out in the exposition. 
In particular, the construction involves the addition of two auxiliary lines to 
diagram I. Thus, diagram I goes through two successive modifications.170 Let us 
consider them successively. 
 As to the first constructive procedure, Kant says: “[h]e extends one 
side of this triangle [i.e., the one exhibited in the exposition].” To fix our 
thoughts, suppose the mathematician extends the base side of the triangle 
involved in the exposition to a point we call D, as follows: 
 
                                                 
168
 See also the quotation from Leibniz’ New essays, cited in § 4.1. 
169
 We already made this point in footnote 6. 
170
 This more or less matches with the development of the diagram seemingly involved in Euclid’s 
proof of theorem 32. 
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As to the second constructive procedure, Kant says that the mathematician 
“divides the external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the 
opposite side of the triangle”. The external angle Kant talks about is precisely 
∠ACD. Again, to fix our thoughts, let us assume that he divides this angle by 
drawing a line CE, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us make some remarks on behalf of the two steps that have been undertaken 
in the construction. 
a. As in the case of diagram I, the labels D and E are primarily added by us. 
Similar remarks apply as in the case of diagram I (see above). 
b. When the mathematician extends a side of the triangle exhibited in terms of 
diagram I to the point we have called D in diagram II, we may say that he has 
executed a constructive procedure in accordance with Euclid’s second postulate 
(see § 4.1). Accordingly, this postulate functions as a kind of methodological rule 
(or principle) guiding a constructive procedure. 
 Similar points can be made of the line CE added to diagram I (cf. diagram 
III). When the mathematician adds a line parallel to the opposite side (cf. ii. 
above), we may say that he carries out a constructive procedure in accordance 
with theorem 31 (see § 4.1). Again, on this particular occasion, theorem 31 
functions as a kind of methodological rule (or principle) guiding a constructive 
Diagram II 
Diagram III 
 A 
C D 
 B 
 E 
 A 
C D 
 B 
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procedure. Collectively, diagram III comes as the result of successively carrying 
out three constructive procedures. 
c. Let us also note that the mathematician whose methods Kant is describing 
did not draw the additional lines without purpose. Quite the contrary, Kant says 
that the mathematician did so in view of his knowledge of theorem 3. This 
knowledge seems to be what motivates the subsequent procedures to be carried 
out. Accordingly, these procedures appear to be executed in a strict purposeful 
manner. The impression arising is that the task or problem the mathematician 
was confronted with in the enunciation evokes a kind of “programmed response” 
(as we may call it). 
d. Constructive procedures also come into play in case of the exposition. Note 
that this seems to be a difference with what Proclus himself appears to suggest. 
For according to the latter, a mathematician’s constructive activities only seem to 
play a role in that item of Proclus framework called the construction. 
 
Before we turn to the apodeixis, it will be convenient to introduce some 
notational abbreviations. 
 We refer to the constructive procedure resulting in diagram I as 1. The 
constructive procedure that modified diagram I, thus resulting in diagram II, is 
referred to as 2. Finally, the constructive procedure modifying diagram III, thus 
resulting in diagram III, is referred to as 3. 
 We may now say that diagram II comes as the result of a certain composite 
constructive procedure, namely, the procedure that consists of carrying out 1 and 
2 in sequence, that is, as a composite procedure 1;2. 
 Furthermore, diagram III comes as the result of another composite 
constructive procedure, namely, the result of sequencing the procedures 1;2 and 
3, i.e., 1;2;3. The three relevant constructive procedures and their respective 
outputs are summarized below: 
 
 • 1    diagram I 
 • 1;2    diagram II 
 • 1;2;3   diagram III 
 
It will be convenient to have these notations for the sake of future reference. 
 Before we end our discussion of the construction, let us first make clear that 
the mathematician Kant describes in The Passage strictly does as a matter of fact 
not carry out the procedure 1;2;3, that is, he does not carry out the procedures 
1, 2, and 3 in a row. In particular, right after the procedure 2, the 
mathematician does not go straight on to execute 3. In contrast, he first executed 
an inferential procedure, delivering the establishment of the truth of a conclusion 
as a product (see below). Only then he proceeds to 3. We shall return to this 
later. 
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 Diagrams I, II, and III can be naturally seen as three successive stages of a 
dynamic diagram (§ 3.4), that is, a diagram that evolves through (discrete) time. 
Thus, the intuition or intuitions that play a role in the course of a proof are not 
static. In contrast, they evolve through time. This may seem a remarkable point. 
In Kant’s view, the knowledge a mathematician reasons with (in the form of 
intuitions) seems not static but dynamic instead. In Kant’s view, the evolvement 
of intuition turns precisely on the workings of a specific creative force, viz. the 
productive imagination (§ 3.4). Thus, proving a theorem can be quite properly 
typified as a procedure of proof creation. 
 
5. The apodeixis. The apodeixis concerns the inferential procedures that are 
executed in the course of a proof. In The Passage, we find an explicit description 
of two inferences. The first is where Kant says that the mathematician “obtains 
two adjacent angles that together are equal to two right ones.” The second is 
where Kant says that the mathematician “sees that there arises and external 
adjacent angle which is equal to an internal one.” Kant does not explicitly state 
the other inferences that need to be drawn in order to arrive at the desired result. 
We made a plausible suggestion as two what those inferences might be in § 1.1. 
It will convenient to repeat them here. 
 First, the mathematician sees yet another external angle that is equal to an 
internal one. 
 Second, he seems to collect what is obtained thus far, and concludes that the 
sum of the internal angles is equal to two right angles. (See below for 
clarification.) 
 Collectively, the mathematician carries out four inferential procedures—or 
so we assume. The product of any of these inferential procedures is the 
establishment of the truth of a conclusion, among which is the theorem itself. Let 
us discuss these inferences successively. We pay most attention to the first 
inferential procedure. Many of the points raised there will also apply to the 
others. 
 
i. The first inference. The first inference is executed at the point where Kant says 
that the mathematician “obtains two adjacent angles that together are equal to 
two right ones.” Let us first state more clearly what the conclusion is that is being 
drawn. 
 Note that the conclusion—or better: Kant’s formulation of this conclusion—
makes mention of a relation, namely, a relation of adjacency between two angles. 
In the present context, this relation should be evidently understood as a 
diagrammatic relation, i.e., a relation in diagrammatic space. This relation 
determines how two angles are located with respect to one another in 
diagrammatic space. 
 It seems reasonable to believe that the relation of adjacency mentioned (by 
Kant) is in fact a specific constituent of diagram II, namely, the relation of 
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adjacency that holds between ∠ACB and ∠ACD. What the mathematician more 
specifically concludes, then, is that two adjacent diagrammatic objects—viz. 
∠ACB and ∠ACD—are together equal to two right angles. In other words, the 
mathematician establishes the truth of a conclusion we may write as follows: 
 
 Q1: ∠ACB + ∠ACD  
 180°.171 
 
Let us refer to the inferential procedure we are currently considering as 1. Let us 
consider in somewhat more detail how the truth of Q1 is established. 
 The truth of Q1 has not been established merely by way of running the 
inferential procedure 1. In contrast, the mathematician establishes Q1’s truth by 
way of an execution of the composite procedure 1;2;1, that is, the sequencing 
of the (composite) constructive procedure 1;2 and the inferential procedure 1. 
In Kant’s view, then, the mathematician comes to know Q1 as the product of 
what we may properly call a constructive-inferential procedure. 
 Recall that the procedure 1 has been executed in accordance with the 
definition of a triangle and that 2 has been carried out in accordance Euclid’s 
second postulate. Furthermore, the inferential procedure 1 is carried out in 
accordance with theorem 29. (See above.) Collectively, then, the definition of a 
triangle, Euclid’s second postulate and theorem 29 function as methodological 
principles guiding the execution of the procedure 1;2;1. 
 Note that, when Euclid added line CE to the first diagram, he did it in such a 
way that point E turned out to be located above line BC. However, it is 
interesting to consider what would happen if he had drawn line CE in such a way 
that point E turned out to be located below line BC. All other things being equal, 
this would result in a diagram that looks, say, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
171
 Recall that 180° is equal to two right angles (cf footnote 3). 
 E 
 A 
C D 
 B 
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This time, too, CE is parallel to AB and AC is intersecting both AB and CE. 
However, it does not follow that ∠BAC = ∠ACE. It seems that we are led to 
conclude that the truth of the conclusion drawn depends on the specific 
diagrammatic relations (i.e., relations in diagrammatic space) among 
diagrammatic objects. In particular, the conclusion depends on the relative 
position of the point E with respect to the line AB. 
 
ii. The second inference.  The second inference is drawn at the point where 
Kant says that the mathematician “sees that there arises an external adjacent 
angle which is equal to an internal one.” 
 Note again that this conclusion mentions several spatial relations First, there 
is mention of a relation of adjacency between two angles. Second, there is 
mention of an angle that is internal with respect to the triangle constructed. 
Third, there is mention of a relation that is external with respect to the triangle 
constructed. Again, using terminology introduced earlier, these relations hold 
among certain diagrammatic objects in a diagrammatic space. 
 We can state the second inference more clearly using diagram III (see 
above). What Kant is trying to say can accordingly be rephrased as follows: there 
arises an external adjacent angle ∠ACE (say) equal to the internal angle ∠BAC. 
In other words, the mathematician establishes the truth of a conclusion we may 
write as follows: 
 
 Q2: ∠ACE 
 ∠BAC. 
 
Henceforth, we shall refer to the inferential procedure that delivers the 
establishment of Q2’s truth as its product as 2.  
 The same questions may be asked as in the case of the inferential procedure 
1. First, how does he carry out the procedure 2? Second, what constitutes the 
basis of Q2? The respective answers to these questions proceeds in a similar way 
as above. 
 As to the first question, note that Q2’s truth has not been established merely 
by way of an execution of the procedure 2. In contrast, the mathematician 
comes to know Q2 as the product of the composite procedure 1;2;3;2. As in 
the case of the first inference, we may refer to thus composite procedure as a 
constructive-inferential procedure. 
 Note that 2 is an inferential procedure carried out in accordance with 
theorem 29. Recall that the constructive procedure 3 is carried out in accordance 
with theorem 31 (see above). Collectively, the definition of a triangle, Euclid’s 
second postulate, theorem 31, and theorem 29 function as methodological 
principles guiding the execution of the procedure 1;2;3;2 delivering the 
establishment of Q2’s truth as its product. 
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 As a further observation, suppose Euclid would have drawn line CE in such 
a way that point E turned out to be located below line BC (cf. the diagram 
above). Then, all other things being equal, AB is still parallel to CE and BD 
intersects both AB and CE. However, it would not be true that ∠ECD equals 
∠ABC. As in the case of the first inference, the truth of the conclusion would 
seem to be dependent on a specific spatial relation among (other) diagrammatic 
objects. Therefore, it would again seem that we are entitled to conclude that 
inference (2) is not a logical deduction from a true premise. 
 Furthermore, suppose that Euclid would have extended the line BC to D in 
the opposite direction, that is, in such a way that D turns out to be located to the 
left of B rather than to the right of C. All other things being equal, this would 
result in a diagram that looks, say, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, AB would still be parallel to CE. It does not seem, however, that line 
BD still intersects line CE, unless BD continues to at least the point C. 
Furthermore it is neither true that ∠ECD = ∠ABC. 
 What we see is that each of the diagrams I-III organizes the knowledge used 
in the proof in a distinctly spatial way. Accordingly, in Kant’s view, diagrams are 
not merely psychological aids. Instead of using relational expressions such as lies 
above, lies adjacent to, lies opposite to, etc., a mathematician in Kant’s view 
exhibits these relations as relations in space, i.e., in terms of diagrammatic 
relations (§ 3.4). These relations are employed in the course of the proof. This is 
precisely what makes the reasoning genuinely diagrammatic.  
 
iii. The third inference. The third conclusion is drawn where the mathematician 
concluded that there arises yet another external angle that is equal to an internal 
one (or so we assumed). As in the case of the previous two inferences, similar 
remarks can be made on behalf of the diagrammatic relations mentioned. In 
short, the mathematician establishes the truth of the following conclusion: 
 
 Q3: ∠DCE 
 ∠ABC. 
 
 E 
 A 
C D 
 B 
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Further discussion of this inferential procedure would add no substantially new 
points. Therefore, we proceed directly to a discussion of the final inference.  
 
iv. The fourth inference. The impression arising is that the fourth inference 
more or less collects the results obtained thus far. More specifically, the 
impression may arise that the mathematician now concludes: 
 
 Q4: ∠ABC + ∠BCA + ∠BAC 
 180°. 
 
from Q1, Q2, and Q3. In other words, the fourth inference appears to be a simple 
inference (§ 2.3): 
 
Q1, Q2, Q3 
Q4. 
 
An alternative reading is possible, however, a reading that puts the fourth 
inference on a par with the previous three constructive-inferential procedures. 
 Perhaps an inclination to consider the fourth inference as a non-constructive 
inference comes from the fact that Q1, Q2 are described by Kant as two 
intermediate conclusions. No doubt, this is something could also be said of Q3, 
had Kant offered a full description of the proof of § 1.1, theorem 1, in The 
Passage. Accordingly, the impression may arise that the mathematician whose 
proof Kant is describing himself likewise drew these conclusions. We may then 
go on by saying that this mathematician stored Q1, Q2, and Q3 somewhere until 
he needed them. At that point, he retrieved Q1, Q2, and Q3 in order to draw Q4 as 
a conclusion from them. 
 However, we must not too readily conclude something about the structural 
organization of a process from Kant’s description of it. In this respect, it need not 
be the case that the mathematician’s conclusion Q4 forms the product of (a run 
of) a certain non-constructive-inferential procedure, namely, one from the 
premises Q1, Q2 and Q3. In contrast, it may very well be that Q4 forms the 
product of the entire constructive-inferential proof procedure as it has been 
executed thus far. This reading accords well with the constructive outlook of the 
proof. Without definitely resolving the issue, let us briefly speculate a bit further 
on the issue. 
 Again, reconsider diagram III above. Before Q4 was drawn as a conclusion, 
we may say that the mathematician conceived of this diagram in a specific way. 
In particular, it seems not unreasonable to say that he saw the diagram mainly as 
a configuration of angles such that some of these angles coincided with others 
(e.g., ∠ACE 
 ∠BAC, ∠DCE 
 ∠ABC). At the point he draws Q4 as a 
conclusion, in contrast, he primarily sees it as a triangle (plus, perhaps, some 
auxiliary lines) whose internal angles sum up to 180°. In other words, his 
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intentional attitudes with respect diagram III have changed, and hence diagram 
III itself has changed (cf. § 3.4). 
 Perhaps this change in intentional attitudes with respect to a diagram can 
itself be interpreted as a constructive step. If we refer to the attitude change we 
are currently considering as 4, then we may say that the inferential procedure 
delivering Q4 as its product at least involves the constructive procedure 
1;2;3;4. In a way, then, the procedure leading up to the establishment of Q4’s 
truth is constructive in its entirety. 
 
6. The conclusion. Kant clearly alludes at something that can be naturally 
interpreted as a conclusion when he says: “In such a way, through a chain of 
inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and 
at the same time general solution of the question.” (Note that Kant sees the 
conclusion in terms of a solution of a question.) 
 One way to understand this is as follows. What Kant has described in The 
Passage is a mathematician proving a theorem by way of broadly the following 
method. The proof mainly proceeds in terms of a consideration concerning one 
specific triangle (this triangle is introduced in the construction). What the 
mathematician has shown is that the sum of the internal angles of this triangle is 
equal to two right angles. Now, when this mathematician finally arrives at the 
conclusion (or, as Kant says, arrives at his solution), he carries out a procedure of 
universal generalization to the effect that all triangles have the property 
mentioned. This is what Kant would have had in mind when he says that the 
mathematician arrives at a “general solution of the question” (emphasis added). 
It is primarily the conclusion that is general (i.e., concerns all triangles). The 
method that in the end leads to this general conclusion mainly concerns an 
individual specific triangle and is in that sense itself specific. This is essentially 
the way Beth [16], [18] (especially chapter 4) and Hintikka [72], [73] interpret 
the proof Kant’s describes in The Passage. 
 However, it is not entirely clear that Kant sees the proof as proceeding this 
way. It is not clear that Kant thinks of the proof as mainly proceeding in terms of 
a consideration that concerns a specific triangle and in the end generalizes to all 
triangles (by way of an extra step of universal generalization). Notice that when 
Kant says that the mathematician arrives at a general solution to the question, he 
refers to the way this solution has been obtained: “[i]n such a way, through a 
chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully 
illuminating and at the same time general solution of the question.” The “way” 
Kant is referring can be naturally interpreted as the (mainly constructive) 
procedures that have been executed thus far. Accordingly, the generality 
primarily applies to the method of proof (cf. A714/B742). 
 In this respect, then, there seems to be no point in saying in the conclusion 
that all triangles have the property in question, when the latter is meant as the 
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product of an extra inferential step (i.e., a step of universal generalization).172 It 
may very well be that Kant thinks that the procedures that have been executed in 
the exposition, the construction and the apodeixis do precisely this: together, they 
prove that all triangles are such that their internal angles add up to two right 
angles. 
 The last point accords well with the following. Kant says that 
 
[…] mathematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, 
indeed even in the individual, yet nonetheless a priori and by means of 
reason, so that just as this individual is determined under certain general 
conditions of construction, the object of the concept […] must likewise be 
thought as determined universally (A714/B742). 
 
The individual in terms of which mathematics contemplates the general is 
precisely an intuition (cf. ibid.). In some way, then, such an individual intuition 
makes a mathematician “see” the general. This may sound rather mysterious, but 
upon closer inspection, there appears to be an interesting idea underlying it. Let 
us explain. 
 Besides the fact that mathematics contemplates the universal in the 
particular, Kant also says that mathematics “considers the concept in concreto” 
(A715/B743). Put differently: “mathematics contemplates the concepts only in an 
intuition that it has exhibited a priori [i.e., constructed]” (A716/B744). In our 
view, this makes it not entirely clear that in case of the proof we are currently 
considering, an intuition must be understood as representing a specific triangle. 
In contrast, especially the last two remarks of Kant’s suggest that, in some sense, 
this intuition is closely akin to the concept of a triangle. However, it should be 
emphasized that, in Kant’s view, this intuition is not the concept of a triangle; it 
is the product of constructing that concept. Neither should we believe it to be an 
instantiation of this concept (i.e., an individual triangle). In contrast, it is the 
concept of a triangle made concrete. 
 The idea that the proof Kant describes in The Passage proceeds mainly on 
the basis of a consideration concerning a specific triangle and then generalizes to 
all triangles corresponds well with certain methods of proof in first order logic   
(§ 2.3). In this respect, the introduction rule for the universal quantifier plays an 
important role. It may very well be that Beth’s and Hintikka’s respective readings 
of The Passage (cf. above) are to a considerable extent influenced by insights 
stemming from standard proof procedures from first-order logic. However, the 
considerations above indicate that an alternative reading must certainly not be 
excluded. More positively, we think that the reading sketched above may very 
well amount to a more plausible interpretation of Kant. 
 
                                                 
172
 One is reminded of Proclus’ remark that mathematicians  “are accustomed to draw what is in a 
way a double conclusion” (see § 4.1; emphasis added). 
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Concluding remarks. We state our conclusions on behalf of our analysis of The 
Passage. 
1. When a mathematician proves a theorem, he, among other things, carries out 
several constructive-inferential procedures. The constructive procedures that in 
part constitute them are carried out in that part of Proclus’ framework called the 
exposition, but also in the part referred to as the construction. Hence, the 
inferences doe not merely concern the apodeixis; as constructive-inferential 
procedures, they concern the exposition and the construction as well. 
Accordingly, in Kant’s view, the entire proof is permeated with constructive 
elements. 
2. We found that several mathematical axioms, definitions and theorems often 
function as a kind of rules (or principles) in the course of proving a theorem. 
Consequently, we may say that the inferential regime is to a considerable extent 
constituted by axioms, definitions and theorems. The items reasoned with, 
furthermore, are mainly intuitions. This idea is hard to square with the modern 
idea of a logical system. From the latter point of view, the axioms and theorems 
on the one hand and the rules of inference on the other, from two separate 
categories. The inferential regime is constituted by the rules of inference; the 
items reasoned with are axioms, theorems, and other propositional items such as 
assumptions. See chapter 2 for details. In Kant’s view, in contrast, axioms, 
definitions and theorems have a more flexible use. On the one hand, they are the 
propositional items of knowledge that constitute mathematical science. On the 
other hand, however, they can also form the inferential principles of a 
mathematical proof. 
3. Intimately related to our second conclusion, we argued that the items of 
knowledge figuring in the proof—i.e., the intuitions a priori—are not 
propositional but diagrammatic instead. Since the diagrammatic features of those 
items where really employed in the course of the proof, we may conclude that in 
Kant’s view, proving a mathematical theorem is (essentially) a form of 
diagrammatic reasoning. 
4. As pointed out in § 2.3, Beth and Hintikka hold that Kant’s views on 
mathematical proof can be adequately characterized in terms of modern systems 
of natural deduction. From a procedural point of view, we can now say that this 
amounts to a mischaracterization of the structural organization of a proof process. 
According to Kant, a mathematician reasons mainly with diagrammatic items of 
knowledge. According to a view as put forward by Beth Hintikka, in contrast, a 
mathematician would reason with primarily with propositional items instead. 
5. We can now confirm a point that was raised in § 2.3. Recall that Beth 
associates the constructive character of a Kantian mathematical proof to the 
introduction rule of the universal quantifier. Hintikka, in contrast, concentrate on 
those rules of natural deduction according to which new individuals are 
introduced in the course of a proof. This implies that Hintikka associates the 
constructive nature of a Kantian mathematical proof with the elimination rule for 
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the universal quantifier and the elimination rule for the existential quantifier. 
Hintikka focuses especially on the elimination rule for the existential 
quantifier.173 
 We now clearly see that if there is any logical inference corresponding to 
what is going in a proof according to Kant at all, it must be an annotated logical 
inference (of which the elimination rule for the existential quantifier is only one; 
§ 2.3). According to Kant, in order to draw a conclusion, it is essential that a 
constructive procedure be carried out first. Something similar happens in the case 
of annotated logical inferences. For we noticed that in the case of such logical 
inferences, in order to draw a conclusion, it is essential that a derivation be 
produced first. 
 However, as we observed (§ 2.3) the fact remains that logical proof can be 
entirely formulated in terms of a language (sentences). This, we think, forms one 
great difference with Kant’s conception of inference as exemplified in The 
Passage.174 We may say that in case of the proof described in The Passage, 
language does not seem to play any significant role. Perhaps a Kantian 
mathematical proof can be reconstructed in terms of a logical proof, and hence in 
terms of a language. However, such a reconstruction would not seem to be able 
to reflect certain procedural characteristics that are, in Kant’s view, essential for a 
mathematical proof. The most important of these procedural characteristics is 
precisely the essential constructive nature of a mathematical proof procedure. 
 
 
§ 4.3. Conclusion 
 
In the present chapter, we have analyzed The Passage in the light of Proclus’ 
methodological framework for proving theorems in mathematics. According to 
this framework, one (ideally) proves a theorem by way of an enunciation, an 
exposition, a specification, a construction, an apodeixis, and a conclusion.  
Considering The Passage, many of these items of Proclus’ framework can be 
naturally discerned. According to Kant, both the exposition and the construction 
are constituted by the execution of several constructive procedures. In the 
exposition an intuition is produced, in the construction it is modified for several 
times. Furthermore, the inferential procedures carried out the apodeixis 
essentially involve the constructive procedures executed in the exposition and the 
construction. These constructive procedures deliver a diagrammatic item of 
knowledge (an intuition a priori) as their product. Hence, it became appropriate 
to refer to these inferential procedures as constructive-inferential procedures. 
                                                 
173
 An application of these rules, Hintikka holds, correspond to what he calls “synthetic inference 
steps” (Hintikka [76], p.136). 
174
 Another difference turns of the non-locality of logical inferences; in Kant’s view, in contrast, 
mathematical inferences are highly local—i.e., mathematical—in nature (cf. also § 2.3). 
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Collectively, in Kant’s view, a proof can be typified as being mainly constructive 
(in the sense of Kant). Related to this, proving a theorem is, in Kant’s view 
essentially a form of diagrammatic reasoning. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The synthetic a priori 
in mathematics reconsidered 
 
 
 
In the present chapter, we want to turn our insights on two further themes. The 
first concerns Kant’s famous claim that the propositions of (pure) mathematics—
and hence the theorems of mathematics—are synthetic and a priori. The second 
theme concerns Kant’s views on the relation between the methodology of 
mathematical proof and logic. 
 In § 5.1, we discuss Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic 
theorems. In § 5.2, Kant’s views on the methodology of proving analytic 
propositions are explained in some detail and compared with the methodology of 
mathematical theorems (cf. § 4.2). Finally, § 5.3 addresses the relation between 
logic and methodology, and the relation between logic and the methodology of 
mathematical proofs in particular. As always, we end up by stating our 
conclusions (§ 5.4). 
 The previous paragraph indicates that we will pay at least some attention to 
Kant’s views on analytic propositions (despite the fact that the theorems of 
mathematics are synthetic). Our motivation to do so stems from two sources. 
First, the nature of synthetic propositions (and synthetic a priori theorems in 
mathematics in particular) will be better understood when we also consider the 
contrasting class of analytic propositions. Second, and related to this, we will see 
that an important motivation for Kant to distinguish between analytic and 
synthetic propositions turned on certain specific cognitive issues. 
 
 
§ 5.1. Analytic and synthetic propositions: 
      definitions and criteria 
 
In the present section, we discuss Kant’s views on the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions. We only consider true propositions. We 
begin by squaring the analytic-synthetic distinction with another distinction Kant 
has made, namely, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori (see § 3.2). 
Subsequently, we consider how Kant defines analytic and synthetic propositions. 
In the next two sections, we discuss the respective criteria for analytic and 
synthetic propositions. The relevant terminology will be clarified as we go along. 
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Kant’s division of propositions. As said in the introductory paragraphs to this 
chapter, Kant famously claimed that all the propositions of (pure) mathematics 
are without exception synthetic and a priori: 
 
Mathematical judgments are all synthetic. […] It must first be remarked 
that properly mathematical propositions are always a priori judgments and 
are never empirical, because they carry as necessity with them, which 
cannot be derived from experience. But if one does not want to concede 
this, well then, I will restrict my proposition to pure mathematics, the 
concept of which already implies that it does not contain empirical but 
merely pure a priori cognition (B14-15; cf. Kant [95], p.63). 
 
A proposition in mathematics is an axiom, a definition or a theorem 
(A726/B754). When Kant says that all propositions of mathematics are synthetic 
and a priori, what he therefore means is that the axioms, definitions and the 
theorems of mathematics are synthetic a priori (cf. A727-33/B755-61; A10/B14). 
We are mainly interested in the theorems of Euclidean geometry. 
 Besides the a priori ones, synthetic propositions also come in the a posteriori 
variety. Thus, Kant clearly suggests that all “experiential” propositions are 
synthetic and a posteriori (A7-8/B11-2; cf. also A9/B13). Experiential 
propositions can be quite naturally associated with what we would nowadays call 
empirical or natural science (cf. A7-8/B11-2). 
 Kant held that analytic propositions are always a priori; there are no analytic 
a posteriori propositions. Collectively, then, Kant acknowledged three types of 
propositions. They are depicted in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insofar as the purposes of the present study are concerned, we are exclusively 
interested in propositions of mathematics, which live in the upper left part of the 
above diagram. Nevertheless, it will prove fruitful if we also consider analytic 
propositions, which live in the lower left part. 
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Analyticity and syntheticity defined. Kant defines analytic and synthetic 
propositions as follows: 
 
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is 
thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments, since the application to 
negative ones is easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either 
the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) 
contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though 
to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case I call the 
judgment analytic, in the second synthetic (A6-7/B10; cf. Kant [95], p.62). 
 
Kant’s definition of analytic as well as synthetic propositions is stated in 
exclusively terms of certain relations that hold between concepts. In particular, 
Kant does not consider quantifiers. Apparently, he considers these irrelevant in 
this respect (we shall briefly return to this point below). 
 Evidently, Kant assumes that the logical structure attributed to a proposition 
is that of a categorical proposition. Specifically, Kant defines analyticity and 
syntheticity in terms of certain relations that hold between the subject concept 
and the predicate concept of a categorical proposition. With Kant, let us 
henceforth restrict ourselves to affirmative categorical propositions. 
 In the first Critique, Kant provides two examples in order to illustrate the 
difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. As an example of an 
analytic proposition Kant gives all bodies are extended. This proposition 
involves the subject concept body and the predicate concept extended. Kant 
holds that the concept extended is already “contained in” the concept body 
(cf. A7/B11). Hence the proposition is analytic. 
 Kant suggests that this does not hold for the proposition all bodies are 
heavy. This time, Kant says, “the predicate [i.e., the concept heavy] is 
something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a 
body in general” (A7/B11). Hence, the proposition is not analytic; in Kant’s 
view, it is to be classified as synthetic. 
 In passing, we note that Kant would classify theorem 1 at the beginning of   
§ 1.1 also as synthetic (and a priori). The reason is that it is a mathematical 
theorem.175 For the sake of clarity, let us state this theorem again: 
 
The sum of the internal angles of every triangle equals two right angles. 
 
Kant would attribute to this theorem the logical structure of a categorical 
proposition. Reasonably enough, as the subject concept involved in this theorem, 
                                                 
175
 The Passage, where Kant describes how he thinks a mathematician proves this theorem (see § 
1.1), comes from a section in the first Critique where Kant contrasts the philosophical method with 
the method of pure mathematics; cf. A712/B740. 
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he would reckon the concept triangle. As the predicate concept he would 
reckon the concept corresponding to the predicate is such that the sum of the 
internal angles is equal to two right angles. We may refer to this concept as the 
sum of the (three) internal angles being equal to two 
right angles (cf. § 3.1). For the sake of brevity, we refer to this concept as 
angles_sum. Why this is a plausible choice will be argued in § 5.2.  
 As in the first Critique, in the Prolegomena, Kant too offers an example of 
an analytic proposition and an example of a synthetic proposition in order to 
illustrate the analytic-synthetic distinction (cf. Kant [95], p.62). As an example of 
an analytic proposition he gives: all bodies are extended. Note that this is 
example is the same as the one given in the first Critique (cf. above). As an 
example of a synthetic theorem, he gives: some bodies are heavy. The careful 
reader will have noticed that this example is not identical to the corresponding 
example given in the first Critique. For the latter reads: all bodies are heavy. In 
the Prolegomena, Kant has replaced the quantifier all by the quantifier some. 
 Kant’s seemingly carefree switch from all to some suggests that quantifiers 
(i.e., the respective quantifiers all and some) are not relevant when it comes to 
defining what synthetic propositions are. What a synthetic proposition is only 
bears on the relation between the predicate concept and the subject concept 
involved in that proposition. 
 Very likely, a similar point could be made on behalf of analytic propositions. 
(As we have not found any textual evidence for this, our remarks will remain 
somewhat speculative in this respect.) Rather than all bodies are extended, Kant 
might as well have taken some bodies are extended as an illustrative example of 
an analytic proposition. The latter proposition would be analytic precisely for the 
same reason: this time, too, the predicate concept extended is contained in the 
subject concept body. As in the case of synthetic propositions, what an analytic 
proposition is would not turn on quantifiers (i.e., either the quantifier all or 
some). Only on the relation between predicate concept and subject concept is 
relevant. 
 Now is the time to consider Kant’s definitions of analyticity and syntheticity 
somewhat more closely. We first rephrase Kant’s definition of analyticity as in 
the citation given at the beginning of this section. Let  be a proposition 
involving the subject concept A and the predicate concept B. Ignoring quantifiers, 
we may write  as A is B (cf. also § 3.1). 
 
DEFINITION 1.  is analytic iff the predicate concept B is contained in the subject 
concept A. 
 
This definition states an essential characteristic of analytic propositions. As such, 
it can be taken as a real definition. 
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 As to Kant’s definition of analyticity, Quine [130], p.21, has once lamented 
that Kant’s talk of a containment relation is left at a metaphorical level. This may 
indeed seem true for the passage quoted (including the other passages referred to 
at the end of the quotation). However, Quine’s remark puts Kant in a too negative 
perspective, especially when he means to suggest that there is no elaborate view 
supporting it. For de Jong [86] has made clear that Kant accepted a view 
according to which concepts are certain structured entities. Using mathematical 
terminology, we may interpret de Jong’s point as follows: according to Kant, 
concepts admit at least of a binary, idempotent, commutative and associative 
“meet operator.” This gives concepts an interesting algebraic structure, namely, 
that of a semi-lattice. Let us briefly explain the point. 
 For Kant, a concept generally is a “package” or “combination” of other 
concepts. This can be made articulate by thinking of concepts in algebraic terms. 
Let  denote the aforementioned meet operator. As an example, suppose we are 
given the concepts animal, rational and mortal. Then we can form the 
combined concept 
 
animal  rational  mortal.176 
 
According to a traditional definition, the latter is also known as the concept man. 
Thus, the operator  can be seen as one that “combines” concepts in order to 
form other concepts. 
 The algebraic structure of concepts gives rise to a containment relation 
between concepts, as follows: B is contained in A iff A  B 
 A.177 As a result, 
definition 1 is equivalent to the following: 
 
DEFINITION 1*.  is analytic iff A  B 
 A. 
 
For example, since 
 
man  animal 
 man, 
 
the concept animal is contained in the concept man. Hence, the proposition 
man is animal is analytic. 
 How does Kant define synthetic propositions? As before, let  be the 
proposition A is B. Considering the quotation given at the beginning of this 
subsection, Kant appears to define the syntheticity of  as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 2.  is synthetic iff B lies entirely outside A. 
                                                 
176
 Since  is clearly associative, we are justified to omit parentheses. 
177
 The containment relation is accordingly reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive, turning it into a 
partial order. 
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A qualification should be added to this definition, however. For though the 
predicate B concept lies entirely outside the subject concept A, B still stands in a 
certain connection with A. However, in case of synthetic propositions, this 
connection is not one—indeed, cannot be one (see below)—of containment. 
 From definitions 1 and 2, we reasonably enough infer the following: 
 
 () if a proposition is synthetic, then it is not analytic. 
 
Indeed, if a predicate concept B lies entirely outside a subject concept A, then we 
would expect that B be not contained in A. We shall need this on a later 
occasion.178 
 The containment relation in case of analytic propositions can be typified as 
an intensional relation, i.e., it is a relation between intensions or contents. It is not 
a relation between extensions (of concepts). The extension of a concept is the set 
of objects falling under that concept. For example, the extension of the concept 
human is the set of humans.179 Now, if a concept B is contained in a concept A, 
then we would expect that the extension of A is a subset of the extension of B. 
The following example confirms this: if the concept animal is contained in the 
concept man, then the set of humans is a subset of the set of animals. 
 We think that the connection between the subject concept and the predicate 
concept in case of synthetic propositions a priori in mathematics is in some way 
also a “contentual” relation. What would the nature of this relation be? We think 
that answer must lie in Kant’s notion of construction. Recall that for Kant a 
mathematician always and essentially constructs his concepts, by exhibiting them 
in terms of an intuition a priori. Accordingly, we may suspect that the content of 
a concept reappears in concreto, as the content of an intuition a priori (this 
content is provided by an exercise of the productive imagination). We may say 
that carrying out further constructive procedures provides a “contentual” relation 
with other intuitions. These further intuitions Kant again sees as concepts in 
concreto. Accordingly, the relation between two concepts in case of a synthetic 
proposition a priori appears to be a constructive relation. In case of a synthetic 
proposition, the content of the subject concept is related to the content of the 
                                                 
178
 At first sight, it is not entirely clear whether the reverse implication also holds, i.e., that a 
proposition is synthetic provided it is not analytic. If the reverse implication does hold, then every 
proposition would in Kant’s view be either analytic or synthetic. Hence, in Kant’s view, there 
would be no propositions that are neither analytic nor synthetic. 
179
 This is obviously problematic as it stands, since we typically tend to think of a set as a kind of 
stable thing. However, the number of humans typically varies over time. Prima facie, then, there 
doesn’t seem to be a thing such as “the set of humans.” The difficulty may be repaired by defining 
the extension of man as the set of possible humans. Let us also add that Kant has somewhat 
different views on extensions of concepts (Kant defines the extension of a concept is the set of 
concepts that are contained in it); cf. De Jong [86] for a detailed discussion. 
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predicate concept in that the former can, as it where, be constructively developed 
into the latter. This “content development,” however, always takes place in 
concreto. Indeed, in Kant’s view, it is essential for a mathematician to construct 
his concepts (§ 3.3). This means that a mathematician does not reason 
conceptually. 
 Something along these lines seems to be precisely what happens in case of 
the proof described in The Passage. According to Kant, the mathematician begins 
with the construction of a triangle. Thus, he exhibits the concept triangle in 
concreto, in terms of an intuition a priori. Subsequently he executes further 
constructive procedures to produce further intuitions and thus to provide a 
contentual link with the predicate concept the sum of the (three) 
internal angles being equal to two right angles (cf. 
above). 
 What we see is that, for Kant, the content of a synthetic a priori proposition 
in mathematics (a mathematical theorem) does not stand apart from the way it is 
proved. In this respect, the content and justification of a proposition are closely 
related.180 Of course Kant did not speak of theorems and propositions but of 
judgments instead. From a procedural point of view, however, a judgment is a 
procedure of getting to know that a proposition is true, and thus to affirm the 
truth of that proposition. Given this, our point can be rephrased as follows: to 
judge a proposition to be true comes close to proving it. Consequently, the 
passage may be taken as providing an elaborate description of a synthetic 
judgment a priori, or, more accurately, a procedure of “synthetically judging a 
priori.” 
 
The principle of analytic propositions. We have seen that Kant defined analytic 
propositions as those propositions such that the predicate concept is contained in 
the subject concept. The following citation may lead think that Kant offers yet a 
second definition of analytic propositions:  
 
[…] if the judgment is analytic, whether it be negative or affirmative, its 
truth must always be able to be cognized sufficiently in accordance with 
the principle of contradiction (A151/B190; cf. Kant [95], p.62). 
 
That Kant would have given two definitions of analyticity was claimed by Ayer 
[1], p.104. Upon closer inspection, however, a different reading suggests itself. 
Let us begin by noting that Kant here states a necessary condition for the 
knowability of (the truth of) an analytic theorem: if a proposition is analytic, then 
                                                 
180
 Compare Frege, who said that the “distinctions between […] synthetic and analytic concern, as I 
see it, not the content of the judgment but the justification for making the judgment.” Remarkably, 
Frege added a footnote in which he said the following: “By this I do not, of course, mean to assign 
a new sense to these terms, but only to state more accurately what earlier writers, Kant in particular, 
have meant by them” (Frege [45], p.3; ibid., n.1). 
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an agent can come to know (i.e., prove it) it solely by means of the principle of 
contradiction. 
 Kant calls the principle of contradiction the “proposition that no thing can 
have a predicate that contradicts it” (A151/B190). Alternatively stated, given two 
concepts A and B, the principle of contradiction is the principle that no A can be 
both B and not B. 
 Let us wonder whether, in Kant’s view, the aforementioned condition is also 
sufficient. The following quotation makes clear that it is: 
 
[…] synthetic judgments … agree in this, that they can by no means arise 
from […] the principle […] of contradiction; they demand yet a completely 
different principle (Kant [95], p.62; cf. A151-2/B191; cf. A154/B193). 
 
What Kant appears to say is that if a proposition is synthetic, then one cannot 
come to know it by means of the principle of contradiction alone. Since synthetic 
propositions are non-analytic (see () above), we can conclude that the principle 
of contradiction is not only a necessary but also sufficient means for knowing the 
truth of analytic propositions. Taken together, we have 
 
 () a proposition is analytic iff its truth can be known in accordance with the 
principle of contradiction alone. 
 
In other words, a proposition is analytic iff it can be proved in accordance with 
the principle. Kant explains: 
 
For the contrary of that which as a concept already lies and is thought in 
the cognition of the object is always correctly denied, while the concept 
itself must necessarily be affirmed of it, since its opposite would contradict 
the object (A151/B190-1). 
 
What is the relation between () and definition 1 from the previous subsection? 
Recall we have taken definition 1 as a real definition of analyticity. 
 In Kant’s view, the principle of contradiction forms a means to an end, 
namely a means to the end of getting to know the truth of analytic propositions. 
Accordingly, the principle of contradiction provides a sufficient criterion for 
getting to know the truth of analytic propositions. This point can be alternatively 
put as follows. 
 A criterion is a principle or means for deciding (i.e., getting to know) 
whether entities of a certain kind are in the possession of a certain property (cf. 
Carney and Scheer [27], p.73, n.3). Notice, however, that a criterion is precisely 
what is provided by (): given an analytic proposition, the latter gives a means by 
way of which it can be decided that it is true. 
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 We conclude that Kant does not give two definitions of analyticity. In 
contrast, he gives a definition and a criterion instead. The former states what 
analytic propositions are. The latter states a principle or means by means of 
which their truth can be decided, i.e., a principle by means of which one can 
come to know their truth. 
 Kant considers the principle of contradiction the “supreme principle” of all 
analytic propositions (cf. A150/B189; cf. also A151/B191). Furthermore, Kant 
classifies the principle of contradiction as a “merely logical principle” 
(A153/B192). In fact, Kant acknowledges the principle of contradiction as the 
highest principle of general logic (cf. A151/B190). It seems to follow that an 
analytic proposition can be known exclusively by means of general logic. We 
shall turn to Kant’s characterization of general logic in § 4.3. 
 Besides the principle of contradiction, Kant sometimes gives the impression 
that analytic propositions can be proved also by means of a different principle: 
 
Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are […] those in which the 
connection of the predicate is thought through identity (A7/B10). 
 
In the same vein, Kant says in the Jäsche logic: 
 
Propositions whose certainty rests on identity of concepts (of the predicate 
with the notion of the subject) are called analytic propositions. Propositions 
whose truth is not grounded on identity of concepts must be called 
synthetic (Kant [93], p.606). 
 
The principle appealed to here is the principle of identity (cf. also Kant [92], 
p.67; Kant [91], pp.104-5).181 In case of an analytic proposition A is B (say), the 
predicate concept B is identical with some concept contained in A (cf. ibid.). Note 
that accordingly it seems more appropriate to speak of the principle of partial 
identity. The idea is to think of the subject concept A as a “package” or 
combination of other concepts, namely, the concepts contained in it. The analytic 
proposition A is B rests on thinking the identity of the predicate concept B with 
some concept contained in this package. We will return to the principle of 
identity in § 5.2. We now address the following question: what is the criterion for 
getting to know the truth of synthetic propositions, and the synthetic propositions 
a priori in mathematics in particular? 
 
The principle of synthetic propositions. Is it possible to come to know the truth 
of a synthetic proposition solely by means of the principle of contradiction (that 
is, solely by means of general logic)? Kant’s answer to this question is negative: 
                                                 
181
 In the pre-critical work “A new elucidation of the first principles of metaphysical cognition,” 
Kant calls this principle of identity the principle that “whatever is, is, and whatever is not, is not” 
(Kant [90], p.7). 
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[…] we must allow the principle of contradiction to count as the universal 
and completely sufficient principle of all analytic cognition; but its 
authority and usefulness does not extend beyond this, as a sufficient 
criterion for truth. For that no cognition can be opposed to it without 
annihilating itself certainly makes this principle into a conditio sine qua 
non, but not into a determining ground of the truth of our cognition. Since 
we now [i.e., in the Critique of pure reason] really have to do only with the 
synthetic part of our cognition, we will, to be sure, always be careful not to 
act contrary to this inviolable principle, but we cannot expect any advice 
from it in regard to the truth of this sort of cognition (A151-2/B191). 
 
In Kant’s view, no item of knowledge (cognition) may violate the principle of 
contradiction. Hence, no synthetic proposition may violate the principle of 
contradiction. However, Kant says that we can never expect to come to know the 
truth of a synthetic proposition by means of the principle of contradiction alone. 
The principle of synthetic propositions must lie somewhere else. Since for Kant 
the principle of contradiction is the highest principle of general logic, this seems 
to mean that the methodological basis for synthetic propositions must lie outside 
general logic. This is strongly confirmed by the following: 
 
The explanation of the possibility of synthetic judgments is a problem with 
which general logic has nothing to do, indeed whose name it need not even 
know (A154/B193). 182 
 
Turning to synthetic propositions, and synthetic propositions a priori in 
particular, Kant holds that the explanation of their possibility is one of the main 
tasks of transcendental logic: 
 
But in a transcendental logic it [i.e., the explanation of the possibility of 
synthetic propositions] is the most important business of all, and indeed the 
only business, if the issue is the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments 
[…] (A154/B193). 
 
For Kant, transcendental logic 
 
[…] has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason, but 
solely insofar as they are related to objects a priori […] (A57/B81-2). 
 
In this respect, transcendental logic differs from general logic, which relates to 
objects a priori as well as a posteriori (cf. ibid.). 
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 See also § 5.3. 
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 The principle for getting to know synthetic propositions lies entirely outside 
general logic. Kant compactly formulates the “supreme principle” of synthetic 
propositions as follows: 
 
Every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of 
the manifold of intuition in a possible experience (A158/B197). 
 
Kant relates the principle for synthetic propositions to intuition. We can now 
make a plausible guess as to what the principle for synthetic propositions a priori 
in mathematics will be: a proposition is synthetic a priori, iff its truth can be 
established by means of constructing concepts in intuition a priori. 
 Analytic and synthetic propositions differ in the way their constituting 
concepts are related (see above). However, this section has revealed yet another 
difference between analytic and synthetic propositions, which is far more 
important. This time, their difference concerns their principle. In Kant’s views, 
we can come to know the truth of analytic propositions by means of the principle 
of contradiction alone. In contrast, we can come to know the truth of 
mathematical theorems by constructing concepts in intuition. 
 
Concluding remarks. In this section, we have shown that Kant defines analytic 
propositions as those whose predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. 
A synthetic proposition in contrast, is one whose predicate concept lies entirely 
outside the subject. Nevertheless, in case of synthetic propositions a priori in 
mathematics (mathematical theorems) there is still a “contentual link” between 
the subject concept and the predicate concept. We have suggested that, in case of 
mathematics, such a contentual link is provided when a mathematician proves a 
proposition, which he does in concreto. 
 Kant also provides criteria for analytic and synthetic propositions 
respectively. One can come to know the truth of an analytic proposition solely by 
means of the principle of contradiction. Since the latter is the highest principle of 
general logic, the truth analytic propositions can be known by means of general 
logic alone. Synthetic propositions, in contrast, need an entirely different 
methodological basis, one that lies outside general logic. However, it should be 
added that, in Kant’s view, no item of knowledge—and hence no mathematical 
theorem—is allowed to violate the principle of contradiction. 
 In the case of mathematics, the truth of a proposition can be established on 
the basis of the possibility of constructing concepts in intuition a priori. The 
latter, Kant considers a principle of what he calls transcendental logic. 
Transcendental logic is a logic that refers only a priori to objects. In this respect, 
transcendental logic differs from general logic, which refers to objects a priori as 
well as a posteriori. 
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§ 5.2. How to prove analytic and synthetic  
  propositions: a comparison 
 
In § 4.2, we have seen how, in Kant’s view, a synthetic proposition (a theorem) is 
proved. The aim of this section is to make a comparison between the respective 
ways analytic propositions and synthetic propositions a priori in mathematics are 
proved. We begin by investigating Kant’s views on the methodology of proving 
analytic propositions. A comparison with the methodology of proving synthetic 
propositions follows subsequently. 
 
Proof in action: analytic propositions. We seek a reasonable informative 
answer to the following question: how, in Kant’s view, does one prove an 
analytic proposition? In order to answer this question, we begin by noting that 
Kant considers analytic propositions elucidatory (A7/B11). Thus, when he 
speaks of analytic theorems, Kant sometimes parenthetically adds that the 
predicate concept is “covertly” contained in the subject concept: 
 
One could call [analytic propositions] judgments of clarification […] since 
through the predicate [they] do not add anything to the concept of the 
subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component 
concepts, which where already been thought in it (though confusedly) 
(A7/B11). 
 
In the light of observations like these, de Jong has argued that, for Kant, analytic 
propositions mainly serve the purpose of conceptual clarification (de Jong [87], 
p.257). This seems to imply the following: proving an analytic proposition can be 
characterized as a procedure of conceptual clarification, or analysis. Let us 
explain. 
 Consider an analytic proposition A is B (say). The predicate concept B is 
contained in the subject concept A. To prove the proposition A is B means to 
“uncover” or to “analytically unpack” the predicate concept B from the subject 
concept A. Put differently, to prove A is B means to analyze the concept B from 
the concept A. Thus, it becomes understandable why Kant would call the analytic 
theorem A is B elucidatory: the analytic proposition A is B elucidates the subject 
concept A. 
 Observe that a process of conceptual clarification always starts with a given 
concept (cf. De Jong [87], p.247; cf. A730/B758). Starting from this given 
concept, another concept is uncovered from it (see below). We can now begin to 
understand why conceptual clarification can never properly extend our 
knowledge: in a sense, we only make explicit the knowledge we already have, 
though perhaps confusedly. Following this line of thought, it becomes tempting 
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to say that in order to expand our knowledge—to go beyond what one already 
knows—, a certain amount of genuine creativity must be operative. In the case of 
mathematics, of course, this creativity turns on the workings of the productive 
imagination (§ 3.4). The latter makes it possible to go beyond the knowledge one 
already has and thus to obtain new knowledge (see also below). One goes beyond 
a concept by constructing it, and to provide further constructions subsequently.183 
Let us look in some more detail how the clarification of a concept is generally 
carried out. 
 Consider our analytic proposition A is B. In order to prove this proposition, 
one begins with the concept A, which is considered given, though in a confused 
or not yet analyzed way. We may imagine that the proof of A is B proceeds as 
follows. One begins by analytically unpacking from A a concept C1 (say) that is 
contained in A. Analytically unpacking C1 from A can be understood as the 
execution of what we may refer to as an analytic procedure. Let us refer to this 
analytic procedure as 1. (A run of an analytic procedure may be called an 
analytic process.) We may say that, given A as input, a run of 1 delivers C1 as its 
product. We write this as A[1]C1. 
 Subsequently, one unpacks from C1 yet a further concept C2 that is contained 
in C1. Again, this can be understood as the execution of another analytic 
procedure, which we refer to as 2. Given C1 as input, a run of 2 delivers the 
concept C2 as its product. As above, we write this as C1[2]C2. In such a way, one 
proceeds until one arrives at a certain concept Cn. The latter is analytically 
unpacked from a concept Cn – 1 by running an analytic procedure we refer to as 
n. From Cn, finally, one unpacks the concept B, which is contained in Cn by 
running an analytic procedure we refer to as n + 1. We have: Cn[n + 1]B. 
 Collectively, the entire procedure of analytically unpacking B from A is 
formed by sequencing the procedures 1, 2,…, n + 1. This results in a composite 
analytic procedure that may be written as 1;2;…;n + 1 (the same notation for 
the sequencing of procedures was used in chapter 4). We have: 
 
A[1;2;…;n + 1]B, 
 
which we can alternatively depict: 
 
 
A  C1  C2   ……  Cn  B 
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 The latter belong to what Proclus calls the construction (§ 4.1). 
 1  2  n  n + 1 
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In the light of this, it becomes suggestive to call A the starting concept of the 
analytic procedure depicted above; B may be called the end concept. The 
concepts C1,…, Cn may be called the intermediate concepts of the analytic 
procedure. 
 It seems not easy to see how the principle of contradiction plays its role in 
the above process of conceptual analysis. In contrast, however, it seems 
considerable less hard to understand how the principle of (partial) identity plays 
its role in this procedure (see § 5.1). Thus, one executes 1 precisely because one 
thinks C1 to be identical with a certain concept C1 (say) contained in A. Similarly 
for all the other analytic procedures i (i  2). In the light of this, recall that Kant 
holds that the truth of an analytic proposition can be established by means of the 
principle of contradiction alone (§ 4.1). However, the impression arising is that in 
the process of proving an analytic the principle of (partial) identity plays a much 
more important part—indeed a main part. Perhaps we may say that the principle 
of contradiction justifies our knowledge of (the truth of) an analytic proposition. 
An analytic procedure of proving an analytic proposition proceeds in accordance 
with the principle of identity. As such, the principle of identity plays its role in 
the process of proving. 
 Let us note that in principle every concept can form the starting concept of 
an analytic procedure, no matter where this concept comes from. For example, 
Kant suggests that one can analyze the concept triangle. A process of 
analysis may then deliver, for example, the analytic proposition triangle is 
three_sided as its product (cf. A718-9/B746-7). Remarkable enough, 
however, Kant considers the proposition gold is yellow as an analytic 
proposition (cf. Kant [95], p.267).184 This clearly suggests the following. Given 
the concept gold as the starting point of a process of analysis, the proposition 
gold is yellow may be delivered as the product delivered by this process. 
 Both the propositions triangle is three_sided and gold is yellow 
are in Kant’s view analytic and hence a priori. Nevertheless, the concept triangle 
is a priori while the concept gold is empirical. More generally, then, suppose an 
item of knowledge C (a concept) is given, although perhaps confusedly. Then in 
Kant’s view, any proposition obtained by analyzing the starting concept C is an 
analytic proposition (and hence a priori), no matter whether C is a priori or 
empirical. This leads to a further point. 
 Let  be an analytic proposition. Let  be an analytic process delivering  
as its product. Furthermore, let C be the starting concept of the process . In 
Kant’s view, the analyticity of  is something independent of the question 
whether C is a priori or empirical. Though  is analytic (and hence a priori), C 
may be either a posteriori or a priori. A similar point obviously holds for any of 
the intermediate concepts figuring in . In other words, the analyticity of  does 
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 Kant’s example is “gold is a yellow metal.” 
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not turn on the respective sources of the items of knowledge figuring in . In 
contrast, the analyticity of  seems to turn primarily on the nature of the 
procedure by means of which the truth of  is established. Specifically, what is 
important is that this procedure is carried out exclusively in accordance with the 
principle of (partial) identity, and hence in accordance with general logic alone. 
An analytic procedure can be easily reconstructed as a series of syllogisms. 
 A run of the procedure 1 can be seen as a process of (immediately) getting 
to know the proposition that A is C1. Furthermore, a subsequent run of 2 can be 
seen as a process of (immediately) getting to know the proposition C1 is C2. A run 
of the composite procedure 1;2 can be seen as a process of (mediately185) 
getting to know the proposition A is C2. 
 We can reconstruct the result of executing the procedure 1;2 as a syllogism 
with middle “term” C2, as follows: 
 
A is C1 
C1 is C2 
A is C2. 
 
In the same vein, we can reconstruct the result of executing the composite 
procedure 1;2;…;n + 1 as a series of syllogisms. This reconstruction proceeds 
entirely analogous to the way a series of syllogisms was reconstructed from a 
Lockean proof in § 3.1. 
 Observe also that, analogous to the case of Lockean proofs, logical notions 
such as validity and soundness do not straightforwardly apply do an analytic 
procedure as depicted above. However, they do apply to a syllogistic 
reconstruction of this analytic procedure. Insofar as the notions of validity and 
soundness do apply to this procedure, they go firmly hand in hand (cf. § 3.1). 
 It does not seem that the proof of a synthetic proposition can be 
reconstructed as a series of syllogisms. We can now clearly see why this is the 
case. It is precisely because of the auxiliary constructive procedure carried out in 
Proclus’ construction that a mathematical proof does not admit of syllogistic 
reconstruction. These auxiliary constructions make it that a mathematician does 
not “unpack” knowledge from given knowledge. In contrast, in Kant’s view, a 
mathematician goes beyond what he knows (see below), and the auxiliary 
constructions play a pivotal role in this respect. 
 
Cognitive dimensions of analytic and synthetic. Recall that Kant considers 
analytic propositions of clarification (see above). In contrast with this, synthetic 
propositions amplify our knowledge (this was already suggested above): 
                                                 
185
 The “mediateness” consists precisely in the fact that one first needs to unpack C1 from A before 
C2 is unpacked from C1. 
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[synthetic propositions could be called] judgments of amplification, [since] 
they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in 
it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis 
(ibid.). 
 
This suggests that analytic and synthetic propositions differ in a cognitive sense. 
Earlier we saw that Kant defined analytic and synthetic propositions in two 
different ways. Furthermore, they also admitted of two entirely different criteria. 
However, Kant also holds that analytic and synthetic propositions serve two 
entirely different cognitive purposes. While the truth of an analytic proposition is 
established to the end of clarifying our knowledge, synthetic propositions 
(theorems) are proved to the end of amplifying our knowledge.  
 For Kant, we saw, the analytic nature of a proposition intimately relates to 
the nature of the procedure used in order to prove it. An analytic proposition is 
proved by way of an analytic procedure, one that takes place in accordance with 
the principle of contradiction. Accordingly, we may broadly typify the method of 
proving analytic propositions as the analytic method. Furthermore, as we saw in 
chapter 4 (and § 4.2 in particular), a synthetic theorem in mathematics is proved 
by way of construction. The method of proving mathematical theorems can be 
typified as constructive. It is the method of constructively developing (i.e., 
expanding) our mathematical knowledge by proving theorems. 
 Accordingly, a second difference between analytic and synthetic theorems is 
that their truth is established in two radically different ways. Kant’s point is that a 
mathematician, qua mathematician, does not analytically unpack concepts from 
given concepts. In Kant’ view, analysis only makes sense when concepts are 
given confusedly. In contrast, a mathematician essentially proceeds 
constructively. The Passage serves to highlight just this essential feature of the 
mathematical method of proof. 
 
Summary and conclusions. According to Kant, analytic and synthetic 
propositions differ in several respects. 
1. For Kant, all the propositions of mathematics are synthetic and a priori. This 
holds for the theorem of mathematics in particular. Kant defines analytic and 
synthetic propositions differently. On the one hand, and analytic proposition is 
one whose predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. A synthetic 
proposition, on the other hand, is one whose predicate concept lies entirely 
outside the subject concept. 
2. Kant also provides different criteria for analytic and synthetic propositions. 
Our knowledge of the truth of an analytic proposition is known in accordance 
with the principle of contradiction, which Kant considers the highest principle of 
general logic. However, when one actually proves an analytic proposition, 
another though related principle plays its part, namely, the principle of (partial) 
identity. Our knowledge of the truth of a synthetic proposition in mathematics is 
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based on the possibility of construction concepts in terms of intuitions a priori, 
which is a principle of transcendental logic. 
3. For Kant, analytic and synthetic propositions have a different cognitive 
purpose. On the one hand, analytic propositions serve to clarify the knowledge 
we already have, although confusedly. Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, 
serve to expand our knowledge. 
4. Finally, in Kant’s view, analytic and synthetic propositions are proved in two 
radically different ways. An analytic proposition is proved by way of the analytic 
method. A synthetic theorem in mathematics is proved by way of the 
constructive method. 
   
 
§ 5.3. Logic and the mathematical method of proof 
 
In the present section, we discuss Kant’s views on the relation between logic and 
the mathematical method of proof. The issue is important for it considerably 
improves our understanding as to why Kant claimed that the theorems of 
mathematics are synthetic, and why, in Kant’s view, a mathematical theorem 
cannot proved by means of general logic alone. 
 We begin by reviewing some relevant aspects of Kant’s reflections on the 
nature and status of logic. In this respect, we have a keen interest in Kant’s 
distinction between general logic and special logic (this will be explained below). 
Subsequently, we shall argue that Kant believed that there is what we may call a 
special logic of mathematics, covering at least a method of mathematical proof.  
We will make a plausible proposal as to what special logic of mathematical proof 
would look like. 
 
General logic and special logic. In the Critique of pure reason, Kant spends 
several pages on a critical discussion on the nature and status of logic.186 Kant 
notes that logic can be undertaken in two different ways. Thus, Kant 
distinguishes between (1) logic as logic of the general use of the understanding 
and (2) logic as logic of the special use of the understanding. Says Kant: 
 
Now logic in turn can be undertaken with two different aims, either as the 
logic of the general or of the particular use of the understanding. The 
former contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which 
no use of the understanding takes place, and it therefore concerns these 
rules without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be 
directed. The logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the 
rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of objects (A52/B76). 
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 What we have in mind are A50/B74-A64/B89, and especially A50/B74-A55/B79. 
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Instead of the logic of the understanding’s general use, Kant sometimes speaks in 
terms of general logic, or elementary logic (e.g., A52/B77; A55/B79).187 We 
prefer to speak in terms of general logic. In Kant’s view, general logic concerns 
the (absolutely necessary) rules of thinking “without regard to the difference of 
the objects to which it may be directed.” The logic of the understanding’s special 
use concerns the rules for thinking correctly about a certain kind of objects (or 
subject-matter). We shall refer to logic undertaken in this way as special logic. 
 Note that we have used the term general logic for several times before in this 
study (e.g., § 1.3 and § 1.4), putting it more or less on a par with systems of 
natural deduction. That this is to some extent justified is revealed by the 
following. One manifest difference between general logic and special logic is that 
the rules contained by the latter are local in nature while the rules contained by 
the former are not. In contrast, the rules contained by general logic are topic 
neutral. In this respect, then, Kant’s general logic shares an important 
characteristic with systems of natural deduction (cf. § 2.1). 
 Kant sometimes calls a special logic an organon (i.e., instrument) of this or 
that science (A52/B76). Very likely, this must be understood as an instrument to 
the end of obtaining scientific knowledge in particular. We may expect, then, that 
an organon for a particular science includes a method of proof (of theorems) for 
that science, and possibly some other things besides. For us, the following 
question is evidently important: did Kant acknowledge something we may call a 
special logic of mathematics? Such a special logic of mathematics would at least 
cover a method of proof for mathematics. What would such a method of proof 
look like? Before propose an answer to this question, let us first take a closer 
look at general logic. 
 Kant’s general logic is not a logical system as we nowadays think of it (§ 
2.1). Regarding Kant’s views, general logic is best seen as a kind of umbrella 
term covering such things as the theory of concepts, the theory of judgments, the 
theory of the syllogism, and the theory of definitions. However, the principle of 
contradiction and the principle of identity should certainly be mentioned too in 
this respect (see, e.g., Kant [93]). 
 As is well-known, Kant took general logic, and syllogistic logic in particular, 
more or less as he found it. In fact, Kant believed that general logic was already 
delivered in a more or less completed form by Aristotle (Bviii). Thus, Kant’s 
own contributions to logic merely turn on a few technical refinements of 
syllogistic logic (e.g., Kant [91]). However, the received opinion is that Kant did 
not advance the technical content of logic in a very substantial way. Parsons 
holds that this fact is “striking” and “damaging to his [i.e., Kant’s] standing as a 
philosopher” (Parsons [118], p.115). 
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 Parsons remark may suggest that Kant’s views on logic are simply 
uninteresting to consider. However, while it is indeed true that Kant did not 
contribute very significantly to the technical content of general logic,188 his 
philosophical understanding on this score are highly interesting and relevant. 
Considering the matter in some detail will reveal important aspects of Kant’s 
views on the relation between general logic and mathematical proof. 
 Kant argues that general logic must not be taken as an instrument (organon) 
to the end of expanding one’s knowledge. Kant’s words are telling in this respect: 
 
[…] the effrontery of using it [i.e., general logic] as a tool (organon) for an 
expansion and extension of its information, or at least the pretension of so 
doing, comes down to nothing but idle chatter, asserting or impeaching 
whatever one wants with some plausibility (A61-2/B86). 
 
General logic, Kant says, does not—indeed cannot—expand our knowledge. 
General logic used as an organon to the end of expanding our knowledge Kant 
calls dialectic, or a logic of illusion. Kant explains that for the ancients 
 
[dialectic] was the sophistical art for giving to its ignorance, indeed even to 
its intentional tricks, the air of truth, by imitating the method of 
thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for the 
embellishment of empty pretension. Now one can take it as a certain and 
useful warning that general logic, considered as an organon, is always a 
logic of illusion, i.e., is dialectical (A61/B86). 
 
For Kant it is wrong to think that by means of general logic alone one can expand 
one’s knowledge. Such is the nature of general logic: 
 
[…] with mere logic no one can venture to make judgments about objects 
and assert anything about them. Rather, we first must go outside [general] 
logic to obtain well-based information about objects (A60/B85; cf. also 
A59-60/B84-5). 
 
A mathematician, qua mathematician, typically goes outside general logic, 
namely, when he constructs his concepts in terms of intuitions a priori (the 
possibility of constructing concepts accordingly is a principle of transcendental 
logic). It now becomes very tempting to believe that we need a special logic for 
mathematics in order to expand mathematical knowledge. Such a special logic 
for mathematics would contain rules in order to think about a distinctly 
mathematical subject-matter. We will return to this point shortly. 
 Meanwhile, let us note that we think that an often-heard complaint against 
Kant’s views on proof only barely scratches the surface of a quite different issue 
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that may have been much more important for Kant. Thus, it has been frequently 
thought that Kant had to appeal to intuitions in his account of mathematical proof 
simply because Kant’s general logic was too weak in order to take satisfactory 
account of mathematical reasoning. Russell expresses the point as follows: 
 
[…] Aristotelian syllogistic theory […] [is] theoretically inadequate to 
mathematical reasoning, or at any rate required such artificial forms of 
statement that they could not be practically applied. In this fact lay the 
strength of the Kantian view, which asserted that mathematical reasoning 
[…] always uses intuitions […]. Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic 
[…] this part of the Kantian philosophy is now capable of a final and 
irrevocable refutation (Russell [137], p.4). 
 
In contrast with what Russell suggests, we think that Kant’s views on 
mathematical proof (according to which mathematical reasoning uses intuitions) 
did not arise because of the supposed inadequacy of syllogistic logic. For Kant, 
general logic “analyzes the whole formal business of understanding and reason 
into its elements” (A60/B84). Accordingly, general logic is formal. In Kant’s 
view, to analyze is precisely what we do when we prove analytic propositions. 
To this end, general logic, and the principle of contradiction in particular, 
suffices (§ 5.2). 
 General logic alone, does not yield us the type of knowledge we are typically 
after in mathematics. Mathematicians typically want to expand their knowledge, 
and in Kant’s view, one cannot do so by means of general logic alone. What can 
be achieved by means of general logic is the clarification of one’s knowledge, 
and hence to make explicit the knowledge we already have, though perhaps 
confusedly. In order to obtain the type of knowledge he is typically after, a 
mathematician must proceed constructively instead of analytically. Only then he 
can turn to a definite (i.e., mathematical) content. 
 As a result, Kant manifests a strong not to take the mathematical method of 
proof as being the business of general logic. This forms an important difference 
with a modern, logical conception of proof, which, on the contrary, has a strong 
tendency to associate logic with methodology (§ 2.4). Considering Kant’s views 
on mathematical proof, an important issue at stake turns on the question: “what is 
the nature of general logic and what type of knowledge does it yield?” Intimately 
related to this is the question: “what type of knowledge is mathematical 
knowledge and how can we get it?” 
 
A special logic for mathematics and Proclus’ framework. Our analysis of The 
Passage in the previous chapter gives us much reason to think that Kant believed 
that a mathematician proves his theorems in a distinctly mathematical way (cf.    
§ 3.3). This suggests that, in Kant’s view, a mathematical proof proceeds by way 
of a specific and distinct method, which we may refer to as a mathematical 
method of proof. Insights obtained in chapter 3 (and especially § 3.3), show that 
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construction (in the sense of Kant) plays an essential role in this method. In the 
previous section, we suggested that Kant would have acknowledged a special 
logic for mathematics. In the present section, we argue that this is indeed the 
case. 
 Let us make clear from the start that as far as we can see, we have found no 
explicit mention of a special logic of mathematics in Kant’s work. Therefore, our 
argument has to be based on other than pure textual considerations. Perhaps it is 
of some interest first to address the following question: can we mention an 
example of a special logic in Kant’s work? 
 Tonelli [159], p.81, convincingly argues that the answer to this question 
must be affirmative. The special logic Kant acknowledged is one that forms the 
main topic of the Critique of pure reason: the transcendental logic.189 As we have 
seen, transcendental logic deals with the laws of understanding and of reason, but 
only insofar as this logic refers a priori to objects. On this point, transcendental 
logic contrasts with general logic, which refers to objects a priori as well as a 
posteriori. (See § 5.1.) This makes it plausible that Kant considers transcendental 
logic as a special logic. 
 Let us try to provide some idea as to what a special logic for mathematics 
would look like. As said, a special logic for mathematics is most plausibly 
understood as an organon for thinking about a distinctly mathematical subject-
matter (see above). We may expect that such a logic would at least contain a 
method to the end of proving mathematical theorems. 
 We propose that Proclus’ methodological framework can be considered as in 
part constituting a special logic of mathematics. More precisely, Proclus 
methodological framework can be considered as a special logic of mathematical 
proofs. Proclus’ framework tells us that a proof of a mathematical theorem 
(ideally) consists of an enunciation, an exposition, a specification, a construction, 
an apodeixis, and a conclusion. When these items, and the exposition, the 
construction and the apodeixis in particular, are taken in a typically Kantian-
constructive sense, then what we get is an instrument to the end of proving 
theorems in a distinctly mathematical way. Understood in this way, the special 
logic of mathematics is operative in case of the proof described in The Passage. 
This much we have seen in § 4.2. 
 Perhaps the special logic of mathematics can be understood as being in some 
sense a “restricted” transcendental logic. We have seen that the principle of 
synthetic propositions a priori in mathematics turns on the possibility of 
constructing concepts in terms of an intuition a priori. This principle, we saw, is a 
principle of transcendental logic. However, we may expect that it is also a 
principle of the special logic of mathematics, and the special logic of 
mathematical proofs in particular. In other words, then, when we add Proclus’ 
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 Ignoring the preface and the introduction, the B edition of the Critique of pure reason counts 884 
pages. The Transcendental logic comprises B74-732. A rough estimate then yields that 
approximately seventy-five percent of the Critique of pure reason concerns transcendental logic. 
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framework to transcendental logic, we may arrive at a special logic for 
mathematical proofs. 
 
 
§ 5.4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have investigated Kant’s views on the synthetic a priori in 
mathematics as well as Kant’s views on the relation between logic and the 
mathematical method of proof. Analytic propositions differ from synthetic 
propositions in that in case of the former the predicate concept is contained in the 
subject concept. In the case of synthetic propositions, in contrast, the predicate 
concept lies outside the subject concept, though it still stands in some connection 
with the subject concept. Turning to analytic propositions and synthetic 
propositions in particular, there is a much more important difference, however. 
Analytic propositions on the one hand and synthetic propositions on the other 
differ in that they admit of two entirely different principles to the end of proving 
them. An analytic proposition can be proved solely by means of general logic, 
and the principle of contradiction in particular. A synthetic proposition, in 
contrast, requires a completely different methodological principle, namely, the 
possibility of the construction of concepts in intuition (which is a principle of 
transcendental logic). As a result, an important difference between analytic and 
synthetic propositions lies in their method of proof: in Kant’s view, analytic and 
synthetic theorems are proved in two radically different ways. Consequently, 
analyticity and syntheticity are in part methodological notions. However, analytic 
and synthetic propositions differ also in another and related way. Analytic 
propositions serve the cognitive end of clarifying our knowledge, while synthetic 
propositions serve the cognitive end of expanding it. This points at an important 
cognitive difference between analytic and synthetic propositions: they constitute 
different respective types of knowledge. The method of proof in mathematics is 
constituted by what according to Kant can be properly called a special logic of 
mathematics, or a special logic of mathematical proofs. Proclus’ methodological 
framework for proving theorems in mathematics can be naturally taken as 
constitutive for such a special logic. 
  
  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In the present study, we have considered Kant’s views regarding the procedure a 
mathematician carried out in order to prove a theorem. We have concentrated 
attention on a specific question: what type of item of knowledge does a 
mathematician employ when he proves a theorem? 
 Kant recognizes two prime types of item of knowledge: concepts and 
intuitions. It turns out that intuitions come in two different types: intuitions a 
posteriori and intuitions a priori. Given an intuition, Kant makes a distinction 
between form and content. The form of an intuition consists of a collection of 
relations in space and time. The relata among which these relations hold 
constitute the content of an intuition. In the present study, we have only 
considered intuitions insofar as their form consists of a collection of relations in 
space. (Time needs to be taken into account when one wants to consider, for 
example, Kant’s views on inferences involving continuity. Such is not done in 
the present work.) This suggests that an intuition is an item of knowledge of a 
quite specific format. We have proposed to construe an intuition as a 
diagrammatic item of knowledge. 
 Now, in Kant’s view, a mathematician essentially proves his theorems 
constructively. This means that a mathematician proves a theorem essentially by 
way of constructing concepts. To construct a concept (e.g., the concept of a 
triangle, or a line), in turn, means to exhibit that concept diagrammatically, in 
terms of an intuition a priori. The diagrammatic features of these intuitions a 
priori, furthermore, are really exploited in the course of a proof. Consequently, in 
Kant’s view, a mathematician employs intuitions a priori in the course of proving 
a theorem. This provides the answer to the question stated in the first paragraph 
above. 
 According to Kant, then, proving a mathematical theorem turns out to be a 
form of diagrammatic reasoning—indeed it is essentially so. Hence, Kant, does 
not accept a fundamental assumption underlying the logical conception of proof, 
namely that reasoning is fundamentally reasoning with propositions. As an 
interesting by-product of our approach, Kant’s notion of intuition also comes to 
stand in an interesting new light: an intuition constitutes a diagrammatic mode of 
cognitive organization. 
 On the one hand, for Kant, the form of an intuition (a posteriori or a priori) is 
given together with the knowing subject; its content, on the other hand, is 
obtained by exercising certain cognitive faculties or powers. If the content of an 
intuition is obtained from sense perception (which Kant considers a receptive 
power), then that intuition is an intuition a posteriori. The content of an intuition 
a priori in mathematics, in contrast, is obtained by exercising the productive 
imagination (which Kant considers a spontaneous power). The productive 
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imagination is a power of original exhibition, making it a properly creative 
power. As such, it differs from what Kant calls the reproductive imagination, 
which, as the term indicates, exhibits by merely reproducing certain elements. 
These considerations lead to a remarkable conclusion: in Kant’s view, the source 
of (pure) mathematical knowledge lies in the imagination, or, more precisely, the 
productive imagination. 
 Kant famously claimed that all the propositions of mathematics—and the 
theorems in particular—are synthetic and a priori. In Kant’s view, synthetic 
propositions generally (i.e., a priori or a posteriori) amplify our knowledge 
beyond the knowledge we already have. Analytic propositions, in contrast, 
merely clarify the knowledge we already have; they make explicit what we 
already know, though perhaps confusedly. In this respect, the difference between 
the analytic and the synthetic appears to be primarily a cognitive one: analytic 
and synthetic propositions constitute different types of (propositional) 
knowledge. 
 Kant holds that by means of general logic one is not able to advance 
knowledge beyond the knowledge we already have. Hence, a mathematician 
cannot prove theorems by means of general logic alone. General logic does 
suffice, however, to clarify our knowledge, and hence to get to know analytic 
propositions. General logic, for Kant, comprises syllogistic logic and the 
principle of  contradiction. 
 To get to know mathematical theorems is, in Kant’s view, accounted for by 
what we have called a special logic of mathematical proofs. This special logic of 
mathematical proofs can be understood as distinctly mathematical methodology 
of (mathematical) proofs, and accordingly concerns the procedure a 
mathematician carries out when he proves a theorem. What does this 
methodology look like? We have considered a methodological framework for 
proving theorems in mathematics due to the neo-platonic philosopher Proclus. 
We have argued that this framework can be plausibly taken as being to a 
considerable extent constitutive for Kant’s special logic of mathematical proofs.  
 According to Proclus, one ideally proves a theorem by proceeding through 
six stages: an enunciation, an exposition, a specification, a construction, an 
apodeixis, and a conclusion. In the enunciation, a theorem is considered. In the 
exposition, that what is given is taken apart and prepared for use in the rest of the 
proof. The specification sets forth the goal. This suggests that the enunciation 
states a certain problem or task. Next, certain auxiliary constructions are carried 
out in the “construction” and several inferences are made. These inferences 
concern the apodeixis. Finally, in the conclusion, everything is collected and it is 
confirmed that the theorem stated in the enunciation has been proved. 
 On the whole, Kant interprets this framework constructively. According to 
Kant a concept is constructed in the exposition. The product of this construction 
(an intuition a priori) is further developed by carrying out further constructions 
after the specification. It turns out that, in Kant’s view, the inferences that belong 
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to the apodeixis are intimately related to these constructions. So intimately, 
indeed, that we can consider a mathematical proof as consisting of several 
constructive-inferential procedures (as we have called them). 
 Closely related to this is that in Kant’s view, a mathematician, qua 
mathematician, proves his theorems in a distinctly mathematical way. For Kant, 
the mathematical way is not the way of general logic. In particular, one should 
not confuse general logic with mathematical methodology, and the methodology 
of mathematical proofs in particular. The mathematical way, we may say in a 
Kantian spirit, is the way of construction. Without construction, Kant holds, a 
mathematician cannot make single step, not a single inference, as a means to the 
end of mathematically establishing the truth of a theorem. 
 Several questions for future research are still open. Let us raise two points 
we think are especially interesting. 
 A first question turns on the functional role of intuitions in the course of a 
proof. For we have mainly argued that, in Kant’s view, a mathematician employs 
intuitions in the course of a proof. However, the question why—to what end—a 
mathematician, qua mathematician, would employ precisely this type of item of 
knowledge has remained largely unanswered. The issue can be developed in at 
least two directions. 
 First, some remarks of Kant suggest that he believes that intuitions have a 
certain heuristic function: they suggest what steps to take in the course of a proof. 
Related to this, they also prevent a mathematician from executing mistaken steps, 
by, as Kant says, putting each inference in front of our eyes, so to speak  (cf. 
A734/B762). It would be interesting to come to closer grips with this heuristic 
aspect of intuitions. Presumably, we will at least need to have a better account of 
the structural dimensions of intuitions, and of the way the structure of intuitions 
is employed in the course of a proof. 
 Second, and to some extent related to the previous point, those who have 
carried out a mathematical proof by themselves will be prepared to admit that at 
least some mathematical proofs in some sense make one “see” that a theorem is 
true, or that a mathematical proof “shows” that a theorem is true (cf. Hardy [63], 
p.18). In a way, a mathematical proof puts one in an immediate or almost 
immediate relation with the object of one’s knowledge. Something along these 
lines seems to be suggested by the traditional word demonstration—a  proof 
demonstrates a theorem. Kant sometimes appears to believe that this aspect of 
mathematical proofs is intimately linked to their intuitive character 
(A735/B763).190 This seems to be an important aspect of proof. Perhaps Kant’s 
notion of intuition may help one to understand this aspect of mathematical proof. 
 A second direction for future research lies in a systematic study of Kant’s 
views on proof in algebraically oriented parts of mathematics. Kant’s remarks on 
this point are notoriously brief (A717/B745, A734/B762). Especially Kant’s 
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notion of “symbolic construction” in algebra turns out to be hard to understand 
(see Shabel [143] for a historical study). Hintikka has suggested interpreting 
Kant’s notion of symbolic construction in terms of modern logic. However, as 
will perhaps be expected, we think that such a strategy is highly unsatisfactory. 
Presumably, Kant sees intuitions in algebra as taking the form of concrete 
algebraic notations, which are manipulated in accordance with certain rules (cf. 
A717/B745). This suggests that in Kant’s view, an item of knowledge can also be 
formatted as a notation, and not only as a diagram (as in geometry). 
Consequently, to explore Kant’s views on mathematical proof in algebra will 
require a study of the role of notations in mathematical proof. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Appendix: two proofs from topology 
  
In this study, we have mainly restricted ourselves to proofs from elementary 
geometry (§ 1.2). In this appendix, we present and briefly discuss two proofs 
from modern topology. We point out that these proofs can be naturally in terms 
of Proclus’ methodological framework,191 the respective items of which can be 
taken in Kantian constructive terms. We accordingly wish to indicate that Kant’s 
views on the mathematical method of proof where not necessarily restricted to 
the mathematics of his days. The proofs we present have a strong geometrical 
flavor. The reader is referred to Nelsen [114], [115] for a variety of other 
geometrical proofs. 
 
Topology. Topology is a branch of mathematics not known in Kant’s days. 
Topology is often roughly characterized as the study of properties of objects—
topological spaces—that remain invariant under continuous transformations. The 
general idea of topology can be understood without delving deep into the 
mathematics. For definitions and proofs, see Engelking [39]. 
 As an illustrative example, a “ball” can be continuously transformed into, 
say, a cube: think of the ball as made of rubber; it can be transformed into a cube 
by kneading and stretching it in appropriate ways.192 A property of the ball that 
remains invariant under such kneading and stretching is, for example, that it is 
made out of one piece (or, as a topologist would say, its “connectedness”): both a 
ball and a cube are made out of one piece. In a sense, a continuous 
transformation transfers this property from the ball to the cube. 
 A continuous transformation of one space to another is sometimes called a 
mapping (e.g., Lefschetz [101], p.33; see also below). 
 The kneading and stretching of a ball into a cube is invertible: a cube can be 
continuously transformed back into a ball again. Objects that can be continuously 
transformed from the one into the other and back again are said to be 
homeomorphic. The ball and the cube are homeomorphic. 
 An invertible continuous transformation whose corresponding inverse 
transformation is also continuous is called a homeomorphism, or a topological 
mapping. In a sense, a homeomorphism carries over every topological property 
from one space to another and vice versa. Thus, two homeomorphic topological 
spaces share all their topological properties, and are in that sense “topologically 
equivalent.” 
 Examples of two spaces that are not homeomorphic are a ball and a torus 
(i.e., a “donut”). In order to transform a ball into a torus one must “tear” a hole in 
it at some place. This, however, makes any transformation from a ball to a torus 
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 Thus indicating that even Proclus’ methodological framework need not have lost its 
systematic value. 
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 Hence, topology is sometimes called “rubber sheet geometry.” 
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discontinuous. A topological property of the ball that is not shared by the torus is 
that the former is simply connected while the latter is not. Roughly, a topological 
space is called simply connected if every closed curve can be shrunk to a point 
without breaking that curve open. 
 
The first proof. The first example proof we shall consider is from Solomon 
Lefschetz’ Introduction to topology [101]. This book was published 1949 and has 
been reprinted for several times afterwards. We shall not look at Lefschetz proof 
as a piece of text (broadly understood, so as to include diagrams) but as encoding 
a proof procedure. By way of preparation, let us present a few definitions and 
notations. 
 Where n  1, n denotes n-dimensional Euclidean space. A region in n is a 
subset of n. A region Ω in n is called bounded if the distance between every 
two elements of Ω remains below some fixed bound. Roughly, Ω is called closed 
if it contains all its boundary points.193 Ω is called convex roughly if for every x, 
y  Ω the line segment from x to y lies entirely within Ω. A closed n-cell is any 
subset of n homeomorphic to the n-dimensional “unit ball” Bn, that is, the set of 
all points in n whose distance to the origin does not exceed the unit length: 
 
Bn 
 {(x1,…, xn)  n : Σi xi2  1}. 
 
The theorem Lefschetz proves is: 194 
 
(10.2) A bounded closed convex region Ω of n is a closed n-cell (ibid., 
p.37). 
 
In other words, a bounded closed convex region Ω of n is homeomorphic to Bn. 
 Lefschetz presents the following proof:195  
 
Let B denote the boundary of Ω and let P be any interior point of Ω             
(P ∈ Ω – B) and S a sphere of center P. Denote by H the closed spherical 
region bounded by S. Any ray issued from P meets B in a single point Q 
and S in a single point R. Let t be the transformation Ω → H defined as 
follows. If M is any point of the segment PQ then 
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 Consider the set {x   : 0 < x < 1}. Since this set does not contain its boundary points (i.e., 0 
and 1), it is not closed (in ). The set {x   : 0  x  1}, in contrast, is closed (in ). 
194
 The number (10.2) is Lefschetz’ original numbering; we have added it only to make 
understandable Lefschetz’ cross reference to the formulation of the theorem at the end of his proof. 
195
 The text “Figure 13” underneath the diagram is simply taken over from the original text. 
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M = tM is that point of the segment PR which divides it in the same ratio 
as M divides PQ. It is easily seen that t is one-one and continuous. Hence 
since H is Hausdorff and Ω is compact, t is topological (8.4) and since H is 
a closed n-cell, this proves (10.2) (ibid.). 
 
Theorem (8.4) referred to in the final sentence is the following. Let X be a 
compact space and let Y be a Hausdorff space. If f : X → Y is a mapping, then 
f[X] is closed in Y (cf. ibid., p.35). 
 Note that Lefschetz does strictly speaking not prove that Ω is homeomorphic 
to Bn. In contrast, what he shows is that there is some closed spherical region H 
in n to which Ω is homeomorphic. It is geometrically obvious, however, that 
any such H is itself homeomorphic to Bn. In order to establish that H is 
homeomorphic to Ω, a transformation t is defined that “shrinks” Ω in a way such 
that the result coincides with H. What needs to be shown in order to complete the 
proof is that t is a homeomorphism (i.e., a topological mapping). To this end, one 
needs to prove (1) that t is continuous and (2) that t is 1-1 (i.e., invertible). By 
means of the theorem referred to (i.e., theorem (8.4)), the result follows. 
 Note that the proof Lefschetz has presented is not carried out in much detail. 
In particular, Lefschetz does not prove (1) and (2) above. Instead, he merely says 
that both (1) and (2) are “easily seen,” thus leaving the respective proofs to the 
reader. If only for the sake of argument, we may think of (1) and (2) as two 
lemmas appealed to in order to prove the theorem Lefschetz has numbered 
(10.2). However, the details of the respective proofs of (1) and (2) need not 
concern us here. 
 We can easily discern the respective items of Proclus’ framework in this 
proof. Thus, Lefschetz’ statement of the theorem can be naturally taken as 
corresponding to the enunciation. In Kantian terminology, the exposition 
Ω 
B 
S 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
H 
P 
M  
R 
M 
Q 
Figure 13 
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corresponds to the exhibition of a bounded closed convex region of n (which is 
called Ω). The product of this exhibitive procedure is displayed in the diagram 
form the quotation above. There appears to be no specification. However, would 
a specification be given, it would reasonably enough concern the proof of the 
existence of an homeomorphism Ω → Bn. The construction concerns the 
diagrammatic exhibition of: 
 
 1. the boundary B of Ω; 
 2. a point P in the interior of Ω; 
 3. a sphere S with center P; 
 4. a closed spherical region H bounded by S; 
 5. a ray issued from P meeting B in a single point Q and S in a single point 
R; 
 6. two points M and M such that MR : PM 
 MQ : PM. 
 
Again, the respective products of 1-6 are displayed in the diagram above. The 
apodeixis, when written out in full detail, would correspond to the proof that the 
transformation t defined by 6. is one-one and continuous, and that t is 
“topological” (i.e., a homeomorphism). The conclusion is given at the end where 
Lefschetz says “this proves (10.2).” 
 
The second proof. The example proof that we shall consider in the current 
section is taken from Kuratowski’s Introduction to set theory and topology [99] 
from 1961.196 
 The theorem that Kuratowski proves is well-known and is stated as follows: 
 
[…] a square together with its boundary is a continuous image of a 
segment […] (ibid. [99], p.222). 
 
Kuratowksi refers to this theorem as Peano’s theorem, named after Peano, who 
was the first to prove it. What Kuratowski proves is that there exists a 
(continuous) curve meeting every point of a square. A curve of this type is 
sometimes called a space-filling curve (or a Peano curve, named after Peano, 
who first proved their existence). What is interesting about the proof presented 
by Kuratowksi is its geometrical character.197 
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 The book was first published in Polish; an English translation appeared in the same year. 
197
 As said earlier, it was indeed Peano [120], who first proved the result stated by Kuratowksi in 
1890. A typical trait of Peano’s proof was that it proceeded entirely by arithmetic means. This was 
also observed by Hilbert [68], who in 1891 presented a different proof. Instead of arithmetic 
methods, Hilbert used “geometrical intuition” (ibid., p459). Moore [111] briefly discusses Peano’s 
1890 paper. Like Hilbert, Moore says that Peano showed that there is a space filling curve “by 
arithmetic process” (ibid., p. 73). Subsequently, Moore briefly discusses Hilbert’s geometrical 
proof. He says that Hilbert made a space-filling curve “luminous to the geometric imagination” 
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 It will turn out that Kuratowksi proves the above theorem for a specific case: 
the unit square is a continuous image of the unit interval.198 However, this easily 
generalizes to the general case. 
 As Kuratowski observes, the above theorem is an immediate consequence of 
a theorem he has proved one page earlier.199 However, he announces to give yet 
another proof: “[t]he following is a direct proof of the Peano theorem (given by 
Sierpiski).”200 
 Kuratowski sometimes writes the unit interval (or segment) [0, 1] as ℑ ; the 
unit square is written as 2ℑ . The numbering of the diagrams that occur in the 
proof is the same as in the original. The theorem (“Theorem 1”) referred to near 
the end of the quotation is the following: the limit of a uniformly convergent 
sequence of functions is a continuous function (Kuratowski [99], p.139). This is 
Kuratowksi’s proof:201 
 
We divide the square into 9 equal squares and draw in each of them the 
diagonal as shown in Fig. 11. We divide the segment [0, 1] into 9 equal 
segments and we transform (linearly) each of them into the corresponding 
diagonal in the order given in Fig. 11. We denote by f1 the function thus 
defined, mapping the segment [0, 1] continuously into the polygonal line 
consisting of 9 diagonals. We call the squares considered squares of the 
first approximation. 
 Next, we divide each of the 9 squares into 9 equal squares; they are the 
second approximation squares. We 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
(ibid.). In subsequent sections (§§ 7-11) of Moore’s paper, we find a “Geometric determination of 
Peano’s curve […].” In these sections, Moore presents detailed geometrical proofs of the existence 
of a Peano curve (among which is Hilbert’s and the one presented by Kuratowski). Note that, 
apparently, the authors mentioned assume a difference between arithmetic methods on the one hand 
and geometric methods of proof on the other. Furthering the paths taken by the mathematicians just 
mentioned, Sierpiksi began to study space-filling curves extensively from 1912 onwards. See 
Sierpiski [146], where among other things, both Peano’s and Hilbert’s proofs, are discussed. See 
also Sierpiski [147]. Nowadays, Sierpiski’s name is intimately connected with the study of space 
filling curves. For an elaborate treatment of space filling curves, see Sagan [139]. 
198
 The unit interval (denoted as [0, 1]) is the set is real numbers between 0 and 1, 0 and 1 included; 
the unit square is the set of pairs of real numbers (x, y) where both x and y range over the unit 
interval. 
199
 The theorem is this: every locally arcwise connected continuum (≠ ∅) is a continuous image of 
an interval (ibid., [99], 221, Theorem 3). The unit square is an example of a locally arcwise 
connected continuum. Hence, the Peano theorem follows as a special case. 
200
 Kuratowksi’s attribution of the proof to Sierpiski is incorrect. The proof given by Kuratowksi 
was already given by Moore [111]. See footnote 197. (Sierpiski himself clearly knew of Moore’s 
work; cf., e.g., Sierpiski [146], p.16.) 
201
 The expressions “Fig 11” and “Fig 12” are taken over from the original. 
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draw a diagonal D in each of them; here in second approximation squares 
lying on a diagonal of a first approximation square we draw the diagonal 
lying on the diagonal D. Thus, the first square of the first approximation 
appears as in Fig. 11 after the corresponding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reduction; the second square of the first approximation is given in Fig. 12. 
 We divide each of the intervals (n – 1)/9, n/9, where n = 1, 2, …, 9, onto 
9 equal parts and we map each of these parts onto the square of the second 
subdivision. This defines the function f2 which maps the interval [0, 1] 
continuously onto the polygonal arc made up of 92 intervals. 
 Continuing thus, we define an infinite sequence of continuous functions 
f1, f2,…, fn,… It is easy to prove that this sequence is uniformly convergent; 
and therefore its limit function f is continuous (see Chapter XII, § 4, 
Theorem 1). Furthermore, every point of the square is a value of the 
function f; in fact, in each square of the n-th approximation there are values 
of the function fn and consequently 
 
n fn() 
 2 whence f() 
  f(2). 
 
(ibid., [99], pp.222-4). 
FIG. 11 
FIG. 12 
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The strategy of the proof is to define a certain infinite sequence of continuous 
functions f1, f2,…, fn,… and to consider the limit function f of this sequence. 
 Each function fn in the sequence maps the unit interval to the unit square. 
From the fact that the aforementioned sequence of functions is uniformly 
convergent (as suggested earlier, this is something Kuratowksi does not show in 
any detail), it follows that f is a continuous function from the unit interval to the 
unit square. Finally, it is shown that f is surjective, i.e., is in fact a mapping onto 
the unit square. Thus, f is a space-filling curve as required. 
 Kuratowski does not present a full proof. In particular, the proof of uniform 
convergence is left out. The point is not very relevant for us, however. See, for 
example, Sierpiski [146] for details. 
 Again, we can easily discern the various items of Proclus’ framework. The 
enunciation corresponds to the theorem stated. When taken in Kantian terms, the 
exposition concerns the diagrammatic exhibition of the unit square. The product 
of this exhibitive procedure is displayed in the diagrams. As in the previous case, 
no specification is given. However, we can easily imagine that a specification, 
would it be given, concerns the existence of continuous surjection  → 2. The 
construction concerns the diagrammatic exhibition of a sequence of mappings f1, 
f2, f3,…. Note that the sequence ( fi )i  1 is produced iteratively. Note also that not 
all the terms of this sequence are explicitly exhibited in terms of the diagrams 
occurring in the proof. In fact, the product of exhibiting f1 is displayed in the first 
diagram (“fig. 11”). The product of constructing f2 is only partially in the second 
diagram (in “fig. 12”). Perhaps the proof turns on the possibility of constructing 
the remaining terms in the sequence in terms of a certain iterative rule. 
Subsequently, f is defined as the limit of the sequence. The apodeixis concerns 
the proof that the series ( fi )i  1 is uniformly convergent. Hence, f is continuous. 
Furthermore, it needs to be shown that f is surjective. The conclusion, finally, is 
not explicitly stated. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Hoe bewijs je een wiskundig theorema? In dit proefschrift richten we ons op een 
aspect van Kants opvattingen omtrent de wiskundige bewijsmethode. We 
beperken ons hierbij tot Kants opvattingen aangaande bewijzen in de elementaire 
geometrie. We presenteren twee geometrische bewijzen uit de moderne topologie 
in een appendix (deze bewijzen hebben een sterk geometrisch karakter). Aldus 
willen we suggereren dat Kants ideeën ook goed toepasbaar zouden kunnen zijn 
op de wiskunde van na zijn tijd. 
 Het aspect van Kants bewijsopvatting waarin we geïnteresseerd zijn kan aan 
de orde gebracht worden door het stellen van een specifieke vraag. 
 Wanneer iemand redeneert (zoals bijvoorbeeld een wiskundige die een 
theorema bewijst), dan kunnen we een onderscheid maken tussen datgene 
waarmee deze persoon redeneert en datgene waarover deze persoon redeneert. 
Datgene waarmee geredeneerd wordt kunnen we kennis noemen (breed opgevat). 
Het is deze kennis waar we ons op zullen concentreren. 
 Nader beschouwd kan de kennis waarmee iemand redeneert opgedeeld 
worden in verschillende “kennisquanta” of, zoals wij ze noemen, kennisitems. 
Een natuurlijke vraag die nu gesteld kan worden is: wat voor type kennisitems 
gebruikt een wiskundige wanneer hij een theorema bewijst? We benaderen Kants 
visie op de methodologie van wiskundig bewijzen in de hoofdzaak met deze 
vraag in ons achterhoofd. Een groot deel van dit proefschrift (in het bijzonder de 
hoofdstukken 2-5) kan gezien worden als Kants uitgebreide antwoord op deze 
vraag. De volgende beknopte  argumentatie leidt tot Kants antwoord. 
 Een wiskundige, qua wiskundige, redeneert volgens Kant essentieel op 
constructieve wijze. Dit betekent dat een wiskundige zijn theorema’s bewijst 
door middel van het construeren van begrippen (bijvoorbeeld: het begrip van een 
driehoek, of van een lijn). Een begrip construeren betekent: een met dat begrip 
corresponderende intuïtie (of Anschauung, zoals Kant zelf zou zeggen) 
verbeelden. In Kants visie is een intuïtie ruwweg een kennisitem bestaande uit 
relaties in ruimte en tijd. Met andere woorden: een intuïtie is volgens Kant kennis 
georganiseerd in ruimte en tijd. Dit suggereert dat een intuïtie een kennisitem is 
van een heel specifiek formaat. We concentreren ons op intuïties voor zover zij 
uit ruimtelijke relaties bestaan (temporele relaties spelen een rol in onder andere 
continuïteitsinferenties; we laten deze buiten beschouwing). In het licht hiervan 
stellen we voor dat een intuïtie een diagrammatisch kennisitem is. Volgens Kant 
betekent “het begrip van een driehoek construeren” aldus: het op 
diagrammatische wijze verbeelden van het begrip van een driehoek. 
 We beargumenteren dat volgens Kant een wiskundige (sommige van) de 
ruimtelijke relaties waaruit een intuïtie bestaat ook daadwerkelijk gebruikt tijdens 
een bewijsvoering. Aldus gebruikt, volgens Kant, de wiskundige intuïties 
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wanneer hij een theorema’s bewijst. Dit levert een antwoord op de hierboven 
gestelde vraag. 
 Een nevenresultaat van onze specifieke vraagstelling is dat Kants 
intuïtiebegrip in een interessant nieuw licht komt te staan. Onze benadering 
suggereert dat deze notie ongeveer als volgt getypeerd kan worden: een intuïtie 
constitueert een specifieke, dat wil zeggen diagrammatische, wijze van 
cognitieve organisatie. Bovendien blijkt volgens onze benaderingswijze 
wiskundig redeneren in Kants visie een vorm van diagrammatisch redeneren te 
zijn—inderdaad, het is zelfs noodzakelijk een vorm van diagrammatisch 
redeneren. 
 Waarom is het interessant om Kant de bovenstaande vraag voor te leggen? 
 Ten eerste zijn er historische redenen. Volgens Hintikka (in navolging van 
Beth) bestaat er geen diepe tegenstrijdigheid tussen Kants bewijsconceptie 
enerzijds en een op de moderne logica georiënteerde bewijsconceptie anderzijds. 
Sterker nog: Hintikka beweert dat Kants bewijsopvatting goed gereconstrueerd 
kan worden in termen van moderne logische systemen. In het licht hiervan biedt 
Hintikka ruimte voor een herwaardering van Kants ideeën. 
 Echter, volgens de moderne logica bewijst een wiskundige zijn theorema’s 
door te redeneren middels het gebruik van proposities. Een dergelijke vorm van 
redeneren noemen we propositioneel redeneren. Propositioneel redeneren is sterk 
gerelateerd aan taal: een propositie kan uitgedrukt worden middels een beweerzin 
in een bepaalde taal. Een gevolg hiervan is dat volgens een op de logica 
georiënteerde bewijsopvatting een wiskundig bewijs volledig uitdrukbaar is in 
termen van beweerzinnen in een taal. Kortom, Hintikka’s interpretatie van Kant 
doet geen goed recht aan Kants specifieke opvattingen omtrent de specifieke 
kennisitems waarmee een wiskundige redeneert. 
 Ten tweede zijn er ook systematische redenen die het zinnig maken Kants 
opvattingen nader te beschouwen. Zo geeft Friedman op basis van de moderne 
logica een radicaal tegenovergestelde waardering van Kant. In tegenstelling tot 
wat Hintikka denkt, zijn volgens Friedman Kants opvattingen omtrent 
wiskundige bewijsvoering min of meer obsoleet gemaakt door ontwikkelingen in 
de moderne logica. Wij denken dat Friedmans negatieve waardering van Kant 
enigszins overdreven is. In het bijzonder bestaat er vandaag de dag een groeiende 
belangstelling voor diagrammatische vormen van redeneren, onder andere binnen 
de cognitieve psychologie en de kunstmatige intelligentie (AI). Kants visie 
omtrent wiskundige bewijsvoering kan van dienst zijn teneinde de meer 
filosofische achtergronden van deze discussie in kaart te brengen. 
 Wij hebben de sterke neiging Kant te zien als iemand die diepe en 
buitengewoon waardevolle inzichten heeft in de meer cognitieve en 
methodologische aspecten van wiskundige bewijsvoering. Kants punt dat een 
wiskundige essentieel met intuïties redeneert, staat niet los hiervan. In het licht 
hiervan is het onterecht Kants visie te verwerpen omdat ze niet in 
overeenstemming zou zijn met hedendaagse op de logica georiënteerde 
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bewijsconcepties (zoals bijvoorbeeld Friedman doet). Integendeel, Kants 
opvattingen omtrent wiskundige bewijzen dienen vanuit een breder perspectief 
beschouwd te worden. Voor Kant is wiskundig bewijzen niet een kwestie van 
logica alleen; een studie van wiskundige bewijzen dient zeker ook zaken van 
cognitieve en specifiek wiskundig-methodologische aard in zich op te nemen. 
Vanuit een modern gezichtspunt kan gezegd worden dat voor Kant logica, 
psychologie en wetenschapsfilosofie nauw op elkaar betrokken zijn. Veel nauwer 
dan vandaag de dag vaak het geval is. 
 Naast het inleidende hoofdstuk 1 is dit proefschrift voor de rest als volgt 
opgebouwd. 
 In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt een op de (moderne) logica georiënteerde 
bewijsconceptie aan een nader onderzoek onderworpen. De reden hierachter is 
dat een dergelijke bewijsconceptie wijdverbreid is in filosofische kringen en 
bovendien een belangrijke maatstaf vormt om Kants bewijsopvatting te 
interpreteren en te evalueren. Onze interesse gaat uit naar logica zoals opgevat in 
de traditie van Frege en het latere logisch empirisme. Binnen deze traditie wordt 
logica sterk gerelateerd aan wetenschappelijke methodologie. Voor wat betreft de 
logica, richten we ons op systemen van natuurlijke deductie. De reden is dat 
dergelijke systemen geacht worden de wiskundige redeneerwijze vrij adequaat te 
weerspiegelen. We beargumenteren dat de idee van redeneren als propositioneel 
redeneren nauw samenhangt met de aard van een van de specifieke instrumenten 
die door logici gebruikt wordt teneinde redeneringen te bestuderen. De 
instrumenten die we op het oog hebben zijn talen (logici gebruiken vooral 
artificiële talen). 
 We wijden in hoofdstuk 2 ook een kritische beschouwing aan een 
wetenschapsfilosofisch onderscheid dat voor een belangrijk deel de op logica 
georiënteerde bewijsconceptie lijkt te motiveren: het onderscheid tussen 
respectievelijk context of discovery en context of justification. We 
beargumenteren dat het onderscheid tussen deze twee contexten minder scherp is 
dan vaak wordt gedacht. Bovendien lijkt ook Kant van mening te zijn dat 
elementen betreffende de ontdekking van kennis en elementen betreffende de 
rechtvaardiging ervan soms nauw aan elkaar verweven te zijn. 
 In het derde hoofdstuk bespreken we de twee belangrijkste elementen van 
Kants filosofie van de wiskunde: respectievelijk zijn intuïtie- en 
constructiebegrip. Volgens Kant is een intuïtie een kennisitem dat individueel en 
onmiddellijk is. Kant onderscheidt verschillende soorten van intuïties. Het 
onderscheid tussen empirische intuïties en intuïties a priori is het meest 
belangrijk. Het zijn intuïties a priori die een rol spelen de (zuivere) wiskunde. 
 Kant maakt een onderscheid tussen de vorm en de inhoud van een intuïtie. 
De vorm van een intuïtie bestaat uit een aantal ruimtelijke (en temporele) relaties. 
De inhoud van een intuïtie kan gezien worden als de collectie van 
ongestructureerde relata (of verschijningen, zoals Kant zou zeggen) van deze 
relaties. De vraag of een intuïtie empirisch of a priori is komt volgens Kant neer 
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op de vraag: wat is de bron van de inhoud van een intuïtie? Wanneer de inhoud 
van een intuïtie uit de zintuiglijke ervaring komt, dan hebben we te maken met 
een intuïtie a posteriori. Opmerkelijk genoeg komt volgens Kant de inhoud van 
een intuïtie a priori in de wiskunde voort uit de productieve verbeelding. Vele 
Kant commentatoren hebben het belang van de verbeelding voor Kants filosofie 
van de wiskunde over het hoofd gezien. Hierdoor heeft bijvoorbeeld Charles 
Parsons de sterke neiging Kants intuïtiebegrip, voor zoverre dat functioneert 
binnen diens filosofie van de wiskunde, vooral op te vatten in termen van 
empirische intuïties. We betogen tenslotte dat volgens Kant een intuïtie een 
diagrammatisch kennisitem is. 
 In het vierde hoofdstuk geven we een diepgravende analyse van een passage 
uit Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In deze passage beschrijft Kant vrij 
nauwgezet hoe hij denkt dat een wiskundige een theorema uit de elementaire 
geometrie bewijst. Kant geeft ons de indruk dat in zijn opvatting een wiskundig 
bewijs getypeerd kan worden als een soort mentale animatie: een diagrammatisch 
kennisitem word geconstrueerd (bijvoorbeeld een driehoek). Vervolgens wordt 
dit kennisitem een aantal malen gemodificeerd (bijvoorbeeld door het toevoegen 
van hulplijnen). De creatie en modificatie van het diagrammatische kennisitem 
vormt bovendien het middel om de verschillende inferenties uit te voeren. 
 Een methodologisch raamwerk voor bewijzen in de wiskunde dat reeds door 
de neoplatoonse filosoof Proclus is besproken, dient als kader voor onze analyse. 
We betogen vervolgens in het bijzonder dat de inferenties die volgens Kant door 
een wiskundige uitgevoerd worden het beste als constructief-inferentiële 
procedures gekenmerkt kunnen worden. Volgens Kant is het een essentieel 
onderdeel van een inferentiële procedure dat er eerst een constructieve procedure 
(in de zin van Kant) uitgevoerd wordt. 
 In het vijfde hoofdstuk plaatsen we onze bevindingen in een wat breder 
kader. In het bijzonder willen we hier Kants these dat alle proposities van de 
wiskunde synthetisch a priori zijn vanuit ons cognitieve gezichtspunt opnieuw 
belichten. We bespreken ook Kants visie op de relatie tussen de wiskundige 
bewijsmethode en de (algemene) logica. 
 Volgens Kant bestaat er een belangrijk cognitief verschil tussen analytische 
en synthetische proposities. Analytische proposities zijn louter het product van 
een proces van conceptuele verheldering. In contrast daarmee vormen 
synthetische propostities het product van een proces tot uitbreiding van 
wetenschappelijke kennis. Nauw gerelateerd hieraan ligt de methodologische 
basis van analytische proposities in de (algemene) logica, en het principium non 
contradictionis in het bijzonder. De methodologische basis van synthetische 
proposities a priori ligt volgens Kant in de zogenaamde transcendentale logica. 
Voor wat betreft synthetische proposities a priori in de wiskunde in het bijzonder 
ligt de methodologische basis in de mogelijkheid van constructie van begrippen 
in termen van intuïties. 
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 De syntheticiteit van een wiskundig theorema kan volgens Kant niet los 
gezien worden van de specifiek wiskundige methode die gebruikt wordt teneinde 
dit theorema te bewijzen. Deze methode zou volgens Kant een speciale logica 
van de wiskunde genoemd kunnen worden. De speciale logica van de wiskunde 
omvat de regels teneinde te denken over een specifiek wiskundig onderwerp. 
Deze speciale logica dient volgens Kant onderscheiden te worden van de 
algemene logica, welke volgens hem niet kan volstaan om op wiskundige wijze 
wiskundige theorema’s te bewijzen. We betogen dat de speciale logica Proclus’ 
methodologische raamwerk voor bewijzen in de wiskunde omvat. 
